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ABSTRACT  
This dissertation consists of four essays examining a range of topics in empirical 
corporate finance and financial market. The first essay tests the impact of CEO social 
capital on corporate risk-taking. Using a large panel of companies from 41 countries, the 
paper documents a significant positive relationship between CEO social capital and 
corporate risk-taking. More importantly findings show that this increase in risk-taking 
caused by social capital is value-enhancing.  
The second essay examines the effects of managerial social capital on the firm’s 
implied cost of equity capital and demand for liquidity. The paper finds that social capital 
reduces the implied cost of capital as well as the marginal propensity to save cash. The 
association between social capital and the cost of equity is stronger in underdeveloped 
financial markets. In addition, marginal effect of social capital in reducing the cost of 
equity is stronger for constrained firms with good investment opportunities.  
The third essay examines the impact of managerial social capital on investment 
and external finance sensitivities to cash flow and Q. The paper documents that social 
capital reduces a firm’s dependence on internally generated cash. Social capital positively 
affects external finance-Q and negatively – external finance-cash flow sensitivities. These 
effects of social capital are stronger in markets characterized by weak legal protection of 
investors. Social capital also has important implications for firm performance.  
Finally, the fourth essay tests the relation between social capital and financial 
development. The study provides evidence that social capital positively affects financial 
development. The results also suggest that casual, non-professional ties are the most 
efficient forms of social capital with the strongest implications for financial markets.
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Chapter I: INTRODUCTION 
Social capital has been discussed broadly in various social disciplines such as 
economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology (e.g., Dasgupta 2005; 
Fafchamps 2002; Knack and Keefer 1995; Portes 1998; Putnam 1993; Schneider 2006), 
yet it has received only limited attention in academic finance. The current interest of the 
finance scholarship in the concept of social capital stems from the limitations of an 
exclusively economic approach toward the solution of the fundamental developmental 
and organizational problems - sustained growth and agency conflict. In this sense, I argue 
that the implications of social capital for financial markets  and corporate finance is both 
direct and meaningful: Social capital harnesses the participation of financiers otherwise 
unavailable for development purposes, makes investment strategies work efficiently, and 
affects corporate risk-taking and the cost of external financing by altering agency 
relationships.    
The concept of social capital has a powerful and intuitive appeal. Social capital 
can be understood as the value of social obligations or informal contacts formed through 
social networks. More formally, social capital can be defined as the information, trust, 
and norms of reciprocity inherent in a social network (Woolcock, 1998), where a social 
network is simply the aggregation of personal relationships an individual possesses. A 
social network constitutes social capital to the extent that certain configurations of 
relationships confer significant information and control benefits. The information 
dimension of social capital concept implies that social capital can be understood as the 
economically meaningful shared information that resides in a social network. Another 
aspect of social capital is trust, which is conceptualized as reliability in transactions. The 
 2 
 
social norm of reciprocity is reflected in the ethic of a quid pro quo relationship. From 
this perspective, social capital is a set of effective norms of reciprocity imposed upon 
social network. Understanding social capital as trust, information and norms of 
reciprocity provides a coherent framework for incorporating social capital concept into 
academic finance research. 
These dimensions of social capital definition are accentuated by a variety of 
theoretical constructs. I aggregate these theories into two broad groups: cognitive and 
structural. Cognitive theories put forward by the rational-choice theory of Coleman 
(1988) and the collective asset view of Putnam (1993), derive from mental processes and 
resulting ideas, reinforced by norms, values attitudes and beliefs. Structural theories 
developed by Lin (1999; 2001) are based on the Bourdieu’s (1984; 1986; 1989) 
theoretical framework and focus on connections and participation in various networks.     
From these theories of social capital, four distinct theoretical mechanisms emerge 
through which social capital exerts an influence on financial market development and the 
practice of corporate finance.   These mechanisms are trust, the flow of information, the 
ability to punish and reward, and the ability to alter preferences. Each of these 
mechanisms offers different implications for corporate finance and financial 
development. 
The fundamental problem facing market participants willing to engage in 
economic transaction concerns trust. As is argued by Arrow (1972) virtually every 
commercial transaction encompasses an element of trust. The existence of trust allows 
agents to operate even in the markets contaminated by the “lemons” problem. In 
developing the economics of social capital, some researchers focus exclusively on trust 
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(Dasgupta, 1988). Economic agents in high-trust societies need to divert fewer resources 
to protect themselves from unlawful violations of their property rights. Consequently, 
more resources can be re-deployed for investment and production. Trust explains the 
depth of country’s capital market (Guiso et al, 2008). In addition, the level of inter-
organization trust affects the cost of borrowing and corporate risk-taking because trust 
reduces costly monitoring and information asymmetry. From the perspective of 
incomplete contract theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986), trust minimizes the negative 
consequences of incomplete contracts. Social capital induces cooperative and efficient 
behavior within the social structure through trust.  
Social capital can also improve economic efficiency and enhance coordination 
through the information channel. A major impediment to financial market development 
and efficiency is that economic agents bear high information search and transaction costs. 
Social capital eases potential inefficiencies in the financial markets caused by imperfect 
information and reduces search costs.  From this perspective, researchers such as Cohen 
et al, (2008), Hochberg et al, (2007), Rauch and Casella, (2001), Fafchamps and Minten, 
(1999), Granovetter (1975; 1995), and Montgomery, (1991) provide consistent evidence 
that social capital through social networks opens new channels for the circulation of 
information, expands stock market participation and plays an important role for portfolio 
choice decisions, while simultaneously influencing asset prices.  
Ensuring that high quality information is transferred through a social network 
requires a punishment mechanism for breach. Social capital offers several disciplinary 
instruments for violating norms and contracts within the social structure. These 
mechanisms include loss of reputation, extra-legal relationship, and guilt (Fafchamps, 
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1996;  Platteau, 1994a). Social capital channels information about breach and facilitates 
exclusion of cheaters through reputation loss (McMillan and Woodruff, 2000).  The 
extralegal relationships grounded in social capital, can be viewed as a mutual 
enforcement mechanism of contracts that reduces contracting and monitoring costs. 
Research in psychology (Platteau, 1994a; 1994b) shows that individuals feel guilty for 
failing to respect business promises. The disposition to honor a contract often would be 
toward members of some particular group. Therefore making a promise in the context of 
a social network is a commitment and can act as the contract enforcement instrument of 
social capital.  
Social capital can also alter preferences within social network by favoring 
altruism and mimicry. Economic experiments demonstrate that agents induced to identify 
with a group exhibit more altruism and play more cooperatively (Fershtman and Gneezy, 
2001). Mimicry is a role model effect that fosters herding behavior.  Certain individuals 
by visibly and credibly demonstrating their attitude may induce change in behavior of 
others within a social group. Further, social capital provides informal insurance within a 
social network and by pooling individual risks may stimulate riskier preferences. These 
phenomena have implications for financial markets and corporate finance. 
Based on this multi-dimensional and inter-disciplinary theoretical framework, I 
employ the idea of social capital to address a set of research questions in my essays. I 
develop testable hypotheses regarding the causal role social capital plays in managerial 
risk-taking, external financing, real investments, and financial market development, 
through the trust, information, contract enforcement, and preference modification 
channels.      
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In my first essay I examine how social capital affects corporate risk-taking and 
valuation. Managerial risk-taking has important implications for the economic growth 
(John et al, 2008).Also, corporate risk-taking is fundamental to firm performance and 
survival. Prior research (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) shows that managers 
prefer “quite life” and tend to be more risk-averse than shareholders would like them to 
be (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theories highlight the importance of mechanisms that 
promote managerial risk-taking (e.g, Coles et al, 2006; Low, 2009) to better align 
managers’ interest with that of shareholders’. The role of social capital in corporate risk-
taking, however, remains unexplored. The contribution of this essay is to establish 
specific economic and psychological channels through which social capital influences 
corporate risk-taking. 
I postulate that social capital resident in managerial social networks influences 
corporate risk-taking directly through its effect on managerial risk preferences and 
perception of power, and indirectly through increasing employment opportunities for 
executives. Several studies show that social networks are a mechanism for risk-sharing 
(e.g., Ambrus et al, 2010). Allen and Gale (1997) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) 
argue that better risk-sharing tends to promote more risk-taking. In addition, social capital 
provides informal insurance within a social network (Genicot and Ray, 2008; Bloch et al, 
2005) and as demonstrated by Miller and Paulson (2007), risk-tolerance increases with 
the quality of informal insurance. 
Prior research (e.g., Rowley, 1997) in social networks and management document 
that the more ties and access the individual has with others in the social network, the 
greater is that individual’s power. I apply the approach-inhibition theory of power 
 6 
 
(Keltner et al, 2003) and argue that the experience of power drives managers to take more 
risk. Also, a number of studies (e.g., Schneider, 2006; Zhou, 1992; Granovetter, 1973) 
show that social capital in social networks is instrumental for access to jobs and is related 
to more successful employment outcomes. Consistent with this reasoning, I posit that 
managerial social capital positively affect corporate risk-taking.  
Research in social psychology shows that a team consisting of individuals with 
diverse psychological attributes and personal characteristics should achieve greater 
creativity and innovations. Since innovations are directly connected with risk-taking, I 
expect that social capital resident in the heterogeneity of social connection to promote 
corporate risk-taking. If social capital induces managers to take more risk which is 
optimal for shareholders, we should observe a positive relation between the risk-taking 
and firm performance. In addition, because prior research (e.g., Bertrand, 2011) 
documents gender related differences in risk-taking, I argue that the association between 
social capital and corporate risk-taking should be weaker for female-tied networks. 
I empirically examines these predictions using a large panel of international 
companies and find supportive evince of the main conjectures. To preview main results, 
the study documents significant positive relationship between CEO social capital and 
corporate risk-taking.  This positive causal association between CEO social capital and 
risk-taking is robust to the use of four alternative proxies of risk-taking, cross-sectional 
model specification and variety of endogeneity tests. More importantly results show that 
this increase in risk-taking caused by social capital is value-enhancing.  
In my second essay I analyze the importance of social capital for the cost of 
equity financing. Financial market frictions, such as asymmetric information and agency 
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problems, limit firms’ reliance on external finance (Stein, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 
1998; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The mechanisms that mitigate these forces are critical 
for reducing a firm’s cost of equity capital. Social capital in managerial social networks 
with financiers is one such mechanism. This essay provides an innovative analysis of a 
previously unexamined factor that can directly affect the cost of obtaining equity 
financing. 
I argue that social capital in managerial social networks with financiers can reduce a 
firm’s cost of equity capital by lowering information asymmetry between the firm and its 
investors, by reducing the costs but enhancing the quality of external monitoring, and by 
diminishing managerial incentives to expropriate. Prior evidence suggests that firms 
which reduce information asymmetry through disclosure have a lower cost of capital 
(e.g., Francis et al, 2004; Hail, 2002; Verrecchia, 2001; Botosan, 1997). In addition, 
investors demand lower compensation for holding securities that require less out-of-
pocket monitoring costs (Lombardo and Pagano, 2002a). Social capital facilitates the 
sharing of information and reduces information asymmetry within a network (e.g., Cohen 
et al. 2008; 2010; Kuhen, 2009; Hong et al, 2004, 2005). In addition, social capital 
reduces the cost and quality of external monitoring to ensure contract enforcement 
(Fafchamps, 1996; Platteau, 1994). Through mechanism of reputation loss (Kandori, 
1992; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000) social capital provides punitive mechanisms for 
expropriation, thereby reducing contracting costs and the price financiers demand for 
their capital. Consequently, I theorize that the social capital in managerial social networks 
with financiers is negatively associated with the cost of equity capital.  
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From the hypothesized association between social capital and the cost of equity 
finance, I derive four additional implications. First, social capital should be more 
valuable in countries with weak legal protection of shareholders and underdeveloped 
financial markets because investors in these countries cannot rely on legal systems and 
market mechanisms alone to prevent expropriation and enforce contracts. Second, social 
capital should have stronger implications for the cost of equity financing for small, 
young, and financially constrained firms since these firms have greater need to reduce 
information asymmetry. Third, gender-related differences in risk-aversion could cause 
differential effects of social capital on cost of equity financing.  
In the presence of costly external financing, a firm’s investment will be 
constrained to its internal cash flows. Because social capital eases firms’ access to lower 
cost external financing, these firms do not need to hold large cash reserves to respond 
unexpected profitable investment opportunities. Therefore, as my fourth implication, I 
argue that the social capital in managerial social networks with financiers is negatively 
associated with the need for internal financing or marginal propensity to save cash from 
current cash flows. 
Empirical examination of these hypotheses shows that social capital is negatively 
related to the implied cost of equity after controlling for risk factors, governance, 
analysts’ forecast biases, and other firm and country-level effects. In addition, marginal 
effect of social capital in reducing the cost of equity is stronger for firms in 
underdeveloped financial markets and in markets characterized by weak legal protection 
of investors. I also show that firms with greater social capital are more likely to decrease 
their cash holdings in response to an increase in cash flows.  
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The third essay examines the effects of managerial social capital on investment 
and external finance sensitivities to cash flow and Q. Social capital, through information 
sharing, trust, and enforcement channels reduces negative consequence of financial 
market frictions, such as information asymmetry and agency problem, and eases a firm’s 
access to external financing to fund growth options. Consequently I argue that investment 
will be less dependent on internally generated cash for socially well-connected firms. 
Based on Tobin’s (1969) investment-Q sensitivity framework, I theorize that marginal Q 
should predict real investments better for firms with greater social capital. As an 
additional corollary, I posit that if social capital reduces costs and improves availability 
of external finance, then firms with low cash-flows but high social capital should be able 
to issue more shares or more debt if needed. The effects of social capital on these 
sensitivities should be stronger when distortionary forces of frictionless capital market 
are aggravated, that is, in countries with weak investor protection standards. In addition, 
if social capital mitigates agency problems and forces managers to make more efficient 
investment decisions, it should have implications for firm performance. 
Empirical tests of these propositions document that social capital is positively 
associated with investment sensitivity to Q. In addition, social capital reduces a firm’s 
dependence on internally generated cash.  It also positively affects external finance-Q and 
negatively – external finance-cash flow sensitivities. Results are consistent with the 
prediction that social capital has positive implications for firm performance. 
 In my fourth essay I investigate how social capital in managerial social networks 
with financiers affects financial market development. A number of influential studies 
show that financial markets greatly facilitate economic development by attracting foreign 
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investment, boosting domestic saving, and improving the pricing and availability of 
capital (e.g, Levin and Zervis, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998). Understating the factors that account for financial market 
development is an increasingly important research topic. Although studies suggest 
several explanatory factors, the role of social capital is overlooked. My fourth essay 
addresses this omission in the literature by examining the importance of social capital for 
financial development. 
Trust, transparency and contract enforcement have emerged in recent literature as 
influential determinants of financial development
1
. Because social capital stimulates trust 
(e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Dasgupta , 1988; Bowles and Gintis, 2002), reduces information 
asymmetry (e.g., Barr, 2000; Rauch and Casella, 2001; Granovetter, 1975,1995; 
Montgomery , 1991), and encourages contract enforcement (Fafchamps, 1996;  Platteau, 
1994), it should positively affect national financial development. Empirical results 
provide robust evidence that social capital resident in managerial social networks 
encourages financial development. In addition, casual, non-professional ties are the most 
efficient form of social capital that have the strongest implications for financial markets.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 See among others, La Porta et al (1997a), Guiso et al (2008) for the positive role of trust in capital market 
development, La Porta et al (2006), Pagano (1993) Mayer and Sussman (2001) how reduction information 
asymmetry encourages financial market development and La Porta et al (1998), Pistor et al (2000), 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Coffee (2008), Roe and Siegel (2008), how contract enforcement promotes 
stock market development. 
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Chapter II: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1. The Concept of Social Capital 
The concept of social capital has been used to describe a number of phenomena 
pertaining to social-economic relations at the individual/organizational and societal 
levels. Social capital broadly can be defined as the information, trust, and norms of 
reciprocity inherent in social networks
2
. This definition of social capital provides a 
consistent framework for incorporating social capital concept into finance and 
economics. Social capital resides in relationships (connections), not in individuals, and 
therefore shares roots with many aspects of the social network theory. A social networks 
itself is a structure of relationships linking social-economic actors (Marsden, 2000) or the 
set of actors and the ties that exists among them (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The 
concept of social capital is distinct from, but convergent with the idea of social network 
since social networks are the media through which social capital is created, maintained 
and used. Social capital is about the value of social networks. Social network constitutes 
social capital to the extent that certain configurations of relationships confer significant 
information and control benefits. Economic agent’s position in a social network is a 
determinant of its opportunities and constraints (Wellman, 1988).  
The information aspect of the social capital definition implies that social capital 
can be understood as the economically meaningful information that resides in a social 
network. Social networking facilitates the willingness and cooperation to share 
information, thereby revealing the tacit information that would be difficult to exchange 
                                                          
2
 Although this definition exhibits some broad consistencies, there are differences in the way social capital 
is conceptualized. The differences in the definitions and treatments partly reflect the different theoretical 
traditions from which the concept has emerged. See Appendix A for the most common alternative 
definitions of social capital.   
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otherwise. Information is likely to be given a higher value and uncertainty about 
information reliability is low if it comes from social acquaintances. In addition, the cost 
of information acquisition within a social network is low since it can be acquired 
passively during social interactions. The extent to which an individual acquires valuable 
information from a social network depends on the existence of information in the 
network, the intensity of social interactions, and the willingness to share information. The 
search for information is preceded by problem awareness and this awareness can be 
created by social interactions (Rogers, 1983). By encouraging awareness of the problem, 
social network contributes to information exchange by stimulating the process of 
information search. 
The literature on social capital employment in finance and economics contains 
many applications of this information-based idea of social capital, though researchers are 
reluctant to use the term social capital due to its imprecise meaning. Fafchamps and 
Minten (1999), Granovetter (1975, 1995), Montgomery (1991), Rauch and Casella (2001) 
emphasize the role of business networks in conveying information. Hong et al (2004, 
2005) study the influence of social ties on portfolio choices and stock market 
participation. Evidence shows support of epidemic model in which investors spread 
information about stocks to one another by social interactions. Hochberg et al (2007) 
investigate venture capital networks and argue that some venture capitalists have better-
quality relationships and hence enjoy more influential social network positions than 
others, implying differences in accessing the information. Kuhnen (2009) shows 
supportive evidence of social ties as a means for efficient information exchange. Cohen et 
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al (2008) documents that social networks are an important mechanism for information 
flows that shape asset prices in the mutual fund industry.    
A number of researchers focus on the trust dimension of social capital (Dasgupta, 
1988; Fukuyama, 1995). Trust refers to the level of confidence that people have that 
others will act as they say or are expected to act, or that what they say is reliable. Baier 
(1986) defines trust “as the trustor's expectation of being the recipient of the trusted 
party's good will”. Fukuyama (1995) terms trust “as the expectation that arises within a 
community of regular, honest and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared 
norms, on the part of other members of the community”. Trust arises from repeated 
interpersonal interaction within a social structure. It can also arise from general 
knowledge about the population of agents, the incentives they face, and the upbringing 
they have received (Platteau, 1994a, b). Trusting others enables economic agents to 
operate more efficiently since they can economize on transaction costs. In addition, trust 
makes it easier for agents to renegotiate their contractual obligations when problem arise, 
thereby providing flexibility for dealing with external shocks (Bigsten et al, 2000). 
Understanding social capital as trust has important implications for finance and 
economics.  
Social capital definition also encompasses the norms of reciprocity within a social 
structure. Social norms are shared understandings, informal rules, and conventions that 
prescribe, prohibit or modify certain behaviors in various circumstances. Shared social 
norms are forms of social capital. These norms facilitate more predictable and beneficial 
behavior patterns from individuals in society. Without norms it is hard to imagine how 
interaction and exchange between strangers could take place (Hechter and Opp, 2001)). 
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Underpinning many social norms is the concept of reciprocity, which is strongly reflected 
in the ethic of quid pro quo relationships. The norm of reciprocity implies some level of 
symmetry among those who engage in long-term relationships. Oakerson (1993) argues 
that in a reciprocal relationship, each individual contributes to the welfare of others with 
an expectation that others will do likewise.  
 These three dimensions of social capital concept discussed above are 
interconnected. Social norms underlying the social networks enhance the trust and 
cooperation of network members, which in turn influence the information exchanged 
within a network. Increased trust and cooperation reduce the uncertainty about other 
people’s willingness to reciprocate and hence enables individuals with valuable 
information to share it with others. 
2. Theories of Social Capital 
There are two broad classifications of social capital theories as it applies to 
financial markets and corporate finance: cognitive and structural. Cognitive social capital 
theories are built upon intangible factors such as perception of trust, solidarity and 
reciprocity. These theories derive from mental processes and resulting ideas (reinforced 
by culture and ideology), specifically norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs that contribute 
to cooperative behavior. Structural social capital theories concern connections and 
participation in various networks. They are associated with various forms of social 
organization, particularly roles, rules, precedents and procedures as well as a wide variety 
of networks that encourage cooperation. Structural social capital assets are extrinsic and 
observable, while cognitive social capital assets are not. The social structural and 
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cognitive realms are linked in practice. Networks are held together by mutual 
expectations of benefit, that is, by the cognitive forces of reciprocity and trust.  
2.1. Cognitive Theories of Social Capital  
Cognitive theories of social capital consider social capital as a cognitive resource 
- trust and emotional attachment to a group or society at large that facilitates the 
provision of public goods. Cognitive elements of social capital include norms, values, 
attitudes and beliefs. Social capital is considered as the norms and mutual trust of “civil 
society” that facilitate cooperative action among citizens and institutions. This view is 
developed by the rational choice theory of Coleman (1988) and the collective asset 
perspective of Putnam (1993).  
2.1.1. Rational-choice Theory of Social Capital  
Coleman’s (1988, 1990) rational choice theory explains why people develop 
networks that seem not to maximize individual self-interest. He identifies several forms 
of functional, but intangible entities within a social network (such as mutual expectations 
and obligations) that depend on trustworthiness of the social environment, information-
flow capability of the social structure, and norms accompanied by sanctions. Social 
capital is defined by its function. He shows that social capital is very useful to draw 
resources within a collectivity and bring positive consequences to individual rational 
pursuits. As an example, Coleman (1988) demonstrates that family expectations and 
information channels in private religious schools produce norms and obligations that 
reduce the risk of educational failure or dropout. He further argues that social capital 
reflects a set of effective norms imposed upon its members, specifically norms of trust 
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and reputation. When social networks lack such norms, social exchanges tend to be 
inefficient and fail to generate benefits from reciprocal expectations.  
Coleman (1990) stresses the positive effect exerted by the cohesive structure of 
networks on the production of social norms and sanctions that facilitate trust and 
cooperative exchanges. Coleman’s descriptions are generally of social capital via strong 
ties. The strength of a tie is determined by the amount of time, the emotional intensity, 
the intimacy (mutual confiding), as well as the reciprocity involved in social connection. 
Strong ties provide organizations with two primary advantages: (1) exchanges of high-
quality information and tacit knowledge, and (2) it serves as a mechanism of social 
control that governs the interdependencies in partnerships. Coleman’s rational choice 
perspective of social capital stresses the importance of trust, information, and norms but 
has obscured what constitute the actual sources of relational advantage. 
2.1.2. Collective Asset Theory of Social Capital   
The view of social capital from a collective asset theory perspective considers 
social capital as a public good—the amount of participatory potential, civic orientation, 
and trust in others available to cities, states, or nations (Putnam, 1993). Social capital is 
equated to the level of civicness in communities. Putnam and his followers are oriented to 
the collective perspective that focuses on civic associations and effective norms in a 
community (e.g., Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2002; Narayan, 2002; The World Bank, 1999). 
Social capital refers to features of social life, networks, norms, and trust that enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared interests (Putnam, 1995). 
Working together is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social 
capital. Social capital improves the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
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actions. Drawing on his broader evaluation of institutional performance across Italy’s 
regions, Putnam (1995) demonstrates that the effectiveness of regional governments 
depends on social capital. Putnam’s version of social capital represents a major collective 
resource causing a wide variety of positive outcomes. In addition, communitarianism and 
interpersonal trust represent the best ways of producing social cohesion in modern 
societies. Putnam (2006, 2007) proposes hunkering down hypothesis - showing that 
people living in diverse communities are more likely to experience isolation and declines 
in social capital and hence in societal cohesion.  
Several other researchers develop models of social capital that are comparable to 
Putnam’s views. Fukuyama (1995) introduces a parallel argument to Putnam and 
describes social capital as a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society 
or certain parts of it. It can be embodied in the smallest and most basic social group, the 
family, as well as the largest of all groups, the nation, and in all the other groups in 
between. Technology, markets, and human capital contribute to economic growth, but the 
key ingredient in generating growth is social capital in the form of a supporting culture of 
trust.  
Inglehart (1997) invokes Putnam (1995) to interpret social capital as a culture of 
trust and tolerance, in which extensive networks of voluntary associations emerge. Trust 
and membership in voluntary associations are strongly linked with a stable democracy 
and shift to a more participatory government.  Harrison (1985, 1992, 1997) argues that 
political and economic development depend on values involving trust, ethical codes, and 
orientations to work and risk-taking. 
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Putnam’s (1993,1995) theory has attracted significant attention from community 
development scholars and practitioners. Social capital helps people resolve collective 
problems more easily, facilitates development, heightens awareness of global 
connectedness, fosters the flow of useful information and helps people cope with trauma 
and improve their health, find jobs and maintain businesses. Powerful agents such as the 
World Bank and national governments embraced social capital as a way in which market 
failures can be addressed without returning to a reliance on costly state interventions to 
promote development.  
2.2. Structural Theories of Social Capital 
Structural theories consider social capital as a structure, an asset embedded in a 
network. This meaning is sometimes referred as social network capital to emphasize that 
agents derive benefits from knowing others with whom they form networks. Structural 
elements of social capital include networks, roles, rules and precedents. Bourdieu’s 
(1984, 1986, 1989) theoretical framework is considered to be the basis of structural 
theories of social capital.   
Bourdieu (1984, 1986) separates social capital from its functions. Social capital is 
“the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition”. Bourdieu focuses on the benefits accruing to individuals by virtue of 
participation in social networks, that are not a natural given but must be constructed 
through investment strategies oriented to the institutionalization of group relations. 
Bourdieu’s definition makes clear that social capital is decomposable into two elements: 
(1) the social relationship itself (social network) that allows individuals to claim access to 
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resources possessed by their associates and (2) the amount and quality of those resources 
(sociability). Thus, it is important to distinguish the resources themselves from the ability 
to obtain them by virtue of membership in different social networks. Although the size of 
the network and the volume of the resources in the network are very clear dimensions of 
social capital, Bourdieu places more emphasis on relationships because usable resources 
do not exist naturally but are realized by specific social locations in the network. Social 
groups use social capital to solidify their class positions through facilitating or controlling 
resources. Therefore, social capital represents group interests rather than shared trust or 
reciprocity. In some cases, social capital generates social cohesion, but in other cases it 
may be linked to social conflict.  
Network theories, as a special case of structural theories, build on Bourdieu’s 
insight and define social capital as resources embedded in a social network that are 
accessed and/or mobilized for purposive actions.  Lin (1999) reviews the social capital 
literature and proposes a social capital theory based on the idea that social capital is 
captured from embedded resources in social networks. He considers social capital as an 
asset resident in a network and argues that deviations from this perspective in 
conceptualization and measurement lead to confusion and flawed analysis. This view of 
social capital makes it measureable and explicitly based on social network theory.  
Resources embedded in social networks can be mobilized when an actor wishes to 
increase the likelihood of success in a purposive action. Lin offers three explanations why 
embedded resources in social networks will enhance the outcomes of actions: (1) it 
facilitates the flow of information. (2) Social connections may exert influence on the 
agents who play a critical role in decisions involving the actor. (3) Individual social 
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connections can be viewed as certifications of the individual's social credentials and 
reflect the individual's accessibility to resources through social networks.  
Understanding social capital as a source of network-mediated benefits stresses the 
importance of bridges in facilitating information and influence flows. Bridges can be 
thought of as elements of a network that connect or hold together the sub-networks of the 
larger network. Putnam (2000) defines bridging social capital as bonds of connectedness 
that are formed across diverse social groups (cross-cutting ties). Whereas bonding social 
capital cements only homogenous groups. A number of researchers focus on the locations 
of individuals in a network as the key to social capital. Burt's and Granovetter’s work 
typifies this approach. By identifying the locations of individual nodes, it is possible to 
assess how close or how far the node is from a strategic location, such as a bridge. This 
can affect the extent to which the occupant has a competitive advantage in possible 
access to more, diverse, and valued information. Granovetter (1973, 1975) is the first 
who recognizes the strength of the weak ties, defined as the power of indirect influences 
outside the immediate circle of close acquaintances, and provides conceptual and 
empirical arguments for bridge usefulness.  Bridges, as usually reflected in weaker ties, 
provide better access to information. Granovetter (1983) criticizes the prior belief that 
strong ties between people result in local cohesion, and weak ties - in alienation. He 
theorizes that strong ties by themselves generate fragmentation, as subgroups in a 
community become isolated from each other, and weak ties allow for community 
integration, connecting these subgroups.  
Burt (1992) expands upon Granovetter’s (1983) insight and develops the theory of 
structural holes.  This theory not only analyzes the tight connections in a social network, 
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but also the “structural holes” where connections have failed to form. More formally, 
structural holes are locations within a network where there is a sparsity or a lack of links. 
Individuals or organizations who bridge structural holes in networks gain significant 
advantages. Through such intermediation, they potentially can broker the flow of 
information and synthesize ideas arising in different parts of the network. While Coleman 
(1988, 1990) emphasizes dense networks as a necessary condition for the emergence of 
social capital, Burt highlights the opposite situation. In his view, it is the relative absence 
of ties that provides opportunities to enhance both the control benefits and the 
information benefits of networks. This is so because dense networks tend to convey 
homogeneous information, while weaker ties can be sources of new knowledge and 
resources. 
3. Social Capital, Financial Markets and Corporate Finance 
From these theories of social capital, four distinct theoretical mechanisms emerge 
by which social capital plays an important causal role in financial market development 
and in the practice of corporate finance. These four channels are trust, flow of 
information, ability to punish and reward, and the ability to alter preferences. First, social 
capital affects trust which is a key ingredient in any financial transactions. Second, social 
capital shapes the flow and quality of information. Much information in financial markets 
is subtle, nuanced and difficult to verify.  Third, social capital is an important source of 
reward and punishment through the mechanism of “enforceable trust”. Fourth, social 
capital modifies preferences in the group by favoring altruism and raising concern for the 
common good. Though these channels are distinct, they are also interconnected. For 
example, trust is maintained by the threat of punishment for anyone who breaks a 
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contract. Also, trust facilitates the collection and dissemination of information. In 
addition, trust and trustworthiness may be the result of altruistic preferences. 
3.1. Social capital and trust  
Trust is an optimistic expectation or belief regarding other agents' behavior 
(Fafchamps, 2004). Mutual trust is the key to cooperation. Social capital is a means for 
creating trust. In developing the economics of social capital, some researchers focus 
exclusively on trust (Dasgupta, 1988). A number of authors subsequently argue that 
social capital generally refers to trust, concern for one’s associates, a willingness to live 
by the norms of one’s community (Bowles and Gintis, 2002). Trust is important because 
economic activities that require agents to rely on the future actions of others are 
accomplished at a lower cost in a high-trust environment.  As Arrow (1972) argues, 
virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust. Trusted 
agents may be able to operate in markets that are otherwise devastated by the lemons 
problem (Akerlof, 1970).  
Economic agents in high-trust societies divert few resources to protect themselves 
from unlawful violations of their property rights. In addition, written contracts are less 
likely be needed. Trust also promotes innovations since entrepreneurs need to devote less 
time to monitor possible malfeasance by suppliers and other contractors. High trust can 
facilitate investment where there is no well-developed formal system of contract 
enforcement. Government officials in these societies are also perceived as more credible. 
As a consequence, economic agents adopt more appropriate investment horizon in 
making project decisions and choose production technologies that are optimal over the 
long rather than the short run. Trust can also explain differences in stock market 
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participation across individuals and countries (Guiso et al, 2008). In addition, the level of 
inter-organizational trust affects the cost of borrowing and corporate risk because trust 
reduces costly monitoring and information asymmetry. Since financial contracts are trust-
intensive, social capital should have major effects on the development of financial 
markets. Financing means exchanging money today for a promise of return in the future. 
Whether such an exchange can take place depends not only on the legal enforceability of 
contracts, but also on the extent to which the financier trusts the borrower.  
There are two theoretical frameworks regarding how social capital and trust 
influence financial markets. First, social capital is modeled in the context of the notions 
of trust and trustworthiness.  Zak and Knack (2001) develop a general equilibrium growth 
model in which agents facing moral hazard problems decide how much to invest in 
monitoring. The authors show that cheating is more likely (and trust is therefore lower) 
when the social distance between agents is larger, formal institutions are weaker, social 
sanctions against cheating are ineffective, the amount invested is higher, and the 
investors' wages are lower. The presence and strength of formal and informal sanctions 
for dishonesty have powerful implications for growth because of their role in reducing 
the need to invest in monitoring.  
Somanathan and Rubin (2004) use a different approach to theoretically model 
trust. They study the evolutionary stability of honest types in a population and investigate 
why human beings have evolved the capacity for moral behavior. The authors show that 
exogenous decreases in incentives to be honest, such as a weaker and more corruptible 
government, can lead to a fall in honesty for each level of the capital stock. This can lead 
to the appearance or disappearance of multiple equilibria in output and honesty. 
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Countries with weak and corruptible governments could show negative growth rates 
caused by declining levels of honesty as they converge to a low steady state. The 
inefficiency and corruptibility of a government can adversely influence the accumulation 
of honesty in civil society. So, honesty is a form of social capital that can be 
accumulated. Since honesty affects output and physical capital accumulation, it has 
implications for financial markets.  
The second formal theoretical approach to incorporate trust as a tool of social 
capital is in the context of prisoner’s dilemma games. The sustainability of a cooperative 
equilibrium depends on either the likelihood with which a match today will be repeated in 
the future and/or the ability of an agent to access information about the past behavior of a 
new partner. Using this approach, Routledge and Von Amsberg (2003) focus on social 
capital as influencing cooperative behavior. The necessity of cooperation stems from the 
expense or difficulty in writing complete and enforceable contracts. In these situations, 
trust reduces contracting costs and has multiple implications for corporate finance.  
3.1.1. Incomplete Contract theory, Good-faith Articles and Trust 
Social capital minimizes the negative consequences of incomplete contracts 
through the trust channel and by this link affects financial market development, capital 
budgeting and firm-level risk. Incomplete contract theory has been a central building 
block for models in finance and economics, starting with Grossman and Hart (1986) and 
Hart and Moore (1990). These theories build on the idea that when state contingencies 
cannot be perfectly observed, contracted upon or enforced, contracting parties are often 
left to settle contractual issues via ex post renegotiation which can lead to holdup of the 
party that has made more relationship specific investments.  
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Contracts as a legal document are inherently imperfect instruments for governing 
the relationship between economic agents. Imperfect information and uncertainty about 
the future means that all contracts are incomplete to some degree (Hart and Moore, 1999; 
Artz and Brush, 2000). A growing empirical literature tests the role of reputation and 
trust in correcting the incompleteness of contracts
3
. Trust interacts with the degree of 
contract completeness to influence contract effectiveness across different circumstances. 
Firms often adapt to contract completeness in response to changes in the level of trust. 
Contracts become less complete as trust evolves between parties, and less complete 
contracts become more complete when trust deteriorates between parties.  
Alternatively, good-faith is the way a growing number of legal systems presume 
to facilitate the creation of trust and reduce the negative effects of incomplete contracts. 
The ordinary meaning of good-faith is “honesty of purpose or sincerity of declaration” or 
the “expectation of such qualities in others” (Delbridge et al, 1991). Uniform Commercial 
Code defines good-faith as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the trade” (§ 2-103).  In this context, social capital and good-
faith articles
4
 are substitutes. Good-faith articles are legislation requiring contracts to be 
formed and performed in good faith. The philosophical basis for the good-faith doctrine 
                                                          
3
 Crocker and Reynolds (1993) investigate the procurement contracts used by the U.S military and find that 
higher reputation and complexity lead to drafting a more incomplete contract. Banerjee and Duflo (2000) 
show that contracts written between firms are associated with reputation level of the firms. McMillan and 
Woodruff (1999) 
find that inter-firm trade credit is more likely when the delivering firm trusts the client. Kaplan and 
Stromberg (2002) find that a central feature of venture capital contracts is the allocation of control rights 
between venture capitalist and entrepreneur suggesting that contracts are inherently incomplete. 
4
 Civil law regimes tend to require that contracts be formed and performed in good faith (e.g., Article 1366 
Italian Civil-Code states that the contract shall be interpreted according to good-faith; Article 157 German 
BGB says that contracts shall be interpreted according to the requirements of good-faith, giving 
consideration to common-usage). The principle of good faith is less established and less uniform in 
common law systems. (e.g., UCC §1-203 states that every contract or duty imposes an obligation of good-
faith in its performance or enforcement. At one extreme is the United Kingdom, which has no general 
doctrine of good faith). 
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is that a party has to compensate its counterpart for damages caused by culpable 
behavior. Good-faith articles can also be an essential building block of national social 
capital. Alternatively, good-faith articles, can damage group-level social capital and trust 
within the country. The U.S. evidence suggests that good faith efforts to make laws more 
attentive to social capital and norms of trusts can, paradoxically, weaken the very norms 
at stake (Pildes, 1996). 
3.1.2. Bounded Rationality, Cognitive, and Psychobiological Approach to Trust 
The positive effect of social capital on financial markets is consistent with 
bounded rationality. Social capital can produce a heuristic of trust through social 
networks and by this channel impact financial markets and corporate finance. The theory 
of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) reflects the limited cognitive ability of humans to 
optimize their decisions, such as suggested by the mathematical and economic models of 
rational choice theorists. The extreme notion of calculative rational actions, in which 
individuals engage in a precise self-interested cost-benefit analysis of the consequences 
of trusting, has little or no association with real world behavior. Instead, people’s 
information and processing ability is limited and often reliant on cues or heuristics
5
. 
Thus, individuals act as intuitive scientists to draw reasonable inferences about others 
from very limited information and resources. Trust originated from social structure could 
be one of such heuristics. 
Psychobiological research explains trust as evolutionary phenomenon
6
. The 
argument is that evolution promotes trust because it is efficient for the organism to be 
cooperative and trustworthy within social group (network). Because of selection 
                                                          
5
 Tversky and Kahneman (1974)   
6
 Axelrod (1984,1986, 1997) 
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pressures we are adapted to have a general disposition to reciprocate and make 
trustworthy promises. Other scholars argue that that such pro-social dispositions are to a 
greater or lesser extent formed through communal living, role modelling, education, and 
receiving rewards and punishments
7
. In any case, the disposition to be trustworthy at both 
the personal and impersonal level is manifested towards the members of the social group 
to which we belong and is conveyed through the network aspect of social capital.  
On the cognitive level, research shows that people are better able to solve 
coordination problems and stimulate trustworthy social exchange when they are 
presented in a social context rather than in any other context.  Solution of a problem with 
the same level of complexity is done faster and more efficiently by a subject, when the 
question is dressed in a social contracts setting, than when the problem is presented in a 
non-social context. Social contract algorithms are a component of a universal human 
nature designed by natural selection to produce evolutionary advantageous strategy in 
social exchange (Cosmides and Tooby, 1995).  
3.2. Social Capital, Information Sharing and Cost of Search  
Social capital improves efficiency by facilitating costly search and reducing the 
transactions costs of economic agents.  One important potential role for social capital 
concerns its ability to ameliorate potential inefficiencies in financial markets caused by 
imperfect information. Hayek (1945) is among the first to point out that information 
asymmetries are an inescapable feature of human society. Financial markets are hindered 
because economic agents who could benefit from transactions bear high information 
search and transaction costs.   
                                                          
7
 Hinde and Groebel (1991) show that people from their infancy acquire prosocial dispositions; for 
example, by learning to distinguish accidental effects from intentional effects of others' actions. 
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Social capital partially compensates for the inefficiencies associated with 
information asymmetry and costly search. Participation within social networks often 
involves the transfer of information, even if the purpose of participation is not to transfer 
information. Participation may also be initiated with the intent of acquiring a specific 
piece of information. The sharing of information is a by-product of the network aspect of 
social capital. Social networks of pairwise interactions can help economic agents reduce 
search costs (Kranton, 1996). In addition, sharing information on “bad” agents lowers 
contracting costs (Fafchamps, 1998). To the extent that shared information is 
economically meaningful, social capital generates a positive externality for financial 
markets and has implications for corporate risk-taking and cost of capital.  
3.3. Social Capital as an enforcement mechanism 
Guaranteeing that accurate information is transferred through social networks 
requires the existence of disciplinary mechanism. Social capital offers several punitive 
instruments for violating norms and contracts within the social structure. These 
mechanisms include loss of reputation, extra-legal relationship, and guilt. 
Social capital fosters building a reputation for honest dealing since it elevates the 
costs of reputation loss.  The formal analysis of reputation as a capital asset is similar to 
one involving parties who expect to face transaction opportunities repeatedly in the 
future
8
. The network aspect of social capital plays a critical role in circulating 
information about breach of contract, thereby enabling socially connected groups to 
penalize and exclude cheaters through reputation loss (Kandori, 1992; McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2000).  
                                                          
8
 Kreps (1990) presents formal analysis of reputation in repeated games.   
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The extralegal relationship grounded in the theory of relational contracts is a 
mechanism of social capital for mutual enforcement of contracts that reduces contracting 
and monitoring costs. In the context of the relational contracts
9
, parties can choose to 
engage in exchanges that are not clearly governed by legal contracts or at least not 
governed by contracts with detailed specifications. In this relational context, parties do 
not attempt to hold one another to detailed terms, but instead work out disagreements 
through some conciliatory process. Rather than trying to extract the most value out of the 
deal, parties put importance on maintaining the relationship, typically as part of a long-
term business association. Contract law emphasizes the restraint of opportunism, while 
relational contract theorists reject reliance on legalistic enforcement and suggest that the 
other party of the transaction can be reliable to fairly participate in the resolution of any 
disputes over contract performance. Some relational contract theorists question the very 
relevance of law in business exchanges. They stress that voluntary cooperation can occur 
without any need for legal intervention. Scholars of relational contracts (e.g., Scott, 1990) 
warn that the great lesson for the courts is that any effort to judicialize social rules will 
destroy the very informality that makes them so effective in the first instance. Relational 
contracts offer some clear advantages: reduction in contracting and monitoring costs. 
While relational contracts are sometimes not legal contracts at all, this is generally not the 
case in the U.S. and in other  common law systems.   
Much of the interest in social capital stems from the view that the absence of 
strong legal investor protection mechanisms represents one of the major impediment to 
financial development and has negative implications for corporate finance. Strong legal 
systems might ensure the respect of financial contracts, but the costs associated with 
                                                          
9
 Macaulay (1963) proposed the theory. 
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negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing these contracts could make them a less desirable 
means of inducing fair treatment. Social capital can serve as a complement for legal 
enforcement. Whether or not social capital increases efficiency depends on the level of 
institutional development. If laws and courts are insufficient to ensure the respect of 
commercial contracts then capital markets must rely on social capital. 
Guilt for failing to respect business promises can be viewed as an enforcement 
mechanism of social capital.  Research in psychology
10
 shows that as adults we have a 
disposition for shunning people who break agreements and avoid those who socialize 
with people who breached contracts. Evolutionary psychologists argue that our capacity 
to have such feelings as shame, guilt, affection, anger, elation, benevolence, and jealousy 
has emerged under selection pressure. Alternatively, one’s ability to feel guilty for failing 
to respect business promises can be  the byproduct of upbringing, or what Platteau 
(1994a, b) calls “secondary socialization”. By internalizing these feelings, a person 
enables the springs of her actions to include them. The individual therefore feels shame 
or guilt in violating a contract, and this prevents her from doing so. For such a person, 
making a promise in the context of social network is a commitment.  Often enough, the 
disposition to honor a contract would be toward members of some particular group and 
can act as the contract enforcement mechanism of social capital.  
3.4. Social Capital and Modification of Preferences  
Identification within a group or network alters preferences and the choices of 
connected individuals. Through this channel, social capital can affect financial market 
development and corporate risk-taking. Social capital may influence preferences through 
                                                          
10
 See applications in economics Rabin (1993) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2002). 
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altruism and mimicry. In addition, social capital may stimulate riskier preferences by 
pooling individual risks. 
Social capital favors altruism and raises concerns for the common good within 
social network. This enhanced coordination should have positive implications for 
financial markets. Since socially connected individuals have interdependent utility 
functions, they care more about each other. These altered preferences can, in turn, raise 
efficiency and improve coordination. Social identity theorists argue that individuals 
engage in the categorization of self and others into social categories as a way to define 
themselves and others. Individuals identify with the groups to which they perceive to 
have common beliefs or characteristics (in-groups) and clarify social identity by 
comparing the in-groups against other groups (out-groups). An important discovery of 
social identity theory is that individuals demonstrate an in-group bias. That is, they 
positively stereotype in-groups and negatively stereotype out-groups (Tajfel and Turner, 
1978). The relationship between altruism and social capital stems from group identity 
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Economic experiments suggest that agents exhibit more 
altruism and play more cooperatively if they have been induced to identify with a group 
(Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001). Identification with social network may trigger agents to 
adopt more altruistic preferences, thereby yielding more efficient contracting outcomes. 
Social capital, by favoring identification with a group, may also affect preferences 
through mimicry, defined as a demonstration or role model effect. This type of change in 
preferences cannot be understood as altruism. For example, Coleman (1988) shows that 
by visibly and credibly demonstrating their positive attitude towards school, parents 
induce a change in attitude among their children. The same kind of mimicry operates 
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within the social network by encouraging herding behavior - the drive to mimic the 
behavior of others. This phenomenon has implications for financial markets. 
In addition, social capital might affect risk-tolerance within a social group. This 
argument is based on the growing literature studying informal insurance within a social 
network (e.g., Genicot and Ray, 2005; Bloch, Genicot and Ray, 2008; Bramoulle and 
Kranton, 2007). Membership in social network offers a way to pool individual risks. 
Social structure generates social collateral that can be used to control moral hazard and 
adverse selection.  
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Chapter III: I GET BY WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS: CEO 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CORPORATE RISK TAKING 
1. Introduction  
 Contemporaneous corporate finance emphasizes the influence that a CEO’s personal 
characteristics, attitudes, and preferences exert on corporate risk-taking. Graham et al 
(2013) reports that behavioral traits such as optimism and managerial risk-aversion are 
related to corporate risk-taking practices. Hilary and Hui (2009) show that a CEO’s 
religion is important determinant of corporate risk-taking. Cai and Mckeon (2012) find 
that a CEO’s  personality trait known as sensation seeking, is related to corporate risk-
taking. Hutton et al (2011) argue that the personal political preferences of CEOs 
influence corporate behavior while Hirshleifer et al (2012) reports that overconfident 
CEOs increase their investments in risky projects. The present study research continues 
this line of inquiry by examining how a CEO’s social capital influences a firm’s decisions 
about risk-taking.   
More specifically, we ask whether the social capital of CEOs that occurs as a result of 
their social networks influences their risk-taking practices. We consider the size, 
heterogeneity, and gender dominance of these networks and whether they exert any 
differential effect on corporate risk-taking. Most importantly, we investigate whether any 
differential risk-taking that results from social capital effects influences firm value.  
Social capital, defined as  information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inherent in a 
social network (Woolcock, 1998), has been discussed broadly in various social 
disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology (e.g., 
Dasgupta 2005; Fafchamps 2002; Knack and Keefer 1995; Portes 1998; Putnam 1993; 
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Schneider 2006), yet has received only limited attention in academic finance. Our 
empirical findings reinforce a growing awareness among finance researchers that 
managerial social capital matters in corporate decisions.    For instance, Engelberg et al 
(2012) show that social connections between banks and borrowers through managerial 
interpersonal linkages reduce borrowing costs. Cai et al (2013) report a positive relation 
between a firm’s social connections and trading costs. Cohen et al (2008) find that social 
networks are an important mechanism for information flows that shape asset prices in the 
mutual fund industry. Cai and Sevilir (2012) show that social connections improve 
information flow between a target and an acquirer.  
  There exists a number of studies documenting the ability of social networks to 
reduce uncertainty and risk. Genicot and Ray (2005) and  Bloch et al, (2008) show that  
social capital offers a mechanism of informal insurance which can increase risk-taking
11
. 
Rowley (1997) contends that with increased ties and access, an individual’s power within 
a social network is strengthened. The approach-inhibition theory of Keltner et al, (2003) 
argues that the experience of power drives people to take more risks. From agency 
theory, studies such as Amihud and Lev (1981) and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) find 
that one of the major reasons for low managerial risk-taking is the career concerns of 
executives. Granovetter (1973), Zhou (1992), Schneider (2006) determine that social 
capital in social networks is instrumental for access to jobs. Nguyen (2012) shows that 
socially connected CEOs are more likely to find new employment after departure.  The 
consistency across these studies leads us to hypothesize that social capital has a positive 
effect on corporate risk-taking. 
                                                          
11Based on Arnott and Stiglitz’s (1991) informal insurance model, Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2013) show 
that informal insurance through social network structure leads more agricultural risk-taking in rural India. 
Miller and Paulson (2007) find that household gambling increases with the quality of informal insurance. 
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To test the effect of social capital on risk-taking, we use the BoardEx databases 
provided by Management Diagnostics Limited. This dataset contains relational links 
between executives based on prior overlap in employment, education and memberships in 
non-profit organizations. Recent studies such as Engelberg et al (2012) and Fracassi 
(2012) use this database to estimate corporate social connections. Consequently, we use 
the BoardEx database to develop a set of  social capital measures for our sample CEOs. 
These measures include the number of connections with financiers, with individuals 
employed in different industries or occupations, the gender dominance of the 
connections, and with individuals having varying academic backgrounds.  
As the first research examining the role that CEO social capital has on corporate risk-
taking, we obtain a number of important findings. We discover that social capital does 
influence corporate risk-taking where risk-taking is measures as the standard deviation of 
7the return on assets, the standard deviation of the return on equity, and Research and 
Development expenditures. Our results also suggest that the heterogeneity of a CEO’s 
network reflecting personal connections differing in educational achievement, access to 
capital, and industry and employment encourages corporate risk-taking. We further 
examine the influence of gender within social capital given the findings of gender-related 
differences in risk aversion by  researchers such as  Bertrand (2011) and others. We find 
that the association between social capital and corporate risk-taking is weaker for female-
tied networks. However, our most important finding is that the increase in risk-taking 
attributable to a CEO’s social capital is value increasing for the firm. Our results are 
invariant to alternative proxies for risk-taking and cross-sectional model specifications. 
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Our findings are also robust to various controls for endogeneity including Heckman’s two 
stage procedure and switching regression analysis. 
We organize the remainder of this study as follows. In the following Section, we 
provide a discussion of the social capital concept and the channels through which it might 
influence corporate decision-making.  We also develop a set of hypotheses regarding 
social capital’s  influence on risk-taking by the firm. We describe our data and sample 
construction procedures in Section 3. Section 4 contains the main empirical results from 
our hypothesis testing while the robustness of those results is explored in Section 5. In 
Section 6 we present our tests for possible endogeneity in the relation between social 
capital and risk-taking. We conclude with a brief summary and discussion of our findings 
in Section 7.   
2. Social Capital’s Channels and Hypothesis Development   
2.1. Social Capital’s Channels of Influence  
 The concept of social capital has a powerful and intuitive appeal. Social capital can 
be understood as the value of social obligations or informal contacts formed through 
social networks. More formally, social capital can be defined as the information, trust, 
and norms of reciprocity inherent in a social network (Woolcock, 1998), where a social 
network is simply the aggregation of personal relationships an individual possesses. The 
concept of social capital is distinct from, but convergent with the idea of social network 
since social networks are the media through which social capital is created, maintained 
and used.  
 The theories of social capital can be broadly classified as either cognitive or 
structural. Cognitive theories developed by Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993) 
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emphasize norms, attitudes, and beliefs. Structural theories advanced  by Lin (1999; 
2001) are based on Bourdieu’s (1984; 1986; 1989) theoretical framework and focus on 
connections and participation in various networks. From these theories of social capital, 
four distinct mechanisms emerge through which social capital exerts an influence on 
corporate finance. These mechanisms are trust, the flow of information, the ability to 
punish and reward, and the ability to alter preferences.  
 A number of researchers focus on the trust dimension of social capital (Dasgupta, 
1988; Fukuyama, 1995). Trust minimizes the negative consequences of incomplete 
contracts (Grossman and Hart, 1986) and by this link affects capital budgeting and firm-
level risk-taking. Trusting economic agents adopt a more appropriate investment horizon 
in making investment decisions and choose production technologies that are optimal over 
the long rather than the short run. Economic agents in high-trust societies need to divert 
fewer resources to protect themselves from unlawful violations of their property rights. 
Consequently, more resources can be re-deployed for innovation, investment and 
production. The level of inter-organization trust affects the cost of borrowing and 
corporate risk-taking because trust reduces costly monitoring and information 
asymmetry.  
 Social capital can also improve economic efficiency and enhance coordination 
through the information channel. The literature on social capital employment in finance 
and economics contains many applications of this information-based idea of social 
capital, though researchers are reluctant to use the term social capital. From the 
informational perspective, researchers such Engelberg et al (2012), Kuhnen (2009), 
Cohen et al, (2008), Hochberg et al,( 2010), Rauch and Casella, (2001), provide 
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consistent evidence that social capital through social networks opens new channels for 
the circulation of information, reduces the cost of external financing, expands stock 
market participation and plays an important role for portfolio choice decisions.   
 Guaranteeing that accurate information is transferred through social networks 
requires the existence of a disciplinary mechanism. The network aspect of social capital 
plays a critical role in circulating information about breachs of contract. This allows 
socially connected groups to penalize and exclude cheaters through reputation loss or 
penalty (Kandori, 1992; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000). 
The preference modification channel of social capital has received limited attention in 
academic finance so far. Identification within a group or network can alter the 
preferences and choices of connected individuals. Through such a channel, social capital 
affects corporate risk-taking. Social capital may stimulate riskier preferences by pooling 
individual risks. This argument is based on the growing literature studying informal 
insurance within a social network (e.g., Genicot and Ray, 2005; Bloch, Genicot and Ray, 
2008; Bramoulle and Kranton, 2007).  
2.2. Hypotheses Development  
An unexplored issue related to the social capital concerns its possible influence on 
corporate risk-taking.  In this section we develop a set of testable hypotheses regarding 
the causal role social capital plays in corporate risk-taking. We begin by asking ask the 
following question: does the social capital of a CEO influence decisions about corporate 
risk-taking? There are three arguments that justify a positive relation between corporate 
risk-taking and the CEO’s social capital.  
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First, social capital offers a way to pool individual risks and through this channel 
affect the  risk-tolerance of socially connected individuals. Recent research shows that 
social networks are a mechanism for risk-sharing. Allen and Gale (1997), Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti (1997) and Ambrus et al (2010) argue that better risk-sharing tends to promote 
more risk-taking, consequently leas leading to firm growth. A defining feature of the 
individual decision making problem is dealing with risk. Miller and Paulson (2007) argue 
that uninsured risk can cause households to make inefficient choices and suggest that 
households allocate resources more efficiently when better insurance were available. 
Since social capital offers a mechanism of informal insurance (Genicot and Ray, 2005; 
Bloch et al, 2008), it can increase managerial risk-taking. 
Second, social capital intensifies an individual’s sense of power, leading to riskier 
managerial preferences and consequently increased corporate greater risk-taking. 
Managerial power can stem from executives’ personal links to institutional investors, 
suppliers, and other economic agents. These social networks generate channels of 
information-sharing, resource acquisition, and alternative employment opportunities for 
the connected individuals. In addition, personal contacts with representatives of other 
organizations create valuable resources for managers, such as door-opening and 
legitimizing (Borch and Huse, 1993). Socially well-connected executives represent a 
“special segment of the capitalist class” with significant power due to the multiple 
connections to large corporations (Useem, 1979).  An executive’s power grows as the 
individual gains more ties and access (Rowley, 1997). Therefore, the CEO’s social 
capital is a source of power and prestige for the individual.   
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Third, agency-based theoretic models show that one of the major reasons for low 
managerial risk-taking is the career concerns of executives (Amihud and Lev, 1981; 
Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; Holmstrom and Ricart Costa, 1986). Social capital is an 
efficient instrument for achieving better employment outcomes. Research by Holzer 
(1987), Burt (1992), Granovetter (1995), and Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) 
establishes that social networks can overcome the information asymmetry that exists in 
the labor market by transmitting crucial information, such as news about job vacancies or 
accounts of workers’ abilities. A number of studies, (e.g.,  Granovetter, 1973; Zhou, 
1992; Schneider, 2006) argue that social capital is instrumental for access to jobs and is 
related to more successful employment outcomes. Nguyen (2012) explicitly shows that 
socially connected CEOs are more likely to find reemployment after a departure. Thus, 
social capital mitigates managerial career concerns and should have a positive effect on 
the corporate risk-taking. Consequently, we hypothesize that social capital resident within 
managerial social networks is positively associated with corporate risk-taking.    
Several studies document a significant role for social connections in innovation 
(Goyal and Moriga-Gonzales, 2001). For managers, access to a diverse social network is 
a crucial for developing novel ideas about products, practices, services or procedures 
(Shalley and Gilson, 2004; Shalley and Perry-Smith, 2008). This result stems from social 
psychology research (e.g., Amabile, 1988; Martindale, 1989) which argues that teams 
consisting of individuals with varying  psychological attributes and characteristics 
achieve greater creativity and innovation. Rodan and Galunic (2004) find that access to 
heterogeneous knowledge through social connections is useful for implementing new 
ideas and developing innovation. Aligning with this literature, Fang et al (2012) show 
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that firms whose CEOs have more heterogeneous social connections are more innovative. 
Consequently, we expect the social capital derived from heterogeneous social ties to 
promote corporate risk-taking.  Therefore we hypothesize that there is a positive 
association between the social capital within heterogeneous social networks and 
corporate risk-taking.   
A considerable literature in experimental economics and psychology examines 
gender-related differences in risk-aversion (e.g., Bertrand, 2011). Bruce and Johnson 
(1994) and Johnson and Powell (1994) provide evidence that women display a lower 
propensity for risk-taking than men. Bernasek and Shwiff (2001) document that women 
are significantly more risk-averse in their allocation of wealth to pensions. Hudgens and 
Fatkin (1985) document that gender related differences in risk-taking are also present in a 
military environment. Therefore we hypothesize that the association between the social 
capital in managerial social networks with financiers and corporate risk-taking is weaker 
for female-tied networks. 
Because of career concerns and their lack of personal wealth diversification, 
managers  are more risk-averse than shareholders, which is sub-optimal for the firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  If social capital induces 
managers to take more risk and therefore better aligns managerial and shareholder 
interests, then we should observe a relation between risk-taking and firm performance. 
Therefore we hypothesize that increased risk-taking caused by managerial social capital 
is value-enhancing for the firm.  
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3. Data, Sample Selection and Measurement  
3.1. Data and Sample Selection 
Our empirical analysis requires data obtained from a variety of databases. We obtain 
data regarding social network from the BoardEx database of Management Diagnostic 
Limited. BoardEx provides social network data for senior executives and directors for a 
set of global public and private firms since 1999
12
. This establishes the starting point for 
empirical analysis as 1999. From these profiles, we collect information on current 
employment, past employment, education background, and affiliation to professional 
associations, not-for-profit associations, and clubs. We match BoardEx data with 
Datastream/Worldscope to obtain the corresponding financial and accounting variables.  
Our final sample consists of 26,707 firm-year observations distributed across 41 
countries
13
. 
Panel A of Table 1 contains a description of our sample. The majority of the sample 
firms are incorporated in North America (72%), reflecting the extensive capitalization of 
the capital markets on this continent. Another 20.1%  of our sample is incorporated in 
Europe. The remaining 7.9% of the sample is incorporated in countries distributed over 
the remaining regions. Firms incorporated in common law countries account for 96% of 
the sample, while 1.6% of sample firms are located in German civil law countries. Less 
than 3% of the sample firms are incorporated in Scandinavian or French civil law 
                                                          
12
 Social ties formed before 1999 are also captured since BoardEx records the covered executives and 
directors’ career, education, and activity history for as long as data are available. 
13
 Counties include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Cayman Islands, 
China, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Poland, Republic Of Ireland, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States. 
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countries.  We note that most of the sample firms (98%) are located in developed 
economies.     
3.2. Measuring Social Capital  
Empirical measures of the social capital used in this study are based on the structural 
theories of social capital of Bourdieu (1984, 1986), Burt (1992) and Lin (1999). This 
meaning is sometimes referred as social network capital to emphasize that individuals 
derive benefits from knowing others with whom they form networks. In this view, social 
capital is an embedded  resource that is accessed through network membership. This view 
of social capital makes it empirically measureable.  
To measure social capture, we first follow the prior research of Freeman (1979) and 
Burt (1983) and estimate the centrality measure of CEO social networks. We count the 
number of CEO social connections with managers of other firms by their current and past 
overlap in education, employment and other activities. In addition
14
, we separately 
measure the CEO’s  social capital with financiers by counting the number of CEO social 
connections with managers of financing firms. This is the “friends with money” effect. 
As is arranged by BoardEx, two individuals are connected via employment if their 
careers overlap at the same employer in the past or at present. Individuals are connected 
via education if they attend the same university at the same time and obtain the same 
degree. Two individuals are connected via other social activities if they both serve in the 
same professional association, non-profit associations, or leisure clubs. In addition, we 
                                                          
14
 Engelber et al (2012) explicitly shows that “Friends with Money” play significant role for the availability 
and cost of external financing for the firm. 
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estimate the aggregate measure of a CEO’s  social network that includes all known 
sources of connections
15
.   
Our second measure of the CEO’s social network emphasizes the diversity of 
connections within the networks. CEOs with access to a more diverse group of people 
can obtain greater value from their social connections because they can obtain a wider 
range of options, reduce group-think problems, and achieve greater creativity and 
innovation. We modify the methodology of Fang et al (2012) and use the heterogeneity 
of the CEO’s social network as our second  measure of social capital.  
Our measure of CEO social network diversity is estimated with a variety of proxies 
based on the construction of a corresponding Herfindahl index. First, we estimate an 
Industry Heterogeneity Index of the CEO’s social network calculated as a Herfindahl 
index based on the percentage of people having different industry affiliations with whom 
the CEO is connected. Second, we estimate an  International Heterogeneity Index as the 
Herfindahl index based on the percentage of foreign nationals with whom the CEO is 
connected. Third, the Professional Heterogeneity Index is calculated as the Herfindahl 
index based on the percentage of people having different occupations with whom the 
CEO is connected. Fourth, an Educational Heterogeneity Index is estimated as the 
average of three components: educational degree heterogeneity, academic major 
heterogeneity, and school heterogeneity. This index is estimated as the Herfindahl index 
based on the percentage of people with different educational degrees, majors, and schools 
                                                          
15
 As is argued by Cai et al (2013), it is possible that the two individuals may not know each other even if 
they both attend the same college at the same time, work or worked at the same employer, or belong to the 
same professional associations and clubs. Such misclassification increases the noise in the data and works 
against finding significant results.  
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with whom the CEO is connected. The Heterogeneity Index is estimated as the average of 
these four specialized indices.
16
  
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics concerning our social capital 
measures. On average, CEOs are connected to 9.4 executives of financing firms. The 
average number of connection with financiers via education is 1.5, via employment is 6,  
and via other social ties is 0.02. The average network size for CEOs with executives and 
directors of all firms (including the financing firms) via education is 22, via employment 
is 76 and via other social connections is 0.3.  The average value of the aggregate 
Heterogeneity Index is 0.70 implying a relative homogeneity of CEO network ties.  
3.3. Risk-Taking Measures 
Motived by prior work, we consider three measures of corporate risk-taking. First, 
our primary measure of corporate risk-taking is the volatility of the return on assets 
(σ(ROA)), where the return on assets is estimated as the ratio of earnings before interest 
and taxes to total assets. Second, we use the standard deviation of a firm’s return on 
equity (σ(ROE)), where return on equity is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
to total stockholders’ equity. The intuition behind these risk-taking measures is that 
riskier corporate operations lead to more volatile earnings (John et al, 2008; Faccio et al 
2011). In addition, the volatility of ROE reflects both the riskiness of a firm’s projects 
and the additional risk induced by the use of leverage in the capital structure. Both 
σ(ROA) and σ(ROE) are estimated over five-year overlapping periods in panel 
regressions. These measures of risk-taking capture the overall risk taken by the firm. 
                                                          
16 The theoretical minimum value of these heterogeneity indices is 0, which means that the network is 
highly heterogeneous. The maximum value of these indices is 1, which means that network is very 
homogeneous. 
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Third, we also employ research and development expenditures (R&D) scaled by total 
assets as a measure of corporate risk-taking. R&D is commonly used as a measure of 
riskiness of corporate policies (e.g. Ferris et al, 1996; Coles et al, 2006, Bargeron et al, 
2010; Li et al, 2012).  It captures risk-taking in long-term corporate investment because 
R&D investments have a low probability of success and their benefits are distant and 
uncertain.   
In robustness tests presented in Section 4.1, we deploy four alternative cross-
sectional measures of risk-taking: 1) The volatility of the firm’s operating return on assets 
over the entire sample period (1999-2012), 2) the volatility of the firm’s return on equity 
over the entire sample period, 3) the difference between the maximum and minimum 
ROA over the entire sample period, and 4) the difference between the maximum and 
minimum ROE over the entire sample period. 
3.4. Control Variables 
To control for correlated omitted variables, we augment our  regression equations 
with several control variables motived by prior research (John et al, 2008; Faccio et al 
2011). Specifically, we include a measure of profitability (ROE) because high return 
volatilities might stem from poor management, rather than increased risk-taking. To 
account for growth and investment opportunities, we include Sales Growth and the Book-
to-Market ratio. We also consider Leverage and Asset Tangibility as measures of 
financial distress. We include the log of the market value of equity (LnMV) and Free 
Cash Flow to control for the cost of external financing and capital availability. To control 
for differences in the firm’s life cycle, we include Ln(Age) and Ln(Size), since firm 
riskiness tends to decrease with firm age and size.  
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A number of studies such as Cohen et al, (2000), Coles et al,(2006), Chakraborty et 
al, (2007), Hirshleifer et al, (2010) and Cain and Mckeon (2012) include CEO tenure and 
CEO age to proxy for CEO risk-aversion. Managerial age is also used as a proxy for 
career concerns (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). Consequently, we use Ln(CEOAge) and 
Ln(CEOTenure) as additional control variables. In panel regressions, control variables are 
measures at the beginning of the period over which volatilities are estimated. In the cross-
sectional regressions, all control variables are measures at the end of the first-year. In 
panel regressions we also include country, industry and year fixed effects. In our 
robustness tests, we use CEO fixed effects.  Our results  are qualitatively similar if firm 
fixed effects are use.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our major variables. On 
average, our sample firms are large, profitable and moderately leveraged, with total assets 
of approximately $5 billion, a return on assets of 3.9% and a leverage ratio of 28%. These 
sample firms also possess important growth opportunities as implied by an average 
Tobin’s Q of 2.1. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. CEO Social Connections and Corporate Risk-taking  
We first examine the relation between CEO social capital and corporate risk-taking. 
We employ propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to compare the 
risk-taking of firms with socially connected CEOs to a control sample of firms whose 
CEOs lack social connections with financiers
17
. Since pairs of matched firms show no 
observable difference in firm characteristics except CEO social connections, firm 
                                                          
17
 For CEO economy-wide connections, the top and bottom quartiles are compared. 
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operated by socially connected CEOs should make the same risk-taking choices as those 
whose CEOs lack social connections. The propensity score is estimated by using firm 
characteristics and country and industry effects. We use the following probit regression 
for our propensity matching:  
                                                                       
                                                                  
                                               
where CEO(Fin)ConD is a dummy variable that equals 0 if the CEO is not connected 
with financers and 1 otherwise. Table 2 contains our results. We find strong evidence that 
even after holding firm characteristics identical, firms operated by socially connected 
CEOs take more risk than those whose CEOs are without social connections.  For 
example, by using CEO social connections with financers as a measure of social capital 
and σ(ROA) estimated in five-year overlapping periods as our  measure of risk-taking, 
we find that the difference in mean risk-taking between these two groups of firm is 
positive and statistically significant. We obtain similar results for our analysis of the 
volatility of the return on assets. These results confirm that the difference in risk-taking is 
due in fact to CEO social connections rather than firm characteristics.   
We further examine the relation CEO social capital and corporate risk-taking with a  
multivariate panel regression. We regress our risk-taking measures against CEO social 
capital proxies and other determinants of corporate risk-taking as described below:   
                                                                            
                                                         
                                                     
                               
Table 4 presents our regression results. In specifications (1) through 4) the 
dependent variable is σ(ROA). In models (5) through (8), the dependent variable is 
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σ(ROE) while in specifications (9) through (12) it is R&D. Social Capital (Sc) is 
measured by the total number of social connections between CEOs of public firms and 
executives of financier firms (models 1, 5, and 9), by the number of connection with 
financiers via education (models 2, 6 and 10), via employment (models 3, 7 and 11) and 
via other social ties (models 4, 8 and 12). We control for firm profitability, growth 
prospects, firm size and age, market value of equity, asset tangibility, leverage, free cash 
flow as well as CEO personal characteristics, such as CEO age and tenure. In addition we 
include country, industry, and year fixed effects. The results show that CEO social capital 
with financiers is positively and significantly related to corporate risk-taking. The 
coefficient estimates of the main independent variables also appear to be economically 
significant
18
. For example, given the average cross-sectional R&D value of 0.063, a one 
standard deviation increase in CEOs social connection measures results in an increase of 
risk-taking relative to cross-sectional mean by 5.34%
19
. Social ties via education and 
other social activities have a stronger effect on corporate risk-taking than social networks 
occurring from employment. These results confirm the findings of prior studies (e.g., Cai 
et al, 2013) that casual, non-professional ties are the most important form of social 
capital.     
     Next we investigate the effect of CEO social connections on risk-taking by using 
a broader set of connections and eliminating the exclusive focus on “friends with money” 
connections. We estimate the same regressions as in Table 4, but measure social capital 
as: (1) CEO all social connections, (2) connections via education, (3) connections via 
                                                          
18
 To estimate economic significance, we first multiply the standard deviation of the major independent 
variable by its coefficient estimate. This gives an increase in the dependent variable associated with a one 
standard deviation increase in the independent variable. Then we compare this increase in risk-taking to the 
cross-sectional average of the risk-taking measures. 
19
 This number is 4.70% and 1.92% if σ(ROE) and σ(ROA) are used as a measure of risk-taking.  
 50 
 
employment and (4) connections via other activities. Note that these connections include 
those with financiers as well as with other executives. The results of these regressions are 
contained in Table 5. Rowley (1997) contends that with more ties and access, CEOs feel 
more powerful and hence take greater risk. Table 5 confirms this prediction. Across all 
model specifications, the coefficient estimates for the social capital measures are 
significantly positive. Again, it appears that informal social ties through social activities 
have the greatest effect on corporate risk-taking. Overall, the results in this section 
present previously unknown differences in corporate risk-attributable to CEO social 
capital.   
4.2. CEO Social Network Heterogeneity and Corporate Risk-taking 
In this section we examine the effect of another aspect of social capital on corporate 
risk-taking: network heterogeneity. We first examine this relation with a univariate 
analysis. We sort firms into quartiles by an overall Heterogeneity Index and then estimate 
the mean values of risk-taking for each quartile. The results, shown in Table 3, reveal that 
risk-taking monotonically decreases with heterogeneity quartiles
20
 suggesting that greater 
social network heterogeneity is associated with greater corporate risk-taking. The average 
σ(ROA) estimated over five-year overlapping periods for High Heterogeneity Index 
quartile is 0.10 compared to 0.073 for the low Heterogeneity Index quartile. The 
difference, 0.027, is statistically significant at 1% level. Qualitatively similar result is 
obtained if σ(ROA)cross-sectional,  the volatility of return on assets over entire sample period 
(1999-2012), is used as a measure of risk-taking. These initial findings  indicate a 
                                                          
20
 Note that lower Heterogeneity Index means greater social network heterogeneity.      
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significant positive association between CEO social network heterogeneity and risk-
taking.    
To further test the relation between CEO social network heterogeneity and corporate 
risk-taking, we estimate the following multivariate panel regression:  
                                                      
                                                                          
                                                                   
                                                                              
                                                                             
Our results are presented in Table 6. In specifications (1) through (5), the dependent 
variable is σ(ROA). In specifications (6) through (10), the dependent variable is σ(ROE). 
In the last set of specifications, (11) through (15), the dependent variable is R&D. NH is 
the network heterogeneity measure and across model specifications indicates educational 
heterogeneity industrial heterogeneity, international heterogeneity, professional 
heterogeneity, or an overall average measure of social network heterogeneity.  Our 
control variables include CEO’s economy-wide all social connections, firm profitability, 
growth prospect measures, firm size and age, market value of equity, asset tangibility, 
leverage, free cash flow as well as CEO age and CEO tenure. In addition we add country, 
industry and year fixed effects in all regressions. As expected, all CEO social network 
heterogeneity indices are negatively and significantly related to corporate risk-taking. 
This implies that greater CEO social network heterogeneity increases corporate risk-
taking. The economic impact of network heterogeneity on risk-taking is important. On 
average, a one standard deviation increase in the CEO overall social network 
heterogeneity index results in a 3.26% increase in the volatility of return on assets 
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relative to its mean, a 3.47% increase in the volatility of return on equity relative to its 
mean, and a 11.01% increase in R&D relative to its mean
21
.  
We further determine that network heterogeneity has a more important effect on 
corporate risk-taking than size of the social networks. This implies that heterogeneity of 
the network developed by the CEO is more important for understanding executive 
decision-making than the number of connections.  That is, our findings suggest that the 
diversity of the network has more of an influence on a CEO’s decisions that the size of 
the network. It might be that the CEO perceives a heterogeneous network as providing 
superior information on which to take risks as well as a more reliable safety net in the 
event of failure. 
Since a growing literature in experimental economics and psychology highlights 
gender-related differences in risk-aversion (e.g., Bernasek and Shwiff, 2001; Bertrand, 
2011), we separately examine the relation between female-tied networks and corporate 
risk-taking. Bilateral social networks between CEOs of publicly traded firms and 
executives of financier firms, as well as all firm within an economy, are considered as 
female-tied if both connected executives are females. We predict that the association 
between social capital and corporate risk-taking should be weaker for female-tied 
networks.  
To test this conjecture, we augment our major regression with additional dummy 
variables. Table 7 reports the results of these regressions. In models (1) through (3) a 
dummy variable FinMTN equals 0 if the proportion of female-male or male-female-tied 
networks within a CEO’s social network with financiers equals 0 and 1 otherwise. The 
dummy variable FinFTN equals 0 if the proportion of female-tied networks within a 
                                                          
21
 We use the same approach as in Section 4.1. to estimate economic significance.  
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CEO’s social network with financiers is zero and is 1 otherwise. In models (4) through 
(6) the dummy variable MTN equals 0 if the proportion of female-male or male-female 
tied networks within a CEO’s social network is zero 0 and is 1 otherwise. The dummy 
variable FTN equals 0 if the proportion of female-tied networks within a CEO’s social 
network is zero and is 1 otherwise. We next interact these dummy variables with our 
measures of social capital.   
Table 7 shows that coefficient estimates of the interaction terms of female-tied 
network dummies and social capital measures are negative and significant. However, 
these coefficient estimates of the interaction terms between male-female or female-male-
tied network dummies and social capital measures are sometimes negative, but less in 
magnitude than the same measure for female-tied networks, sometimes positive but 
insignificant. These findings provide strong evidence that the relation between CEO 
social capital and corporate risk-taking is weaker for female tied networks.  
4.3. CEO Social Capital and Firm Value  
The previous two sections establish that social capital causes an increase in 
corporate risk-taking. In this section we examine the effects of this increased risk-taking 
on firm value. If social capital encourages managerial risk-taking that is more optimal for 
shareholders, we predict a positive relation between risk-taking and firm value. We 
employ simultaneous equation estimation approach that uses a two-stage least square 
techniques following a system of two equations:  
                                                                            
                                                        
                                                     
                               
 
 54 
 
                             ̂                                           
                                                                  
                                                                     
This approach is suitable because risk-taking is affected by firm characteristics and 
clearly these firm characteristics also influence firm value. Exogenous variables that 
affect risk-taking but do not directly affect firm value include CEO personal 
characteristics (age and tenure) and CEO social capital measures.  Table 8 reports the 
results of the second stage regression of the simultaneous equations. In models (1) and 
(4) the risk-taking measure used in the first stage is σ(ROA). In models (2) and (5) the 
first stage risk-taking measure is σ(ROE) while  in models (3) and (6) it is R&D. Social 
Capital (Sc) is measured by the number of a CEO’s all social connections with financiers 
(columns (1) through (3)) and by the number of a CEO’s economy-wide all social 
connections (columns (4) through (6)), including connections with financiers. The 
coefficient estimates of all risk-taking measures are significantly positive, suggesting that 
increased risk-taking caused by social capital is value-enhancing. If σ(ROA) is used as a 
measure of risk-taking, a 5% increase in risk-taking will cause a 3% increase in firm 
value. For our sample firms this means that average market value will increase by almost 
$152 million
22
.  
5. Robustness Tests 
In this section we test the robustness of our results by using a number of alternative 
model specifications and variables. Particularly, we estimate cross-sectional regressions 
and introduce  four alternative cross-sectional measures of corporate risk-taking:  (1) 
volatility of the firm’s operating return on assets and (2) volatility of the firm’s return on 
                                                          
22
 (5%*β*Average σ(ROA))/(Average Q) 
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equity, both estimated cross-sectionally over the entire sample period (1999-2012); (3) 
the difference between the maximum and minimum ROA, and (4) the difference between 
the maximum and minimum ROE. As in John et al (2008) and Faccio et al (2011), we 
isolate firms for which a minimum of five years data is available over the sample period. 
For these firms we estimate the volatility measures over all available data points as well 
as the range for the ROA and ROE. This methodology generates a single observation of 
risk-taking measures for each firm. The major independent variables as well as controls 
are measured at the year-end. The model specification for cross-sectional regressions 
assumes the following form:  
                         ∑         
 
   
    
where Sc is a measure of social capital and x is a vector of controls. We also include 
industry and country fixed effects.  
To test the robustness of the relation between social capital and risk-taking, we 
regress our cross-sectional measures of risk-taking on social capital proxies as well as 
controls. These results are reported in Tables 9 and 10. In Table 9 social capital is 
measured as the number of social connections between the CEOs of public firms and 
executives of financier firms. Specifically, we examine the total number of connections, 
their current and past overlap in education, employment, and other social activities. In 
Table 10 social capital is measured by all social connections (including connections with 
financiers), connections via education, employment and other activities. In models (1) 
through (4) the dependent variable is σ(ROA)cross-sectional. In models  (5) though (8) the 
dependent variable is (ROAmax-ROAmin ). In model (9) the dependent variable is  
σ(ROE)cross-sectional  while in model (10) it is (ROEmax-ROEmin). The results are 
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qualitatively similar and in most cases comparable to those reported in Table 4 and Table 
5. The coefficient estimates of the social capital measures are significantly positive across 
all model specifications.      
Next we use the heterogeneity of CEO social network as a measure of social capital 
and examine the robustness of the relation between network heterogeneity and corporate 
risk-taking. The results of these cross-sectional regressions are reported in Table 11.  In 
model (1) the ndependent variable is σ(ROA)cross-sectional , while in model (2) it is 
(ROAmax-ROAmin ). The dependent variable in model (3) is σ(ROE)cross-sectional  while in 
model (4) it is (ROEmax-ROEmin). The Network Heterogeneity Index is estimated as an 
average of the educational heterogeneity, industrial heterogeneity, international 
heterogeneity, and professional heterogeneity indices. Consistent with previously 
reported findings, Table 11 shows that network heterogeneity is significantly negatively 
related to corporate risk-taking. This implies a positive relation between CEO social 
network heterogeneity and corporate risk-taking. 
We also confirm the robustness of our finding that the relation between social 
capital and corporate risk-taking in female-tied networks. We estimate similar cross-
sectional regressions as above, but include dummy variables for female-tied networks as 
well as for mixed-gender-tied networks. Table 12 reports our results. All coefficient 
estimates of the interaction terms between the social capital measures and female-tied 
network dummy are negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with our 
previously reported results.             
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6. Tests for Endogeneity  
The relation between social capital and corporate risk-taking might be affected by 
endogeneity. We argue that concerns of endogeneity arising from reverse causality do not 
apply for this study. Reverse causality requires a feedback effect moving from risk-taking 
to social capital. But this is not plausible in the context of the research design used. 
Formation of social connections predates risk-taking measurement by multiple years and 
sometimes for dozens of years as in the case of educational connections. Thus it is not 
credible to contend that risk-taking causes the social connections which have existed 
years prior to the risk-taking decision.  
Endogeneity issues arising from omitted variables and self-selection is a possibility. 
We deploy, however, a battery of tests to address these concerns. First, we include a 
number of control variables. Specifically we control for growth opportunities, leverage, 
firm size and age, free cash flow, executive age and tenure. Our empirical results remain 
robust to the addition of these and other controls.  
Second, we use propensity score matching procedure (Table 2) to compare risk-
taking measures for the firms with socially connected CEOs to a control sample of firms 
run by CEOs lacking connections
23
. Since matched firms are indistinguishable in term of 
firm characteristics, CEOs should take similar risk if social connections are indeed 
irrelevant. Yet our results show that that corporate risk-taking of firms run by CEOs 
without social connections is significantly lower than that of firms led by socially 
connected CEOs.  
                                                          
23
 For CEO economy-wide connections, firms in the top and bottom quartiles of CEO social connections 
are compared. 
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Third, in our major regressions we include CEO fixed effects to control for 
unobservable CEO specific characteristics that impact CEO risk-taking decisions. Our 
findings presented in  Table 13 show that our conclusions are unaffected by the addition 
of CEO fixed effects.  
Fourth, firms that take greater risk could select CEOs with greater social capital. To 
address this self-selection we employ modified Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure – 
treatment effects model. This approach allows controlling for unobserved private 
information that influences a firm’s decision to select socially connected CEOs. In the 
first stage we estimate a binary model by using probit regression:               
                                                               
                                                                            
                                                                                   
                                                 
where CEOFinConD is a dummy variable that equals 0 if CEO is not connected 
with financers and 1 otherwise. LSCEO is the local supply of socially connected CEOs in 
each geographic region in each year. BoardEx reports company locations around the 
world by geographic region and cities (e.g, within Germany, Bavaria, Saarland, Berlin 
etc.). This allows us to estimate the local supply of socially connected executives. Yonker 
(2009) shows that the market for CEOs is geographically segmented.  Firms hire local 
CEOs five times more frequently than expected if geography were irrelevant. So a firm’s 
decision to select socially connected CEO can be affected by the local supply of socially 
connected executives. Therefore we use the local supply of connected CEOs as an 
exogenous explanatory factor. We estimate the inverse Mills ratio from this regression 
and augment the second-stage risk-taking regression with the inverse Mills ratio:  
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                                                                     . 
where IMR is the inverse Mils ratio. Table 14, Panel A, reports our results. In model 
(1) the risk-taking measure is σ(ROA), in model (2)  it is σ(ROE) while risk-taking is 
captured with R&D in model (3). Our results show that after correcting for self-selection 
by adding the inverse Mills ratio, the coefficient estimate of the social capital measure 
remains significantly positive across all model specifications. Even after controlling for 
possible self-selection due to unobservable factors that cause firms to select socially 
connected CEOs, the results show strong evidence that CEO social capital has a 
significant effect on corporate risk-taking.   
As our final control for endogeneity, we use switching regression
24
 analysis to 
control for endogenous self-selection regarding the selection of socially connected CEOs. 
This approach allows performing a counterfactual analysis. That is, what would be risk-
taking of a company if it is run by socially connected CEO, instead of CEO with no 
social connections and vice versa. The binary choice model is similar to the probit model 
outlined above. Following Maddala (1991), however, two inverse Mills ratio parameters 
are calculated
25
. Then two regressions for the variable of interest are estimated: one for 
socially connected CEOs and another for CEOs without social connections. These two 
regressions are then augmented with these inverse Mills ratios. Counterfactuals are 
calculated by multiplying the coefficient estimates from the equation for socially 
connected CEOs by observed values of the independent variables for firms led by CEOs 
                                                          
24
 See Faccio et al (2011) for the application of this methodology 
25
 These two inverse Mills ratio parameter are         
       
      
 and         
       
      
  where   represents 
a vector of repressors in the first stage probit model,   is a vector of coefficient estimates,     is standard 
normal density and   is the standard normal cumulative density.  
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with no social connections. Table 14, Panel B, reports results of this analysis. For firms 
run by CEOs without social connections, σ(ROA) would have been 0.1701 instead of 
0.0920, had firm been run by socially connect CEO. The mean difference is statistically 
significant at 1% level. Qualitatively similar results are obtain if σ(ROE) and R&D are 
used as a measure of risk-taking. These findings confirm our previous results that after 
controlling for self-selection, firms with socially connected CEOs take greater risk.                
7. Summary and Discussion 
This study provides the first direct evidence that a previously unidentified factor, 
CEO social capital, significantly affects corporate risk-taking choices. Agency theories of 
finance contend that managers are more risk-averse than shareholders. A common reason 
given for this  is that the wealth and human capital of risk-averse managers is largely 
concentrated in the firm. Because the wealth of CEOs is undiversified, firm policy 
choices will reflect their personal preferences that lead to suboptimal corporate risk-
taking. A number of classical studies highlight the importance of mechanisms that 
promote managerial risk-taking to better align managers’ interest with that of 
shareholders’.  More recent research, however, emphasizes the importance of CEO 
personal characteristics for explaining corporate risk-taking.  Our study adds to this new 
research stream.  
Social capital, defined as the aggregate benefits derived from social obligations and 
informal contacts formed through social networks, influences corporate risk-taking 
through several channels. Social capital directly influences risk-taking through its effect 
on managerial risk preferences and indirectly through increasing employment 
opportunities for executives. Social capital also offers a way to pool individual risks and 
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by providing an informal insurance mechanism, positively affects risk-taking. Further, 
social capital intensifies a manager’s sense of power, leading to riskier managerial 
preferences and ultimately greater corporate risk-taking. Finally, social capital and its 
potential for reemployment opportunities can mitigate managerial career concerns which 
are commonly cited as a cause of sub-optimal risk-taking.   
Based on the social capital and networks literatures, we develop a set of hypotheses  
regarding the causal role that social capital plays in corporate risk-taking. Findings from 
the social psychology research indicate that teams of individuals with diverse 
psychological attributes and personal characteristics achieve greater creativity and 
innovation. Since innovations are directly connected with risk-taking, we expect that 
social capital in heterogeneous networks promote corporate risk-taking.  Because of 
documented differences in gender attitudes toward risk, we examine gender dominant 
social networks and their for managerial risk-taking. Finally, if social capital induces 
managers to realign their risk-taking more closely to shareholder preferences, then such 
risk-taking should enhance firm value.    
We empirically examine these hypotheses using a large panel of companies from 41 
countries for the period 1999-2012 and document a significant positive relation between 
CEO social capital and corporate risk-taking. We determine that the heterogeneity of the 
CEO’s social network is also significant for explaining corporate risk practices.  
Consistent with previous studies on gender and risk aversion, we find that the association 
between social capital and corporate risk-taking is weaker for female-tied networks. Most 
importantly, however, we show that this increase in risk-taking caused by social capital is 
value-enhancing to the firm.  
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 These findings have a number of important implications for the literature. First, our 
results suggest that social capital of senior management can be a mechanism for reducing 
agency problems within the firm by encouraging the better alignment of managers’ 
interests with those of shareholders. Second, we provide new and direct evidence 
regarding the benefits of workforce diversity through the value associated with the 
creation of heterogeneous social capital. Finally, these results provide important insights 
regarding CEO behaviors and how they shape corporate decisions about risk and project 
investment.         
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A reports sample distribution across geographic location, legal regime origin and development status. Legal 
regimes are defined according to La Porta et al (2008) classification. Country development status is according to 
International Monetary Fund classification. Panel B reports summary statistics for the main dependent and independent 
variables. σ(ROA) is the volatility of a firm’s return on asset, where return on asset is the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxed to total assets. σ(ROE) is the volatility of a firm’s return on equity, where return on equity is the ratio 
of earnings before interest and taxed to total stockholders’ equity . Both σ(ROA) and σ(ROE) are estimated in five-year 
overlapping periods. R&D is research and development expenses scaled by total assets. Heterogeneity Index is 
estimated as an average of HetInd, HetInt, HetProf and HetEduc. HetInd is Industry Heterogeneity Index of CEO’s 
social network calculated as the Herfindahl index based on the percentage of people with different industry groups with 
whom CEOs are connected. HetInt is International Heterogeneity - calculated as the Herfindahl index based on the 
percentage of people from foreign countries with whom CEOs are connected. HetProf is the Professional Heterogeneity 
Index, calculated as the Herfindahl index based on the percentage of people with different occupations with whom 
CEOs are connected. HetEduc is the average of three components: educational degree heterogeneity, major 
heterogeneity, and school heterogeneity, calculated as the Herfindahl index based on percentage of people with 
different educational degrees, majors and schools attended with whom CEOs are connected. Tobin’s Q is defined as 
(total assets + market value of equity − total common equity)/total assets. CEOFinCon, CEOConFinEduc, 
CEOConFinEmpl and CEOConFinOther consequently denote size/degree centrality measure of social connections 
between CEOs of public firms and investment firms by total number of connections, by their current and past overlap 
in education, employment and other activities. Investment firms (i.e., financiers) include those classified by BoardEx as 
“investment companies”, “private equity”, “specialty and other finance”. CEOCon, CEOConEduc, CEOConEmpl, 
CEOConOther consequently denote CEOs economy-wide all social connections, connections via education, 
employment and other activities. Sales Growth is calculated as the annual rate of growth of sales. Leverage is defined 
as the ratio of financial debt divided by the sum of financial debt plus equity. Financial debt is the sum of long term 
debt plus short term loans. Tangibility is calculated as the ratio of fixed to total assets. Ln (Size) is the natural log of 
total assets, Ln (1+Age) - the natural logarithm of (1 + the number of years since incorporation), Ln(MV) - the natural 
logarithm of year-end market value of equity. Book-to-Markets Ratio is book to market ratio at the end of the year. 
Free Cash Flow represents the cash earnings per share, net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid. Ln(CEO 
Age) is the natural logarithm of CEO age in years. Ln(CEO Tenure) is the natural log of CEO tenure in years. CEO 
tenure in a given year is determined as the length of time between the date that the person became the CEO and the 
current fiscal year end.  
Panel A: Distribution of Observations 
Region No. Firms  % 
Africa 216 0.81% 
Asia 880 3.30% 
Australia/New Zealand 568 2.13% 
Central America 182 0.68% 
Europe 5388 20.17% 
Middle East 132 0.49% 
North America 19320 72.34% 
South America 21 0.08% 
Total 26707 100% 
Legal Regime No. Firms  % 
Common Law 25654 96.06% 
French Civil Law 433 1.62% 
German Civil Law 421 1.58% 
Scandinavian Civil Law 199 0.75% 
Total 26707 100% 
Development No. Firms  % 
Developed 26169 97.99% 
Developing 42 0.16% 
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Newly Industrialized Economies 496 1.86% 
Total 26707 100% 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics  
 
N Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
σ(ROA) 26707 0.085 0.045 0.109 0.006 0.577 
σ(ROE) 26707 0.381 0.104 0.876 0.015 4.846 
R&D 14746 0.063 0.022 0.124 0 4.144 
Heterogeneity Index 19165 0.707 0.704 0.077 0.5 1.000 
Tobin’s Q 26707 2.101 1.495 2.736 0.109 154.575 
CEOFinCon 26707 9.407 3 16.283 0 72 
CEOConFinEduc 26707 1.458 0 2.915 0 12 
CEOConFinEmpl 26707 6.140 1 12.587 0 57 
CEOConFinOther 26707 0.018 0 0.131 0 1 
CEOCon 26707 93.923 45 117.162 0 580 
CEOConEduc 26707 22.963 4 35.638 0 128 
CEOConEmpl 26707 76.532 24 117.312 0 491 
CEOConOther 26707 0.297 0 1.603 0 11 
ROA 26707 0.039 0.076 0.249 -13.299 4.064 
Sales Growth 26707 0.201 0.107 0.462 -0.648 2.520 
Leverage 26707 0.280 0.305 6.020 -974.600 38.168 
Tangibility 26707 0.303 0.231 0.254 0.000 0.991 
Ln(Size) 26707 13.140 13.144 2.167 8.533 17.332 
Ln(Age) 26707 2.959 2.944 0.984 0 4.625 
Ln(MV) 26707 13.118 13.141 2.130 8.658 17.146 
Book-to-Markets Ratio 26707 0.577 0.469 1.780 -100 100 
Free Cash Flow 26707 -0.019 0.007 0.126 -4.927 0.705 
Ln(CEO Age) 26707 3.971 3.989 0.158 3.219 4.522 
Ln(CEO Tenure) 26707 1.288 1.386 0.922 0 4.043 
CEOGD 26707 0.024 0 0.154 0 1 
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Table 2: CEO Social capital and Corporate Risk-taking - Propensity Score matching 
This table compares mean values of risk-taking measures for the firms with socially connected CEOs with financiers 
and a control sample of firms run by CEOs with no connections with financiers. For CEO economy-wide connections, 
top and bottom quartiles are compared. The propensity score is estimated by using firm characteristics and country and 
industry effects. The following probit regression is estimated:                                         
                                                                                       
                                             .              is a dummy variable that equals 0 
if CEO is not connected with financers (or CEO is in the bottom quartile of the economy-wide social connections 
measure) and 1 otherwise. σ(ROA) is the volatility of a firm’s return on asset, where return on asset is the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxed to total assets. σ(ROA)  is estimated in five-year overlapping periods. σ(ROA)cross-
sectional is the volatility of return on assets over entire sample period (1999-2012). We require a minimum of five 
observations as does John et al (2008) and Faccio et al (2011).P-values are reported in parentheses. a, b, and c denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.     
     
    Risk-taking Measures Mean Difference P-value 
σ(ROA) 
(CEOs connected with financiers) 
0.1017 
0.0121a [0.0001] 
σ(ROA)  
(CEOs not connected with financiers) 
0.0896 
    
σ(ROA)cross-sectional 
(CEOs connected with financiers) 
0.1138 
0.0131 a [0.0001] 
σ(ROA)cross-sectional  
CEOs not connected with financiers 
0.1007 
    
 
 
  σ(ROA)  
(CEOs in the top quartile of the economy-wide social connections) 
0.0930 
0.0129*** (0.0001) 
σ(ROA)  
(CEOs in the bottom quartile of the economy-wide social connections) 
0.0801 
 
 
  σ(ROA)cross-sectional 
(CEOs in the top quartile of the economy-wide social connections) 
0.0931 
0.0112*** 
(0.0001) 
σ(ROA)cross-sectional 
(CEOs in the bottom quartile of the economy-wide social connections) 
0.0819 
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Table 3: CEO network heterogeneity and risk-taking 
This table presents univariate analysis of CEO network heterogeneity measure and risk-taking. Heterogeneity Index is 
estimated as an average of HetInd, HetInt, HetProf and HetEduc. HetInd is Industry Heterogeneity Index of CEO’s 
social network calculated as the Herfindahl index based on the percentage of people with different industry groups with 
whom CEOs are connected. HetInt is International Heterogeneity - calculated as the Herfindahl index based on the 
percentage of people from foreign countries with whom CEOs are connected. HetProf is the Professional Heterogeneity 
Index, calculated as the Herfindahl index based on the percentage of people with different occupations with whom 
CEOs are connected. HetEduc is the average of three components: educational degree heterogeneity, major 
heterogeneity, and school heterogeneity, calculated as the Herfindahl index based on percentage of people with 
different educational degrees, majors and schools attended with whom CEOs are connected. Theoretically minimum 
value of heterogeneity indices can be 0, which means that the network is highly heterogeneous and nodes in the 
network have different attributes. Maximum value of heterogeneity indices is 1, which means that network is very 
homogeneous. σ(ROA) is the volatility of a firm’s return on asset, where return on asset is the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxed to total assets. σ(ROA)  is estimated in five-year overlapping periods. σ(ROA)cross-sectional is the 
volatility of return on assets over entire sample period (1999-2012). We require a minimum of five observations as 
does John et al (2008) and Faccio et al (2011). P-values are reported in parentheses. a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.     
Heterogeneity Index Quartiles  N σ(ROA) 
1 (High) 4791 0.1000 
2 4791 0.0856 
3 4791 0.0726 
4 (Low) 4791 0.0730 
Difference (High-Low) 
 
0.027a 
P-value (High-Low) 
 
[0.0001] 
Heterogeneity Index Quartiles N σ(ROA)cross-sectional 
1 (High) 993 0.0972 
2 994 0.0852 
3 993 0.0748 
4 (Low) 993 0.0707 
Difference (High-Low) 
 
0.0265a 
T-Stat (High-Low) 
 
[0.0001] 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
67 
T
a
b
le
 4
: 
S
o
ci
a
l 
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
s 
w
it
h
 F
in
a
n
ci
er
s 
a
n
d
 C
o
rp
o
ra
te
 R
is
k
-t
a
k
in
g
 -
 D
o
es
 a
 s
o
ci
a
l 
ca
p
it
a
l 
in
 m
a
n
a
g
er
ia
l 
so
ci
a
l 
n
et
w
o
rk
s 
w
it
h
 
fi
n
a
n
ci
er
s 
p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 a
ff
ec
t 
co
rp
o
ra
te
 r
is
k
-t
a
k
in
g
?
 
T
h
is
 t
ab
le
 r
ep
o
rt
 r
es
u
lt
s 
o
f 
th
e 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
s:
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
. 
R
is
kt
a
ki
n
g
 i
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 b
y
 σ
(R
O
A
) 
- 
th
e 
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
’s
 o
p
er
at
in
g
 r
et
u
rn
 o
n
 a
ss
et
s 
(R
O
A
),
 w
h
er
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
n
 a
ss
et
 i
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 i
n
te
re
st
 a
n
d
 t
ax
ed
 t
o
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
 σ
(R
O
E
) 
- 
th
e 
st
an
d
ar
d
 d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 o
f 
a 
fi
rm
’s
 r
et
u
rn
 o
n
 e
q
u
it
y
 (
R
O
E
),
  
w
h
er
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
n
 e
q
u
it
y
 i
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 i
n
te
re
st
 a
n
d
 t
ax
ed
 t
o
 t
o
ta
l 
st
o
ck
h
o
ld
er
s’
 e
q
u
it
y
 
(b
o
th
 σ
(R
O
A
) 
an
d
 σ
(R
O
E
) 
ar
e 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 i
n
 f
iv
e-
y
ea
r 
o
v
er
la
p
p
in
g
 p
er
io
d
s)
, 
an
d
 R
&
D
 -
 r
es
ea
rc
h
 a
n
d
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
ex
p
en
se
 s
ca
le
d
 b
y
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
S
o
ci
al
 C
ap
it
al
 (
S
c)
 i
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 b
y
 
C
E
O
F
in
C
o
n
, 
C
E
O
C
o
n
F
in
E
d
u
c,
 C
E
O
C
o
n
F
in
E
m
p
l 
a
n
d
 C
E
O
C
o
n
F
in
O
th
er
 -
 c
o
n
se
q
u
en
tl
y
 d
en
o
te
 s
iz
e/
d
eg
re
e 
ce
n
tr
al
it
y
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
so
ci
al
 c
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 C
E
O
s 
o
f 
p
u
b
li
c 
fi
rm
s 
an
d
 e
x
e
cu
ti
v
es
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
er
 f
ir
m
s 
b
y
 t
o
ta
l 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
co
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
s,
 b
y
 t
h
ei
r 
cu
rr
en
t 
an
d
 p
as
t 
o
v
er
la
p
 i
n
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
, 
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
an
d
 o
th
er
 a
ct
iv
it
ie
s.
 C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 i
n
cl
u
d
e:
 S
a
le
s 
G
ro
w
th
, 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
an
n
u
al
 r
at
e 
o
f 
g
ro
w
th
 o
f 
sa
le
s,
 L
ev
er
a
g
e 
d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 d
eb
t 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 d
eb
t 
p
lu
s 
eq
u
it
y
. 
F
in
an
ci
al
 d
eb
t 
is
 t
h
e 
su
m
 
o
f 
lo
n
g
 t
er
m
 d
eb
t 
p
lu
s 
sh
o
rt
 t
er
m
 l
o
an
s.
 T
a
n
g
ib
il
it
y 
is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
fi
x
ed
 t
o
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
L
n
 (
S
iz
e)
 i
s 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
L
n
 (
1
+
A
g
e)
 i
s 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
(1
 +
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
y
ea
rs
 s
in
ce
 i
n
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
),
 L
n
(M
V
) 
- 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
y
ea
r-
en
d
 m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
, 
B
o
o
k-
to
-M
a
rk
et
s 
R
a
ti
o
 -
 b
o
o
k
 t
o
 m
ar
k
et
 r
at
io
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
th
e 
y
ea
r,
 F
re
e 
C
a
sh
 F
lo
w
 -
  
th
e 
ca
sh
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
p
er
 s
h
ar
e,
 n
et
 o
f 
ca
p
it
al
 e
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
s 
an
d
 t
o
ta
l 
d
iv
id
en
d
s 
p
ai
d
, 
L
n
(C
E
O
 A
g
e)
 -
 t
h
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
C
E
O
 a
g
e 
in
 y
ea
rs
, 
L
n
(C
E
O
 
T
en
u
re
) 
- 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
 o
f 
C
E
O
 t
en
u
re
 i
n
 y
ea
rs
. 
C
E
O
 t
en
u
re
 i
n
 a
 g
iv
en
 y
ea
r 
is
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
le
n
g
th
 o
f 
ti
m
e 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
d
at
e 
th
at
 t
h
e 
p
er
so
n
 b
ec
am
e 
th
e 
C
E
O
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
fi
sc
al
 y
ea
r 
en
d
. 
In
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
s 
(1
)-
(4
) 
 d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 i
s 
σ
(R
O
A
),
 i
n
 m
o
d
el
s 
(5
)-
(8
) 
 -
 σ
(R
O
E
) 
an
d
 i
n
 s
p
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
s 
(9
)-
(1
2
) 
- 
R
&
D
. 
p
-v
al
u
es
 a
re
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
 i
n
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. 
a
, 
b
, 
an
d
 c
 d
en
o
te
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
1
%
, 
5
%
 a
n
d
 1
0
%
 l
ev
el
s,
 r
es
p
ec
ti
v
el
y
. 
  
  
   
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
(9
) 
(1
0
) 
(1
1
) 
(1
2
) 
In
te
r
ce
p
t 
0
.2
8
0
8
a  
0
.2
8
2
1
 a
 
0
.2
7
9
6
 a
 
0
.3
1
0
7
 a
 
0
.7
3
3
5
 a
 
0
.7
2
7
6
 a
 
0
.7
2
6
9
 a
 
0
.7
2
0
0
 a
 
0
.1
7
3
2
 a
 
0
.1
7
6
8
 a
 
0
.1
7
1
0
 a
 
0
.1
6
8
7
 a
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
C
E
O
F
in
C
o
n
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 a
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
1
1
 a
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
2
 a
 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
0
3
7
] 
 
 
 
[0
.0
0
3
2
] 
 
 
 
[0
.0
0
3
9
] 
 
 
 
C
E
O
C
o
n
F
in
E
d
u
c
 
 
0
.0
0
0
7
 a
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
2
9
 c
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
1
1
 a
 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
0
0
2
] 
 
 
 
[0
.1
] 
 
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
 
C
E
O
C
o
n
F
in
E
m
p
l 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 b
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
1
8
 a
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 c
 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
1
2
9
] 
 
 
 
[0
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
 
 
[0
.1
] 
 
C
E
O
C
o
n
F
in
O
th
er
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
7
8
 c
 
 
 
 
0
.0
9
5
4
 b
 
 
 
 
0
.0
2
0
0
 b
 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
6
0
6
] 
 
 
 
[0
.0
1
4
5
] 
 
 
 
[0
.0
3
0
6
] 
R
O
E
 
-0
.1
5
5
7
 a
 
-0
.1
5
5
6
 a
 
-0
.1
5
5
8
 a
 
-0
.0
3
5
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
1
3
 a
 
-0
.0
0
1
3
 a
 
-0
.0
0
1
3
 a
 
-0
.0
0
1
3
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
  
0
.0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
-0
.0
2
7
3
 a
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.4
6
1
9
] 
[0
.4
6
5
9
] 
[0
.4
5
9
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
S
a
le
s 
G
ro
w
th
 
0
.0
1
0
5
 a
 
0
.0
1
0
6
 a
 
0
.0
1
0
5
 a
 
0
.0
1
0
7
 a
 
0
.0
3
8
2
 a
 
0
.0
3
8
0
 a
 
0
.0
3
8
3
 a
 
0
.0
3
8
1
 a
 
-0
.0
0
6
9
 a
 
-0
.0
0
6
9
 a
 
-0
.0
0
7
0
 a
 
-0
.0
0
4
6
 a
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
8
] 
[0
.0
0
0
9
] 
[0
.0
0
0
8
] 
[0
.0
0
0
8
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
7
3
] 
  
 
68 
L
ev
er
a
g
e
 
0
.0
0
1
7
 a
 
0
.0
0
1
7
 a
 
0
.0
0
1
7
 a
 
-0
.0
0
0
1
 
-0
.0
0
2
5
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
5
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
5
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
5
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
0
 a
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.2
4
1
8
] 
[0
.0
0
3
2
] 
[0
.0
0
3
1
] 
[0
.0
0
3
2
] 
[0
.0
0
3
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
T
a
n
g
ib
il
it
y
 
-0
.0
4
7
6
 a
 
-0
.0
4
7
7
 a
 
-0
.0
4
7
7
 a
 
-0
.0
4
7
5
 a
 
-0
.1
8
6
8
 a
 
-0
.1
8
9
3
 a
 
-0
.1
8
5
1
 a
 
-0
.1
9
4
5
 a
 
-0
.0
3
3
8
 a
 
-0
.0
3
3
5
 a
 
-0
.0
3
4
3
 a
 
-0
.0
3
9
0
 a
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
L
n
(S
iz
e)
 
-0
.0
1
7
5
 a
 
-0
.0
1
7
4
 a
 
-0
.0
1
7
4
 a
 
-0
.0
1
4
3
 a
 
0
.0
4
1
4
 a
 
0
.0
4
3
6
 a
 
0
.0
4
0
5
 a
 
0
.0
4
4
1
 a
 
-0
.0
2
1
2
 a
 
-0
.0
2
1
0
 a
 
-0
.0
2
0
9
 a
 
-0
.0
1
9
2
 a
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
L
n
(A
g
e)
 
-0
.0
0
4
1
 a
 
-0
.0
0
4
0
 a
 
-0
.0
0
4
0
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
5
 a
 
-0
.0
4
6
9
 a
 
-0
.0
4
5
5
 a
 
-0
.0
4
7
2
 a
 
-0
.0
4
5
7
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
3
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
3
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
4
 a
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
2
] 
[0
.0
0
8
1
] 
L
n
(M
V
) 
0
.0
0
7
1
 a
 
0
.0
0
7
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
7
1
 a
 
0
.0
0
3
8
 a
 
-0
.0
6
5
3
 a
 
-0
.0
6
5
2
 a
 
-0
.0
6
5
1
 a
 
-0
.0
6
5
2
 a
 
0
.0
1
6
0
 a
 
0
.0
1
5
9
 a
 
0
.0
1
6
0
 a
 
0
.0
1
5
9
 a
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
B
M
 R
a
ti
o
 
-0
.0
0
2
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
0
 a
 
-0
.0
3
1
0
 a
 
-0
.0
3
1
1
 a
 
-0
.0
3
1
0
 a
 
-0
.0
3
1
0
 a
 
-0
.0
0
1
2
 b
 
-0
.0
0
1
2
 b
 
-0
.0
0
1
2
 b
 
-0
.0
0
1
9
 a
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
1
4
8
] 
[0
.0
1
3
3
] 
[0
.0
1
4
9
] 
[0
.0
0
0
2
] 
F
re
e 
C
a
sh
 F
lo
w
 
-0
.1
0
6
1
 a
 
-0
.1
0
6
3
 a
 
-0
.1
0
6
1
 a
 
-0
.1
2
0
7
 a
 
-1
.5
5
7
6
 a
 
-1
.5
6
2
1
 a
 
-1
.5
5
5
6
 a
 
-1
.5
6
3
5
 a
 
-0
.3
4
5
4
 a
 
-0
.3
4
5
3
 a
 
-0
.3
4
6
0
 a
 
-0
.1
3
7
4
 a
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
L
n
(C
E
O
 A
g
e)
 
-0
.0
1
0
7
 a
 
-0
.0
1
1
2
 a
 
-0
.0
1
0
6
 a
 
-0
.0
1
7
2
 a
 
0
.0
0
3
1
 
-0
.0
0
2
5
 
0
.0
0
7
1
 
-0
.0
0
1
3
 
-0
.0
1
0
0
 c
 
-0
.0
1
0
9
 b
 
-0
.0
1
0
2
 c
 
-0
.0
1
2
6
 b
 
 
[0
.0
0
3
3
] 
[0
.0
0
2
] 
[0
.0
0
3
6
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.9
2
9
7
] 
[0
.9
4
3
6
] 
[0
.8
4
] 
[0
.9
7
1
4
] 
[0
.0
5
8
5
] 
[0
.0
3
8
8
] 
[0
.0
5
4
7
] 
[0
.0
1
9
5
] 
L
n
(C
E
O
 T
e
n
u
re
) 
-0
.0
0
1
5
 b
 
-0
.0
0
1
6
 a
 
-0
.0
0
1
4
 b
 
-0
.0
0
2
5
 a
 
-0
.0
2
4
2
 a
 
-0
.0
2
4
9
 a
 
-0
.0
2
3
5
 a
 
-0
.0
2
4
7
 a
 
0
.0
0
2
3
 a
 
0
.0
0
2
1
 b
 
0
.0
0
2
3
 a
 
0
.0
0
1
8
 c
 
 
[0
.0
1
6
3
] 
[0
.0
0
9
2
] 
[0
.0
1
8
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
6
3
] 
[0
.0
1
2
2
] 
[0
.0
0
6
2
] 
[0
.0
4
3
7
] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 F
ix
ed
 E
ff
ec
ts
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
In
d
u
st
ry
 F
ix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
ea
r 
F
ix
ed
 E
ff
ec
ts
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
O
b
s 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
1
4
7
4
6
 
1
4
7
4
6
 
1
4
7
4
6
 
1
4
7
4
6
 
A
d
jR
2
 
0
.3
8
6
2
 
0
.3
8
6
3
 
0
.3
8
6
1
 
0
.3
8
6
0
 
0
.1
2
5
8
 
0
.1
2
5
4
 
0
.1
2
6
0
 
0
.1
2
5
7
 
0
.4
9
0
5
 
0
.4
9
0
9
 
0
.4
9
0
3
 
0
.4
9
0
3
 
    
  
 
69 
T
a
b
le
 5
: 
E
co
n
o
m
y
-w
id
e 
S
o
ci
a
l 
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
s 
a
n
d
 C
o
rp
o
ra
te
 R
is
k
-t
a
k
in
g
 –
 I
s 
th
er
e 
a
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
a
ss
o
ci
a
ti
o
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
ce
n
tr
a
li
ty
 o
f 
C
E
O
s 
ec
o
n
o
m
y
-w
id
e 
so
ci
a
l 
n
et
w
o
rk
s 
a
n
d
 c
o
rp
o
ra
te
 r
is
k
-t
a
k
in
g
?
 
T
h
is
 t
ab
le
 r
ep
o
rt
 r
es
u
lt
s 
o
f 
th
e 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
s:
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
. 
R
is
kt
a
ki
n
g
 i
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 b
y
 σ
(R
O
A
) 
- 
th
e 
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
’s
 o
p
er
at
in
g
 r
et
u
rn
 o
n
 a
ss
et
s 
(R
O
A
),
 w
h
er
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
n
 a
ss
et
 i
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 i
n
te
re
st
 a
n
d
 t
ax
ed
 t
o
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
 σ
(R
O
E
) 
- 
th
e 
st
an
d
ar
d
 d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 o
f 
a 
fi
rm
’s
 r
et
u
rn
 o
n
 e
q
u
it
y
 (
R
O
E
),
  
w
h
er
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
n
 e
q
u
it
y
 i
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 i
n
te
re
st
 a
n
d
 t
ax
ed
 t
o
 t
o
ta
l 
st
o
ck
h
o
ld
er
s’
 e
q
u
it
y
 
(b
o
th
 σ
(R
O
A
) 
an
d
 σ
(R
O
E
) 
ar
e 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 i
n
 f
iv
e-
y
ea
r 
o
v
er
la
p
p
in
g
 p
er
io
d
s)
, 
an
d
 R
&
D
 -
 r
es
ea
rc
h
 a
n
d
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
ex
p
en
se
 s
ca
le
d
 b
y
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
S
o
ci
al
 C
ap
it
al
 (
S
c)
 i
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 b
y
 
C
E
O
C
o
n
, 
C
E
O
C
o
n
E
d
u
c,
 C
E
O
C
o
n
E
m
p
l,
 C
E
O
C
o
n
O
th
er
 -
 c
o
n
se
q
u
en
tl
y
 d
en
o
te
 C
E
O
s 
ec
o
n
o
m
y
-w
id
e 
al
l 
so
ci
al
 c
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
s,
 c
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
s 
v
ia
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
, 
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
an
d
 o
th
er
 
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s.
 C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 i
n
cl
u
d
e:
 S
a
le
s 
G
ro
w
th
, 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
an
n
u
al
 r
at
e 
o
f 
g
ro
w
th
 o
f 
sa
le
s,
 L
ev
er
a
g
e 
d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 d
eb
t 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 d
eb
t 
p
lu
s 
eq
u
it
y
. 
F
in
an
ci
al
 d
eb
t 
is
 t
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
lo
n
g
 t
er
m
 d
eb
t 
p
lu
s 
sh
o
rt
 t
er
m
 l
o
an
s.
 T
a
n
g
ib
il
it
y 
is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
fi
x
ed
 t
o
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
L
n
 (
S
iz
e)
 i
s 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
L
n
 
(1
+
A
g
e)
 i
s 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
(1
 +
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
y
ea
rs
 s
in
ce
 i
n
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
),
 L
n
(M
V
) 
- 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
y
ea
r-
en
d
 m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
, 
B
o
o
k-
to
-M
a
rk
et
s 
R
a
ti
o
 -
 b
o
o
k
 
to
 m
ar
k
et
 r
at
io
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
th
e 
y
ea
r,
 F
re
e 
C
a
sh
 F
lo
w
 -
  
th
e 
ca
sh
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
p
er
 s
h
ar
e,
 n
et
 o
f 
ca
p
it
al
 e
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
s 
an
d
 t
o
ta
l 
d
iv
id
en
d
s 
p
ai
d
, 
L
n
(C
E
O
 A
g
e)
 -
 t
h
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
C
E
O
 a
g
e 
in
 y
ea
rs
, 
L
n
(C
E
O
 T
en
u
re
) 
- 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
 o
f 
C
E
O
 t
en
u
re
 i
n
 y
ea
rs
. 
C
E
O
 t
en
u
re
 i
n
 a
 g
iv
en
 y
ea
r 
is
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
le
n
g
th
 o
f 
ti
m
e 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
d
at
e 
th
at
 t
h
e 
p
er
so
n
 
b
ec
am
e 
th
e 
C
E
O
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
fi
sc
al
 y
ea
r 
en
d
. 
In
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
s 
(1
)-
(4
) 
 d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 i
s 
σ
(R
O
A
),
 i
n
 m
o
d
el
s 
(5
)-
(8
) 
 -
 σ
(R
O
E
) 
an
d
 i
n
 s
p
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
s 
(9
)-
(1
2
) 
- 
R
&
D
. 
p
-v
al
u
es
 
ar
e 
re
p
o
rt
ed
 i
n
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. 
a
, 
b
, 
an
d
 c
 d
en
o
te
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
1
%
, 
5
%
 a
n
d
 1
0
%
 l
ev
el
s,
 r
es
p
ec
ti
v
el
y
. 
  
  
  
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
(9
) 
(1
0
) 
(1
1
) 
(1
2
) 
In
te
r
ce
p
t 
0
.2
8
5
6
a  
0
.2
8
3
6
 a
 
0
.2
8
3
4
 a
 
0
.3
3
6
7
 a
 
0
.7
8
7
0
 a
 
0
.7
3
4
7
 a
 
0
.7
8
1
0
 a
 
0
.6
7
4
9
 a
 
0
.1
8
6
8
 a
 
0
.1
7
8
1
 a
 
0
.1
7
9
2
 a
 
0
.1
6
8
0
 a
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
C
E
O
C
o
n
 
0
.0
0
0
0
2
a  
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
2
 a
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
0
5
 a
 
 
 
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
 
 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
 
 
C
E
O
C
o
n
E
d
u
c
 
 
0
.0
0
0
0
6
 a
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
2
8
c  
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
1
1
a  
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
 
 
[0
.0
7
] 
 
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
 
C
E
O
C
o
n
E
m
p
l 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
0
2
3
a  
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
3
4
a  
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
0
5
a  
 
 
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
 
 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
 
 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
C
E
O
C
o
n
O
th
e
r
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
8
 b
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
4
8
3
 c
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
2
3
a  
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
1
7
8
] 
 
 
 
[0
.0
8
0
1
] 
 
 
 
[0
.0
0
7
9
] 
R
O
E
 
-0
.1
5
5
1
a  
-0
.1
5
5
5
 a
 
-0
.1
5
5
3
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
-0
.0
0
1
3
 a
 
-0
.0
0
1
3
a  
-0
.0
0
1
3
a  
-0
.0
0
1
4
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
a  
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.7
5
6
4
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.4
7
2
2
] 
[0
.4
7
1
9
] 
[0
.4
5
7
9
] 
[0
.4
6
1
2
] 
S
a
le
s 
G
ro
w
th
 
0
.0
1
0
6
 a
 
0
.0
1
0
6
 a
 
0
.0
1
0
6
 a
 
0
.0
1
0
0
 a
 
0
.0
3
9
1
 a
 
0
.0
3
8
1
 a
 
0
.0
3
9
4
 a
 
0
.0
3
5
4
 a
 
-0
.0
0
6
6
 a
 
-0
.0
0
6
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
6
7
 a
 
-0
.0
0
6
8
a  
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
6
] 
[0
.0
0
0
8
] 
[0
.0
0
0
6
] 
[0
.0
0
2
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
L
ev
er
a
g
e
 
0
.0
0
1
7
 a
 
0
.0
0
1
7
 a
 
0
.0
0
1
7
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
-0
.0
0
2
4
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
5
a  
-0
.0
0
2
4
 a
 
-0
.0
0
0
7
 
-0
.0
0
2
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
2
a  
  
 
70 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.8
2
7
6
] 
[0
.0
0
3
6
] 
[0
.0
0
3
2
] 
[0
.0
0
3
7
] 
[0
.4
2
4
6
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
T
a
n
g
ib
il
it
y
 
-0
.0
4
6
9
 a
 
-0
.0
4
7
6
 a
 
-0
.0
4
7
0
 a
 
-0
.0
5
5
0
 a
  
-0
.1
7
8
3
 a
 
-0
.1
9
0
9
 a
 
-0
.1
7
3
7
 a
 
-0
.2
3
0
7
 a
 
-0
.0
3
1
0
 a
 
-0
.0
3
2
6
 a
 
-0
.0
3
1
6
a  
-0
.0
3
4
3
a  
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
L
n
(S
iz
e)
 
-0
.0
1
7
7
 a
 
-0
.0
1
7
4
a  
-0
.0
1
7
7
a  
-0
.0
1
4
6
 a
 
0
.0
3
8
5
 
0
.0
4
3
3
a  
0
.0
3
6
8
a  
0
.0
2
8
3
 a
 
-0
.0
2
2
3
 a
 
-0
.0
2
1
1
 a
 
-0
.0
2
2
0
 a
 
-0
.0
2
0
8
a  
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
L
n
(A
g
e)
 
-0
.0
0
4
1
 a
 
-0
.0
0
4
0
 a
 
-0
.0
0
4
1
a  
-0
.0
0
4
1
 a
 
-0
.0
4
7
3
 
-0
.0
4
5
6
a  
-0
.0
4
8
0
a  
-0
.0
4
1
9
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
5
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
6
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
4
a  
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
L
n
(M
V
) 
0
.0
0
6
9
 a
 
0
.0
0
7
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
7
0
a  
0
.0
0
2
5
 a
 
-0
.0
6
7
1
 
-0
.0
6
5
2
a  
-0
.0
6
7
0
 a
 
-0
.0
5
3
4
 a
 
0
.0
1
5
7
 a
 
0
.0
1
5
8
 a
 
0
.0
1
5
8
 a
 
0
.0
1
6
0
a  
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
B
o
o
k
-t
o
-M
a
r
k
et
s 
R
a
ti
o
 
-0
.0
0
2
9
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
9
a  
-0
.0
0
2
8
 a
 
-0
.0
3
1
2
 
-0
.0
3
1
1
a  
-0
.0
3
1
2
 a
 
-0
.0
3
1
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
1
2
b
 
-0
.0
0
1
2
b
 
-0
.0
0
1
2
b
 
-0
.0
0
1
2
b
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
1
7
9
] 
[0
.0
1
3
8
] 
[0
.0
1
9
2
] 
[0
.0
1
4
5
] 
F
re
e 
C
a
sh
 F
lo
w
 
-0
.1
0
6
0
 a
 
-0
.1
0
6
4
 a
 
-0
.1
0
5
9
a  
-0
.1
3
4
3
 a
 
-1
.5
4
8
6
 
-1
.5
6
1
9
a  
-1
.5
4
4
1
 a
 
-0
.7
7
1
6
 a
 
-0
.3
4
2
0
 a
 
-0
.3
4
4
8
 a
 
-0
.3
4
2
8
 a
 
-0
.3
4
5
9
a  
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
L
n
(C
E
O
 A
g
e)
 
-0
.0
1
1
0
 a
 
-0
.0
1
1
5
 a
 
-0
.0
1
0
6
a  
-0
.0
1
9
2
 a
 
0
.0
0
1
0
 
-0
.0
0
3
2
 
0
.0
0
7
3
 
0
.0
3
0
4
 
-0
.0
0
9
6
c  
-0
.0
1
0
8
b
 
-0
.0
0
8
8
 c
 
-0
.0
0
9
6
c  
 
[0
.0
0
2
5
] 
[0
.0
0
1
5
] 
[0
.0
0
3
6
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.9
7
6
2
] 
[0
.9
2
7
8
] 
[0
.8
3
3
4
] 
[0
.3
7
9
5
] 
[0
.0
7
1
] 
[0
.0
4
2
] 
[0
.0
9
6
3
] 
[0
.0
7
] 
L
n
(C
E
O
 T
e
n
u
re
) 
-0
.0
0
1
4
b
 
-0
.0
0
1
6
a  
-0
.0
0
1
3
b
 
-0
.0
0
3
0
 a
 
-0
.0
2
3
4
 
-0
.0
2
5
1
a  
-0
.0
2
1
9
 a
 
-0
.0
2
7
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
2
6
 a
 
0
.0
0
2
2
b
 
0
.0
0
2
8
 a
 
0
.0
0
2
4
a  
 
[0
.0
2
1
] 
[0
.0
0
8
8
] 
[0
.0
2
8
2
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
2
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
2
] 
[0
.0
1
0
9
] 
[0
.0
0
1
1
] 
[0
.0
0
5
3
] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 F
ix
ed
 E
ff
ec
ts
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
In
d
u
st
ry
 F
ix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
ea
r 
F
ix
ed
 E
ff
ec
ts
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
O
b
s 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
2
6
7
0
7
 
1
4
7
4
6
 
1
4
7
4
6
 
1
4
7
4
6
 
1
4
7
4
6
 
A
d
jR
2
 
0
.3
8
7
 
0
.3
8
6
 
0
.3
8
6
 
0
.3
8
6
 
0
.1
2
6
 
0
.1
2
6
 
0
.1
2
7
 
0
.1
2
6
 
0
.4
9
2
 
0
.4
9
1
 
0
.4
9
1
 
0
.4
9
1
 
    
  
 
71 
T
a
b
le
 6
: 
H
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
 o
f 
C
E
O
 S
o
ci
a
l 
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
s 
a
n
d
 C
o
rp
o
ra
te
 R
is
k
-t
a
k
in
g
 –
 I
s 
th
er
e 
a
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
a
ss
o
ci
a
ti
o
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
h
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
 
o
f 
m
a
n
a
g
er
ia
l 
so
ci
a
l 
n
et
w
o
rk
s 
a
n
d
 c
o
rp
o
ra
te
 r
is
k
-t
a
k
in
g
?
  
T
h
is
 t
ab
le
 r
ep
o
rt
 r
es
u
lt
s 
o
f 
th
e 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
s:
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
. 
R
is
kt
a
ki
n
g
 i
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 b
y
 σ
(R
O
A
) 
- 
th
e 
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
’s
 o
p
er
at
in
g
 r
et
u
rn
 o
n
 a
ss
et
s 
(R
O
A
),
 w
h
er
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
n
 a
ss
et
 i
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 i
n
te
re
st
 a
n
d
 t
ax
ed
 t
o
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
 σ
(R
O
E
) 
- 
th
e 
st
an
d
ar
d
 d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 o
f 
a 
fi
rm
’s
 r
et
u
rn
 o
n
 e
q
u
it
y
 (
R
O
E
),
  
w
h
er
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
n
 e
q
u
it
y
 i
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 i
n
te
re
st
 a
n
d
 t
ax
ed
 t
o
 t
o
ta
l 
st
o
ck
h
o
ld
er
s’
 e
q
u
it
y
 
(b
o
th
 σ
(R
O
A
) 
an
d
 σ
(R
O
E
) 
ar
e 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 i
n
 f
iv
e-
y
ea
r 
o
v
er
la
p
p
in
g
 p
er
io
d
s)
, 
an
d
 R
&
D
 -
 r
es
ea
rc
h
 a
n
d
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
ex
p
en
se
 s
ca
le
d
 b
y
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
S
o
ci
al
 C
ap
it
al
 (
S
c)
 i
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 b
y
 
C
E
O
C
o
n
 -
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
C
E
O
’s
 a
ll
 s
o
ci
al
 c
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
s.
 N
H
 i
s 
n
et
w
o
rk
 h
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
 m
ea
su
re
s:
 H
et
In
d
, 
H
et
In
t,
 H
et
P
ro
f 
a
n
d
 H
et
E
d
u
c
. 
H
et
In
d
 i
s 
In
d
u
st
ry
 H
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
 I
n
d
ex
 o
f 
C
E
O
’s
 s
o
ci
al
 n
et
w
o
rk
 c
al
cu
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
H
er
fi
n
d
ah
l 
in
d
ex
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
p
eo
p
le
 w
it
h
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
in
d
u
st
ry
 g
ro
u
p
s 
w
it
h
 w
h
o
m
 C
E
O
s 
ar
e 
co
n
n
ec
te
d
. 
H
et
In
t 
is
 I
n
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 
H
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
 -
 c
al
cu
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
H
er
fi
n
d
ah
l 
in
d
ex
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
p
eo
p
le
 f
ro
m
 f
o
re
ig
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
w
it
h
 w
h
o
m
 C
E
O
s 
ar
e 
co
n
n
ec
te
d
. 
H
et
P
ro
f 
is
 t
h
e 
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
 
H
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
 I
n
d
ex
, 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
H
er
fi
n
d
ah
l 
in
d
ex
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
p
eo
p
le
 w
it
h
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s 
w
it
h
 w
h
o
m
 C
E
O
s 
ar
e 
co
n
n
ec
te
d
. 
H
et
E
d
u
c 
is
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
o
f 
th
re
e 
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
: 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
al
 d
eg
re
e 
h
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
, 
m
aj
o
r 
h
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
, 
an
d
 s
ch
o
o
l 
h
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
, 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
H
er
fi
n
d
a
h
l 
in
d
ex
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
p
eo
p
le
 w
it
h
 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
al
 d
eg
re
es
, 
m
aj
o
rs
 a
n
d
 s
ch
o
o
ls
 a
tt
en
d
ed
 w
it
h
 w
h
o
m
 C
E
O
s 
ar
e 
co
n
n
ec
te
d
. 
H
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
 I
n
d
ex
 i
s 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 a
s 
an
 a
v
er
ag
e 
o
f 
al
l 
h
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
 s
u
b
-i
n
d
ic
es
. 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 i
n
cl
u
d
e:
 S
a
le
s 
G
ro
w
th
, 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
an
n
u
al
 r
at
e 
o
f 
g
ro
w
th
 o
f 
sa
le
s,
 L
ev
er
a
g
e 
d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 d
eb
t 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 d
eb
t 
p
lu
s 
eq
u
it
y
. 
F
in
an
ci
al
 d
eb
t 
is
 t
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
lo
n
g
 t
er
m
 d
eb
t 
p
lu
s 
sh
o
rt
 t
er
m
 l
o
an
s.
 T
a
n
g
ib
il
it
y 
is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
fi
x
ed
 t
o
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
L
n
 (
S
iz
e)
 i
s 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, 
L
n
 (
1
+
A
g
e)
 
is
 t
h
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
(1
 +
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
y
ea
rs
 s
in
ce
 i
n
co
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
),
 L
n
(M
V
) 
- 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
y
ea
r-
en
d
 m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
, 
B
o
o
k-
to
-M
a
rk
et
s 
R
a
ti
o
 -
 b
o
o
k
 t
o
 
m
ar
k
et
 r
at
io
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
th
e 
y
ea
r,
 F
re
e 
C
a
sh
 F
lo
w
 -
  
th
e 
ca
sh
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
p
er
 s
h
ar
e,
 n
et
 o
f 
ca
p
it
al
 e
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
s 
an
d
 t
o
ta
l 
d
iv
id
en
d
s 
p
ai
d
, 
L
n
(C
E
O
 A
g
e)
 -
 t
h
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
C
E
O
 
ag
e 
in
 y
ea
rs
, 
L
n
(C
E
O
 T
en
u
re
) 
- 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
 o
f 
C
E
O
 t
en
u
re
 i
n
 y
ea
rs
. 
C
E
O
 t
en
u
re
 i
n
 a
 g
iv
en
 y
ea
r 
is
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
le
n
g
th
 o
f 
ti
m
e 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
d
at
e 
th
at
 t
h
e 
p
er
so
n
 b
ec
am
e 
th
e 
C
E
O
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
fi
sc
al
 y
ea
r 
en
d
. 
In
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
s 
(1
)-
(5
) 
 d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 i
s 
σ
(R
O
A
),
 i
n
 m
o
d
el
s 
(6
)-
(1
0
) 
 -
 σ
(R
O
E
) 
an
d
 i
n
 s
p
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
s 
(1
1
)-
(1
5
) 
- 
R
&
D
. 
p
-v
al
u
es
 a
re
 
re
p
o
rt
ed
 i
n
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. 
a
, 
b
, 
an
d
 c
 d
en
o
te
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
1
%
, 
5
%
 a
n
d
 1
0
%
 l
ev
el
s,
 r
es
p
ec
ti
v
el
y
. 
  
  
  
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
(9
) 
(1
0
) 
(1
1
) 
(1
2
) 
(1
3
) 
(1
4
) 
(1
5
) 
In
te
r
ce
p
t 
0
.3
1
2
5
a  
0
.3
3
9
2
 a
 
0
.3
2
8
3
 a
 
0
.3
2
8
9
 a
 
0
.3
2
3
1
 a
 
0
.4
2
4
3
 a
 
0
.4
9
2
1
 a
 
0
.3
8
4
9
 b
 
0
.4
0
3
9
 
0
.4
2
9
3
 b
 
0
.1
9
3
7
 a
 
0
.2
4
6
8
 a
 
0
.1
9
4
7
 a
 
0
.2
2
6
7
 a
 
0
.2
2
0
8
 a
 
 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
2
5
7
] 
[0
.0
0
3
1
] 
[0
.0
1
6
1
] 
[0
.0
0
9
9
] 
[0
.0
2
5
2
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
H
et
E
d
u
c
 
-0
.0
1
2
2
 b
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.1
2
9
2
 b
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
1
6
4
c  
 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
5
] 
 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
3
5
7
] 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
7
0
6
] 
 
 
 
 
H
et
In
d
 
 
-0
.0
1
5
2
 a
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
6
9
6
 c
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
6
5
5
 a
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
0
0
3
] 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
8
8
2
] 
 
 
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
 
 
H
et
In
t 
 
 
-0
.0
0
9
9
 a
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
5
6
9
 c
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
2
4
1
 a
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
0
7
3
] 
 
 
 
 
[0
.1
0
] 
 
 
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
 
H
et
P
ro
f 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
0
6
1
c  
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
6
0
5
 c
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
9
6
8
 a
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
9
3
] 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
7
4
8
] 
 
 
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
 
H
et
er
o
g
. 
In
d
ex
  
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
3
6
0
 a
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.1
7
1
6
 c
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
9
0
1
 a
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
0
0
2
] 
 
 
 
 
[0
.0
7
0
2
] 
 
 
 
 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
C
E
O
C
o
n
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
2
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
2
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 a
 
  
 
72 
 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
7
] 
[0
.0
0
0
8
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.6
5
2
2
] 
[0
.0
0
1
7
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
R
O
E
 
0
.0
0
0
0
  
0
.0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
-0
.0
0
2
9
 a
 
-0
.0
0
1
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
1
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
9
 a
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 b
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 b
 
0
.0
0
0
1
 b
 
 
[0
.5
2
5
9
] 
[0
.7
8
3
4
] 
[0
.7
9
0
9
] 
[0
.7
3
7
6
] 
[0
.5
2
6
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
 <
.0
0
0
1
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
1
4
] 
[0
.2
3
6
3
] 
[0
.2
5
3
1
] 
[0
.0
1
3
4
] 
[0
.0
1
4
] 
S
a
le
s 
G
ro
w
th
 
0
.0
1
1
8
 a
 
0
.0
1
1
0
 a
 
0
.0
1
1
1
 a
 
0
.0
1
1
3
 
0
.0
1
1
8
 a
 
0
.0
6
1
3
 a
 
0
.0
4
1
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
2
9
 
0
.0
3
4
9
 a
 
0
.0
6
1
6
 a
 
-0
.0
0
5
9
 a
 
-0
.0
0
6
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
6
5
 a
 
-0
.0
0
5
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
6
0
 a
 
 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
1
4
] 
[0
.8
6
4
5
] 
[0
.0
0
4
4
] 
[ 
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
1
9
] 
[0
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
2
] 
[0
.0
0
2
2
] 
[0
.0
0
1
6
] 
L
ev
er
a
g
e
 
-0
.0
0
0
3
 a
 
-0
.0
0
0
3
 a
 
-0
.0
0
0
3
 a
 
-0
.0
0
0
3
 a
 
-0
.0
0
0
3
 a
 
0
.8
0
7
4
 a
 
0
.8
2
8
6
 a
 
0
.8
3
0
9
 a
 
0
.5
2
0
8
 a
 
0
.8
0
5
9
 a
 
0
.0
4
3
2
 a
 
0
.0
4
1
7
 a
 
0
.0
4
1
0
 a
 
0
.0
4
2
9
 a
 
0
.0
4
3
3
 a
 
 
[0
.0
0
1
1
] 
[0
.0
0
1
1
] 
[0
.0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
8
] 
[0
.0
0
1
2
] 
[ 
<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
T
a
n
g
ib
il
it
y
 
-0
.0
5
1
7
 a
 
-0
.0
5
4
9
 a
 
-0
.0
5
4
7
 a
 
-0
.0
5
4
6
 a
 
-0
.0
5
1
6
 a
 
-0
.1
2
8
9
 a
 
-0
.1
1
4
7
 a
 
-0
.1
1
7
7
 a
 
-0
.1
6
0
4
 a
 
-0
.1
2
8
4
 a
 
-0
.0
3
4
8
 a
 
-0
.0
3
5
6
 a
 
-0
.0
3
5
 a
 0
 -
0
.0
3
3
9
 a
 
-0
.0
3
5
6
 a
 
 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
3
] 
[0
.0
0
0
3
] 
[0
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
3
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
L
n
(S
iz
e)
 
-0
.0
1
0
4
 a
 
-0
.0
1
2
0
 a
 
-0
.0
1
2
0
 a
 
-0
.0
1
0
9
 a
 
-0
.0
1
0
4
 a
 
-0
.0
1
1
4
 
-0
.0
1
9
7
 b
 
-0
.0
1
5
4
 b
 
-0
.0
1
2
3
 b
 
-0
.0
1
2
1
 
-0
.0
2
9
0
 a
 
-0
.0
2
7
1
 a
 
-0
.0
2
6
7
 a
 
-0
.0
2
9
2
 a
 
-0
.0
2
8
7
 a
 
 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.1
9
2
2
] 
[0
.0
1
2
] 
[0
.0
4
7
8
] 
[0
.0
9
3
1
] 
[0
.1
6
8
3
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
L
n
(A
g
e)
 
-0
.0
0
3
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
4
0
 a
 
-0
.0
0
4
1
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
6
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
2
 a
 
-0
.0
3
5
5
 a
 
-0
.0
3
8
3
 a
 
-0
.0
4
0
1
 a
 
-0
.0
4
1
7
 a
 
-0
.0
3
5
7
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
4
 a
 
-0
.0
0
3
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
3
 b
 
-0
.0
0
2
5
 b
 
 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
4
6
] 
[0
.0
0
8
8
] 
[0
.0
0
0
5
] 
[0
.0
1
6
3
] 
[0
.0
1
1
6
] 
L
n
(M
V
) 
-0
.0
0
2
1
 b
 
-0
.0
0
1
2
 
-0
.0
0
1
1
 
-0
.0
0
2
4
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
2
 a
 
-0
.0
2
7
4
 a
 
-0
.0
1
3
9
 c
 
-0
.0
1
4
7
 
-0
.0
1
3
1
 c
 
-0
.0
2
7
7
 a
 
0
.0
2
0
0
 a
 
0
.0
1
9
0
 a
 
0
.0
1
9
 5
 a
 
0
.0
1
9
7
 a
 
0
.0
1
9
8
 a
 
 
[0
.0
1
1
2
] 
[0
.1
0
3
1
] 
[0
.1
3
8
7
] 
[0
.0
0
0
5
] 
[0
.0
0
7
9
] 
[0
.0
0
0
8
] 
[0
.0
5
1
9
] 
[0
.0
4
] 
[0
.0
5
9
2
] 
[0
.0
0
0
7
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
B
M
 R
a
ti
o
 
-0
.0
0
4
8
 a
 
-0
.0
0
4
4
 a
 
-0
.0
0
4
4
 a
 
-0
.0
0
4
4
 a
 
-0
.0
0
4
8
 a
 
-0
.0
3
8
1
 a
 
-0
.0
2
9
8
 a
 
-0
.0
3
1
3
 a
 
-0
.0
1
7
1
 a
 
-0
.0
3
8
0
 a
 
-0
.0
0
0
6
 
-0
.0
0
0
2
 
-0
.0
0
0
2
 
-0
.0
0
0
6
 
-0
.0
0
0
6
 
 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.5
2
4
9
] 
[0
.7
3
6
4
] 
[0
.7
7
8
7
] 
[0
.5
1
9
8
] 
[0
.5
0
7
9
] 
F
re
e 
C
a
sh
 F
lo
w
 
-0
.2
9
2
1
 a
 
-0
.2
8
8
5
 a
 
-0
.2
8
8
9
 a
 
-0
.2
8
9
7
 a
 
-0
.2
9
1
8
 a
 
-1
.4
0
4
9
 a
 
-1
.4
0
5
8
 a
 
-1
.5
1
0
7
 a
 
-0
.7
4
1
1
 a
 
-1
.4
0
1
3
 a
 
-0
.3
4
6
9
 a
 
-0
.3
5
4
3
 a
 
-0
.3
5
6
9
 a
 
-0
.3
4
5
4
 a
 
-0
.3
4
7
6
 a
 
 
[.
0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
L
n
(C
E
O
 A
g
e)
 
-0
.0
1
3
9
 a
 
-0
.0
1
5
0
 a
 
-0
.0
1
3
9
 a
 
-0
.0
1
5
1
 a
 
-0
.0
1
1
7
 b
 
0
.0
4
3
2
 
0
.0
0
5
1
 
0
.0
1
8
9
 
0
.0
4
8
5
 
0
.0
5
5
9
 
-0
.0
0
5
3
 
-0
.0
1
0
2
 c
 
-0
.0
0
8
7
 
0
.0
0
3
3
 
0
.0
0
1
5
 
 
[0
.0
0
2
6
] 
[0
.0
0
0
2
] 
[0
.0
0
0
6
] 
[0
.0
0
0
2
] 
[0
.0
1
1
5
] 
[0
.3
3
7
5
] 
[0
.8
9
5
9
] 
[0
.6
2
6
9
] 
[0
.2
1
0
3
] 
[0
.2
1
7
2
] 
[0
.4
0
2
1
] 
[0
.0
7
0
8
] 
[0
.1
2
9
1
] 
[0
.6
0
4
4
] 
[0
.8
1
8
4
] 
L
n
(C
E
O
 T
e
n
u
re
) 
-0
.0
0
2
3
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
2
 a
 
-0
.0
0
2
3
 a
 
-0
.0
2
6
0
 a
 
-0
.0
1
7
7
 a
 
-0
.0
1
5
0
 b
 
-0
.0
2
5
3
 a
 
-0
.0
2
4
4
 a
 
0
.0
0
2
5
 b
 
0
.0
0
3
3
 a
 
0
.0
0
2
9
 a
 
0
.0
0
3
0
 a
 
0
.0
0
2
7
 a
 
 
[0
.0
0
1
5
] 
[0
.0
0
0
9
] 
[0
.0
0
0
8
] 
[0
.0
0
1
1
] 
[0
.0
0
2
] 
[0
.0
0
0
3
] 
[0
.0
0
5
1
] 
[0
.0
1
5
3
] 
[<
.0
0
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
6
] 
[0
.0
1
0
1
] 
[0
.0
0
0
3
] 
[0
.0
0
1
5
] 
[0
.0
0
2
6
] 
[0
.0
0
6
] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 F
E
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
In
d
u
st
ry
 F
E
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
ea
r 
F
E
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
O
b
s 
1
9
1
6
5
 
1
9
1
6
5
 
1
9
1
6
5
 
1
9
1
6
5
 
1
9
1
6
5
 
1
8
1
7
9
 
2
1
1
0
6
 
2
1
1
0
6
 
2
3
2
2
9
 
1
8
1
7
9
 
1
1
2
1
2
 
1
1
2
1
2
 
1
1
2
1
2
 
1
1
2
1
2
 
1
1
2
1
2
 
A
d
jR
2
 
0
.3
4
4
0
 
0
.3
4
4
1
 
0
.3
4
3
9
 
0
.3
4
4
0
 
0
.3
4
4
4
 
0
.1
7
2
1
 
0
.1
5
9
6
 
0
.1
5
9
6
 
0
.1
7
6
5
 
0
.1
6
7
0
 
0
.4
9
7
6
 
0
.5
0
0
2
 
0
.4
9
7
7
 
0
.4
9
8
1
 
0
.5
0
0
2
 
  
 73 
 
Table 7: CEO Social Connections, Corporate Risk-taking and Female-tied networks– Is the 
association between social capital in managerial social networks and corporate risk-taking 
weaker for female-tied networks?  
This table report results of the following regressions:                                            
                                                                                           
                                                                                       
              . Risktaking is measured by σ(ROA) - the volatility of the firm’s operating return on assets (ROA), 
where return on asset is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxed to total assets,  σ(ROE) - the standard deviation 
of a firm’s return on equity (ROE),  where return on equity is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxed to total 
stockholders’ equity (both σ(ROA) and σ(ROE) are estimated in five-year overlapping periods), and R&D - research 
and development expense scaled by total assets. Social Capital (Sc) is measured by CEOFinCon and CEOCon - 
consequently denote number of CEO’s all social connections with financiers and number of CEO’s economy-wide all 
social connections.  is a dummy variable and in specifications (1) – (3) is denoted by FinMTN - equals 0 if proportion 
of female-male or male-female-tied networks within CEOs social network with financiers equals 0 and 1 other wise 
and FinFTN - equals 0 if proportion of female-tied networks within CEOs social network with financiers equals 0 and 1 
other wise. In regressions (4)-(6)    is denoted by MTN - equals 0 if proportion of female-male or male-female-tied 
networks within CEOs social network equals 0 and 1 other wise and FTN - equals 0 if proportion of female-tied 
networks within CEOs social network equals 0 and 1 otherwise. Controls include: Sales Growth, calculated as the 
annual rate of growth of sales, Leverage defined as the ratio of financial debt divided by the sum of financial debt plus 
equity. Financial debt is the sum of long term debt plus short term loans. Tangibility is calculated as the ratio of fixed to 
total assets, Ln (Size) is the natural log of total assets, Ln (1+Age) is the natural logarithm of (1 + the number of years 
since incorporation), Ln(MV) - the natural logarithm of year-end market value of equity, Book-to-Markets Ratio - book 
to market ratio at the end of the year, Free Cash Flow -  the cash earnings per share, net of capital expenditures and 
total dividends paid, Ln(CEO Age) - the natural logarithm of CEO age in years, Ln(CEO Tenure) - the natural log of 
CEO tenure in years. CEO tenure in a given year is determined as the length of time between the date that the person 
became the CEO and the current fiscal year end. CeoGD is a dummy variable for CEO gender. In regressions (1) and 
(4) dependent variable is σ(ROA), in (2) and (5)  - σ(ROE) and in specifications (3) and (6) - R&D. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Intercept 0.2688
a 0.4835 b -0.0201 0.2862 a 0.7566 a 0.1005 a 
 
[<.0001] [0.0112] [0.528] [ <.0001] [ <.0001] [<.0001] 
CEOFinCon 0.0003
 a 0.0023 b -0.0003 
   
 
[0.0013] [0.0127] [0.1412] 
   
CEOCon 
   
0.00002 a 0.0001 b 0.00005 a 
    
[ <.0001] [0.0117] [<.0001] 
CEOFinCon*FinMTN -0.00038
 a -0.0026 b 0.00003 
   
 
[0.0001] [0.0107] [0.8367] 
   
CEOFinCon*FinFTN -0.00040 
b -0.0052 a -0.0006 b 
   
 
[0.011] [0.0013] [0.0126] 
   
CEOCon*MTN 
   
-0.00001 c 0.00003 -0.00001 
    
[0.0759] [0.5359] [0.2153] 
CEOCon*FTN 
   
-0.00003a -0.00026a -0.00002 c 
    
[0.0019] [0.0015] [0.0835] 
ROE -0.1530
 a -0.0027 a 0.0001 -0.1549 a -0.0013 a 0.0000 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.1805] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.7543] 
Sales Growth 0.0134
 a 0.0361 b -0.0162 a 0.0107 a 0.0404 a -0.0131 a 
 
[<.0001] [0.0179] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0004] [<.0001] 
Leverage 0.0017
 a -0.0030 a -0.0013 a 0.0017 a -0.0024 a -0.0014 a 
 
[<.0001] [0.0006] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0039] [<.0001] 
Tangibility -0.0476
 a -0.1325 a -0.1150 a -0.0468 a -0.1769 a -0.1165 a 
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[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Ln(Size) -0.0149
 a 0.0674 a -0.0304 a -0.0178 a 0.0369 a -0.0285 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Ln(Age) -0.0025
 a -0.0456 a -0.0028 b -0.0040 a -0.0475 a -0.0034 a 
 
[0.0004] [<.0001] [0.0193] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0009] 
Ln(MV) 0.0053
 a -0.0887 a 0.0296 a 0.0069 a -0.0681 a 0.0253 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Book-to-Markets Ratio -0.0015
 a -0.0416 a 0.0002 -0.0028 a -0.0310 a -0.0004 
 
[0.0002] [<.0001] [0.7761] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.5317] 
Free Cash Flow -0.1288
 a -1.7400 a -0.4096 a -0.1063 a -1.5465 a -0.3641 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Ln(CEO Age) -0.0123
 a 0.0509 0.0309 a -0.0111 0.0118 0.0065 
 
[0.008] [0.2758] [0.0001] [0.0025] [0.7373] [0.3081] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) -0.0017
 b -0.0397 a 0.0034 a -0.0012 b -0.0211 a 0.0044 a 
 
[0.0217] [<.0001] [0.0072] [0.0413] [0.0003] [<.0001] 
CeoGD -0.0047 0.0193 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0394 0.0199
 b 
 
[0.3149] [0.6828] [0.8986] [0.8892] [0.4425] [0.0409] 
FinMTN 0.0080
 a 0.0451 b 0.0053 c  
   
 
[<.0001] [0.0152] [0.0753] 
   
FinFMN 0.0197
 b 0.2291 a 0.0219 
   
 
[0.0251] [0.0095] [0.1557] 
   
MTN 
   
0.0014 0.0335 b 0.0077 a 
    
[0.3335] [0.0127] [0.0009] 
FTN 
   
0.0172 b 0.1803 a -0.0108 
    
[0.0156] [0.0083] [0.3973] 
       
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 17773 17773 10124 24998 24998 14124 
AdjR2 0.381 0.125 0.576 0.387 0.127 0.558 
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Table 8: CEO Social Connections, Corporate Risk-taking and Firm Value - Is increased 
risk-taking caused by social capital value-increasing for the firms, but only in countries 
with strong shareholder protection?   
This table shows results of the second-stage regression in the simultaneous equation system. In the first stage risk-
taking measures are estimated from the following regression:                                   
                                                                                  
                                                                       
                             . In the second stage the following regression is estimated:         
            ̂                                                                    
                             . Risktaking is measured by σ(ROA) - the volatility of the firm’s operating 
return on assets (ROA), where return on asset is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxed to total assets,  σ(ROE) - 
the standard deviation of a firm’s return on equity (ROE),  where return on equity is the ratio of earnings before interest 
and taxed to total stockholders’ equity (both σ(ROA) and σ(ROE) are estimated in five-year overlapping periods), and 
R&D - research and development expense scaled by total assets. Social Capital (Sc) is measured by CEOFinCon and 
CEOCon - consequently denote number of CEO’s all social connections with financiers and number of CEO’s 
economy-wide all social connections. In the first stage regressions for columns (1)-(3) CEOFinCon is used and in the 
specifications (4)-(6) CEOCon.  is a dummy variable equals 1 for the firms from Civil law countries. Control variables 
in the second stage include: Leverage defined as the ratio of financial debt divided by the sum of financial debt plus 
equity, Capex – capital expenditures scaled by total assets, Ln (Size) - the natural log of total assets, Ln (1+Age) - the 
natural logarithm of (1 + the number of years since incorporation). In regressions (1) and (4) risk-taking measure is 
σ(ROA), in models (2) and (5)  - σ(ROE) and in specifications (3) and (6) - R&D. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.     
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5) 
Intercept -0.9209 3.2336 -0.5310 -0.8882 3.2355 -0.4492 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.1089] [0.0001] [<.0001] [0.1731] 
          ̂  0.1477 0.0044 0.1779 0.14661 0.0043 0.17613 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Ln(Size) 0.09370 -0.1361 0.0866 0.0919 -0.1362 0.0827 
 [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Ln(Age) 0.0246 -0.0733 0.0265 0.0237 -0.0734 0.0245 
 [0.2101] [<.0001] [0.4164] [0.2263] [<.0001] [0.4498] 
CAPEx 1.2224 1.0773 2.3374 1.2207 1.0774 2.3298 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
 Leverage 0.0036 -0.0013 0.0403 0.0036 -0.0013 0.0399 
 
[0.2059] [0.6335] [<.0001] [0.2108] [0.6321] [<.0001] 
       
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 26707 26707 14911 26707 26707 14911 
AdjR2 0.102 0.090 0.155 0.114 0.090 0.144 
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Table 11: Robustness Tests – CEO network heterogeneity and risk-taking: Cross-sectional 
Analysis 
This table report results of the following cross-sectional regressions:                                   
                                                                                     
                                                                            . 
Risktaking is measured by σ(ROA)cross-sectional  - the volatility of the firm’s operating return on assets (ROA) for each 
firm over the entire sample period, where return on asset is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxed to total assets,  
σ(ROE)cross-sectional  - the standard deviation of a firm’s return on equity (ROE) for each firm over the entire sample 
period,  where return on equity is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxed to total stockholders’ equity, (ROAmax-
ROAmin ) – the difference between maximum and minimum ROA over the sample period, and , (ROEmax-ROEmin ) – the 
difference between maximum and minimum ROE over the sample period. NH is a Network Heterogeneity Index, 
estimated as an average of HetInd, HetInt, HetProf and HetEduc. HetInd is Industry Heterogeneity Index of CEO’s 
social network calculated as the Herfindahl index based on the percentage of people with different industry groups with 
whom CEOs are connected. HetInt is International Heterogeneity - calculated as the Herfindahl index based on the 
percentage of people from foreign countries with whom CEOs are connected. HetProf is the Professional Heterogeneity 
Index, calculated as the Herfindahl index based on the percentage of people with different occupations with whom 
CEOs are connected. HetEduc is the average of three components: educational degree heterogeneity, major 
heterogeneity, and school heterogeneity, calculated as the Herfindahl index based on percentage of people with 
different educational degrees, majors and schools attended with whom CEOs are connected. Social Capital (Sc) is 
measured by CEOFinCon - number of CEO’s all social connections with financiers. Controls include: Sales Growth, 
calculated as the annual rate of growth of sales, Leverage defined as the ratio of financial debt divided by the sum of 
financial debt plus equity. Financial debt is the sum of long term debt plus short term loans. Tangibility is calculated as 
the ratio of fixed to total assets, Ln (Size) is the natural log of total assets, Ln (1+Age) is the natural logarithm of (1 + 
the number of years since incorporation), Ln(MV) - the natural logarithm of year-end market value of equity, Book-to-
Markets Ratio - book to market ratio at the end of the year, Free Cash Flow -  the cash earnings per share, net of capital 
expenditures and total dividends paid, Ln(CEO Age) - the natural logarithm of CEO age in years, Ln(CEO Tenure) - the 
natural log of CEO tenure in years. CEO tenure in a given year is determined as the length of time between the date that 
the person became the CEO and the current fiscal year end. All independent variables are measures at the first year-
end. In regression (1) dependent variable is σ(ROA)cross-sectional , in (2) - dependent variable is (ROAmax-ROAmin ), in (3)  
σ(ROE)cross-sectional  and in (4)  (ROEmax-ROEmin ). P-values are reported in parentheses. a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.3432
a 0.9820 a -0.1533 c -0.4707 c 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0714] [0.0721] 
Heterogeneity Index  -0.0347
c -0.1127 c -0.0571 c -0.1801 b 
 
[0.1] [0.0795] [0.0647] [0.0486] 
CEOFinCon 0.0003
 a 0.0006 b 0.0002 a 0.0007 a 
 
[0.0083] [0.0453] [0.0049] [0.005] 
ROE -0.0334 -0.0906 -0.0052 -0.0171 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0648] [0.0508] 
Sales Growth 0.0103
 a 0.0242 a -0.0014 -0.0066 
 
[0.0009] [0.0089] [0.6221] [0.4416] 
Leverage -0.0002
 b 0.0007 b 0.0199 a 0.0658 a 
 
[0.0277] [0.0167] [0.0031] [0.0016] 
Tangibility -0.0518
 a -0.1536 a 0.0042 0.0116 
 
[ <.0001] [<.0001] [0.5284] [0.5693] 
Ln(Size) -0.0257
 a -0.0736 a -0.0065 a -0.0207 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0093] [0.0074] 
Ln(Age) -0.0026
 c -0.0057 0.0013 0.0041 
 
[0.0847] [0.2085] [0.247] [0.2295] 
Ln(MV) 0.0094
 a 0.0282 a 0.0051 b 0.0162 b 
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[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0493] [0.0411] 
Book-to-Markets Ratio -0.0018 -0.0050 -0.0043 -0.0127 
 
[0.1332] [0.1605] [0.2419] [0.2656] 
Free Cash Flow -0.0761
 a -0.2153 a -0.0169 -0.0563 
 
[ <.0001] [<.0001] [0.2913] [0.2527] 
Ln(CEO Age) 0.0001 0.0015 0.0583
 a 0.1802 a 
 
[0.6764] [0.9629] [0.0069] [0.0067] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) -0.0016
 a -0.0263 a -0.0005 -0.0015 
 
[ <.0001] [<.0001] [0.8302] [0.8516] 
     
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 3973 3973 3973 3973 
AdjR2 0.3858 0.3658 0.5565 0.5531 
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Table 12: Robustness Tests – CEO Social Connections, Corporate Risk-taking and Female-
tied networks: Cross-sectional Analysis 
This table report results of the following cross-sectional regressions:                             
                                                                                    
                                                                       
                           . Risktaking is measured by σ(ROA)cross-sectional  - the volatility of the firm’s 
operating return on assets (ROA) for each firm over the entire sample period, where return on asset is the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxed to total assets,  σ(ROE)cross-sectional  - the standard deviation of a firm’s return on equity 
(ROE) for each firm over the entire sample period,  where return on equity is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxed to total stockholders’ equity, (ROAmax-ROAmin ) – the difference between maximum and minimum ROA over the 
sample period, and , (ROEmax-ROEmin ) – the difference between maximum and minimum ROE over the sample period. 
Social Capital (Sc) is measured by CEOCon - number of CEO’s economy-wide all social connections.  is a dummy 
variable denoted by MTN - equals 0 if proportion of male-tied networks within CEOs social network equals 0 and 1 
other wise and FTN - equals 0 if proportion of female-tied networks within CEOs social network equals 0 and 1 other 
wise. Controls include: Sales Growth, calculated as the annual rate of growth of sales, Leverage defined as the ratio of 
financial debt divided by the sum of financial debt plus equity. Financial debt is the sum of long term debt plus short 
term loans. Tangibility is calculated as the ratio of fixed to total assets, Ln (Size) is the natural log of total assets, Ln 
(1+Age) is the natural logarithm of (1 + the number of years since incorporation), Ln(MV) - the natural logarithm of 
year-end market value of equity, Book-to-Markets Ratio - book to market ratio at the end of the year, Free Cash Flow -  
the cash earnings per share, net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid, Ln(CEO Age) - the natural logarithm 
of CEO age in years, Ln(CEO Tenure) - the natural log of CEO tenure in years. CEO tenure in a given year is 
determined as the length of time between the date that the person became the CEO and the current fiscal year end. 
CeoGD is a dummy variable for CEO gender. All independent variables are measures at the first year-end. In 
regression (1) dependent variable is σ(ROA)cross-sectional , in (2) - dependent variable is (ROAmax-ROAmin ), in (3)  
σ(ROE)cross-sectional  and in (4) (ROEmax-ROEmin ). P-values are reported in parentheses. a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Intercept 0.3939
a 1.1185 a 0.4783 1.5851 
 
[<.0001] [ <.0001] [0.3892] [0.355] 
CEOCon 0.00002
c 0.0001 c 0.0003c 0.0008 c 
 
[0.0544] [0.0852] [0.0876] [0.0855] 
CEOCon*MTN 0.00000 0.0000 0.00005 0.0002 
 
[0.9439] [0.9475] [0.7406] [0.7273] 
CEOCon*FTN -0.00003
c -0.0001 c -0.00046 b -0.0013 c 
 
[0.10] [0.0686] [0.0461] [0.0666] 
ROE -0.0010
 b -0.0031 c -0.0579 a -0.1837 a 
 
[0.0221] [0.0155] [ <.0001] [ <.0001] 
Sales Growth 0.0064
 c 0.0056 0.0392 0.0785 
 
[0.0685] [0.5957] [0.3314] [0.5282] 
Leverage -0.0002
 c -0.0006 b -0.0045 a -0.0112 a 
 
[0.0608] [0.0458] [ <.0001] [0.0012] 
Tangibility -0.0630
 c -0.1853 a -0.1587 -0.3833 
 
[ <.0001] [ <.0001] [0.1195] [0.223] 
Ln(Size) -0.0277
 a -0.0793 a -0.0639 a -0.1970 a 
 
[ <.0001] [ <.0001] [0.0083] [0.0084] 
Ln(Age) -0.0030
 c -0.0062 -0.0664 a -0.1869 a 
 
[0.0638] [0.205] [0.0004] [0.0012] 
Ln(MV) 0.0080
 a 0.0248 a 0.0035 0.0251 
 
[ <.0001] [ <.0001] [0.8765] [0.7154] 
Book-to-Markets Ratio -0.0028
 b -0.0080 b -0.0604 a -0.1850 a 
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[0.0325] [0.0448] [ <.0001] [ <.0001] 
Free Cash Flow -0.0729
 a -0.2093 a -0.4453 a -1.3371 a 
 
[ <.0001] [ <.0001] [ <.0001] [ <.0001] 
Ln(CEO Age) -0.0058 -0.0207 0.2568
 c 0.6795 c 
 
[0.6126] [0.5457] [0.05]  [0.0928]  
Ln(CEO Tenure) -0.0112
 a -0.0050 a -0.0622 c -0.1725 b 
 
[ <.0001] [ <.0001] [0.0068] [0.015] 
CEOGD -0.0362
 b -0.0992 b -0.2908 c -0.7784 
 
[0.0118] [0.0213] [0.079] [0.1275] 
MTN 0.0021 0.0070 0.0114 0.0222 
 
[0.6523] [0.6068] [0.8283] [0.8907] 
FMN 0.0336
 c 0.0980 c 0.3504 0.8768 
 
[0.0692] [0.0772] [0.1] [0.1821] 
   
  
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 3487 3487 3487 3487 
AdjR2 0.377 0.355 0.139 0.135 
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Table 13: Endogeneity Concerns - CEO fixed effects  
This table report results of the following regressions:                                               
                                                                                        
                                                                              . 
Risktaking is measured R&D - research and development expense scaled by total assets. Social Capital (Sc) is measured 
by CEOFinCon, CEOCon,and NH - consequently a number of CEO social connections with financiers,  
CEOs economy-wide all social connections, and Network Heterogeneity Index, estimated as an average of HetInd, 
HetInt, HetProf and HetEduc. HetInd is Industry Heterogeneity Index of CEO’s social network calculated as the 
Herfindahl index based on the percentage of people with different industry groups with whom CEOs are connected. 
HetInt is International Heterogeneity - calculated as the Herfindahl index based on the percentage of people from 
foreign countries with whom CEOs are connected. HetProf is the Professional Heterogeneity Index, calculated as the 
Herfindahl index based on the percentage of people with different occupations with whom CEOs are connected. 
HetEduc is the average of three components: educational degree heterogeneity, major heterogeneity, and school 
heterogeneity, calculated as the Herfindahl index based on percentage of people with different educational degrees, 
majors and schools attended with whom CEOs are connected. Theoretically minimum value of heterogeneity indices 
can be 0, which means that the network is highly heterogeneous and nodes in the network have different attributes. 
Maximum value of heterogeneity indices is 1, which means that network is very homogeneous. Controls include: Sales 
Growth, calculated as the annual rate of growth of sales, Leverage defined as the ratio of financial debt divided by the 
sum of financial debt plus equity. Financial debt is the sum of long term debt plus short term loans. Tangibility is 
calculated as the ratio of fixed to total assets, Ln (Size) is the natural log of total assets, Ln (1+Age) is the natural 
logarithm of (1 + the number of years since incorporation), Ln(MV) - the natural logarithm of year-end market value of 
equity, Book-to-Markets Ratio - book to market ratio at the end of the year, Free Cash Flow -  the cash earnings per 
share, net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid, Ln(CEO Age) - the natural logarithm of CEO age in years, 
Ln(CEO Tenure) - the natural log of CEO tenure in years. CEO tenure in a given year is determined as the length of 
time between the date that the person became the CEO and the current fiscal year end. In regressions (1)-(4)  dependent 
variable is σ(ROA), in models (5)-(8)  - σ(ROE) and in specifications (9)-(12) - R&D. p-values are reported in 
parentheses. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.     
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.8041
a 0.8094 a 0.5246 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CEOFinCon 0.0001
c 
  
 
[0.0755] 
  
CEOCon 
 
0.00001c 0.0000 
  
[0.0831] [0.899] 
Heterog. Index 
  
-0.0394b 
   
[0.0423] 
ROE -0.0001 -0.0101
 a 0.0000 
 
[0.6395] [<.0001] [0.2401] 
Sales Growth -0.0002 -0.0007 0.0016 
 
[0.889] [0.5669] [0.2581] 
Leverage -0.0019
 a -0.0019 a -0.0024 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Tangibility 0.0354
 a 0.0446 a 0.0952 a 
 
[0.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Ln(Size) -0.0439
 a -0.0391 a -0.0437 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Ln(Age) 0.0311
 a 0.0282 a 0.0173 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Ln(MV) 0.0055
 a 0.0045 a 0.0019 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.1277] 
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Book-to-Markets Ratio -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0014
 c 
 
[0.2992] [0.2989] [0.0911] 
Free Cash Flow -0.2280
 a -0.1574 a -0.2912 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [ <.0001] 
    
CEO Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 14746 14746 14746 
AdjR2 0.8521 0.8921 0.8431 
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Table 14: Endogeneity Concerns – Treatment Effects Model and Counterfactual Analysis  
Panel A of this table shows results of the second-stage regression in the modified Heckman’s two-stage 
procedure - treatment effects model. In the first stage following probit regression is estimated:                  
                                                                                          
                                                                           . In the 
second stage the following regression is estimated:                                          
                                                                                          
                                                                                        
              .            is a dummy variable that equals 0 if CEO is not connected with financers and 1 
otherwise.       is the local supply of socially connected CEOs in each geographic region in each year. IMR is the 
inverse mills ratio calculated from the first stage probit regressions. Risktaking is measured by σ(ROA) - the volatility 
of the firm’s operating return on assets (ROA), where return on asset is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxed to 
total assets,  σ(ROE) - the standard deviation of a firm’s return on equity (ROE),  where return on equity is the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxed to total stockholders’ equity (both σ(ROA) and σ(ROE) are estimated in five-year 
overlapping periods), and R&D - research and development expense scaled by total assets. Controls include: Sales 
Growth, calculated as the annual rate of growth of sales, Leverage defined as the ratio of financial debt divided by the 
sum of financial debt plus equity. Financial debt is the sum of long term debt plus short term loans. Tangibility is 
calculated as the ratio of fixed to total assets, Ln (Size) is the natural log of total assets, Ln (1+Age) is the natural 
logarithm of (1 + the number of years since incorporation), Ln(MV) - the natural logarithm of year-end market value of 
equity, Book-to-Markets Ratio - book to market ratio at the end of the year, Free Cash Flow -  the cash earnings per 
share, net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid, Ln(CEO Age) - the natural logarithm of CEO age in years, 
Ln(CEO Tenure) - the natural log of CEO tenure in years. CEO tenure in a given year is determined as the length of 
time between the date that the person became the CEO and the current fiscal year end. . In regression (1) risk-taking 
measure is σ(ROA), in model (2)  σ(ROE) and in specification (3)  R&D. Panel B  reports means of the actual values of 
risk-taking measures and counterfactuals calculated via Heckman’s two stage selection model.  P-values are reported in 
parentheses. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.      
Panel A: Treatment Effects 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 Intercept 0.4172
a 0.4636 a 0.3195 a 
 
[<.0001] [0.0063] [<.0001] 
CEOFinConD 0.0080
 a 0.0618 a 0.0041 b 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0165] 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.19465
 a -0.0429 -0.31316 a 
 
[<.0001] [0.8036] [<.0001] 
ROE 0.00005
 c -0.7109 a 0.0000 
 
[0.0693] [<.0001] [0.5099] 
Sales Growth 0.0122
 a 0.0390 a -0.0050 a 
 
[<.0001] [0.0008] [0.0027] 
Leverage -0.0002
 a 0.0067 a -0.0021 a 
 
[0.0059] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Tangibility -0.0492
 a -0.1483 a -0.0214 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Ln(Size) -0.0182
 a 0.0173 b -0.0298 a 
 
[<.0001] [0.0355] [<.0001] 
Ln(Age) -0.0057
 a -0.0441 a -0.0041 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Ln(MV) -0.0021
 a -0.0355 a 0.0126 a 
 
[0.0031] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
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Book-to-Markets Ratio -0.0030
 a -0.0304 a -0.0012 b 
 
[<.0001] [ <.0001] [0.0177] 
Free Cash Flow -0.2615
 a -0.7995 a -0.3226 a 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Ln(CEO Age) 0.0046 0.0531 0.0220
 a 
 
[0.2821] [0.1763] [0.0002] 
Ln(CEO Tenure) -0.0016
 b -0.0218 a 0.0038 a 
 
[0.0139] [0.0002] [<.0001] 
    
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 26056 26056 14736 
AdjR2 0.342 0.143 0.496 
 
Panel B: Counterfactual Analysis  
 
Actual Counterfactual Difference P-value 
σ(ROA) 0.0920 0.1701 0.0781
 a  [<.0001] 
σ(ROE) 0.3591 0.7527 0.3936
 a  [<.0001] 
R&D 0.0661 0.0817 0.0156
 a  [<.0001] 
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Chapter IV: MANAGERIAL SOCIAL CAPITAL, THE COST OF EQUITY AND 
THE DEMAND FOR INTERNAL FINANCING 
1. Introduction  
The distortionary forces of financial market frictions, such as asymmetric information 
and agency problems, limit a firms’ access to external finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Stein, 2003) and create a wedge between internal and external 
costs of funds. Mechanisms that mitigate these forces have important implication for a 
firm’s cost of capital and demand for liquidity to allocate resources between current and 
future investments for maximizing firm value.  Prior research tests the effects of country 
and firm attributes, such as  institutions and securities regulations (Hail and Leuz, 2006, 
Khurana et al 2006), cross-listing (Hail and Leuz, 2009), voluntary disclosure (Francis et 
al 2005) and corporate governance (Chen et al 2009, 2011). This study examines whether 
social capital resident in managerial social networks is one of such mechanisms that 
ameliorates potential inefficiencies in the financial markets and consequently reduces 
costs of equity financing and a firm’s demand for liquid assets.  
More specifically, we ask whether social capital inherent in managerial social 
networks with financiers impact a firm’s cost of equity capital and how this relationship 
is affected by the degree of investor protection, financial development, firm 
characteristics and the gender aspect of managerial ties. In addition, we explore the 
relation between social capital and the need for internal financing.  
Social capital, defined as  information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inherent in a 
social network (Woolcock, 1998), has been discussed broadly in various social 
disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology (e.g., 
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Dasgupta 2005; Fafchamps 2002; Knack and Keefer 1995; Portes 1998; Putnam 1993; 
Schneider 2006), yet has received only limited attention in academic finance. This study 
reinforces a growing awareness among finance researchers that managerial social capital 
matters in corporate finance practices.  
Social capital eases potential inefficiencies in the financial markets through 
information-sharing, trust, and contract enforcement channels. Social capital facilitates 
the sharing of information and reduces information asymmetry within a network (e.g., 
Cohen et al. 2008; 2010; Kuhnen, 2009; Hong et al, 2004, 2005).Prior evidence suggests 
that firms which reduce information asymmetry through disclosure have a lower cost of 
capital (e.g., Francis et al, 2004; Hail, 2002; Verrecchia, 2001; Botosan, 1997). The 
fundamental problem facing financial market participants willing to engage in transaction 
concerns trust. Social capital is a means for creating trust (Dasgupta, 1988). Trusting 
economic agents can transact more efficiently since trust reduces need for costly 
monitoring. 
 Social capital facilitates honest dealing in transactions by imposing punishment on 
the diversion behaviors through reputation loss (Kandori, 1992; McMillan and Woodruff, 
2000). Consequently, socially connected parties demand less price protection against 
possible expropriation and breach. Fafchamps (1996) and Platteau (1994) discuss 
punitive mechanics for breach available through social capital. Since social capital 
provides mechanisms of information sharing and punishment through reputation loss, it 
also reduces agency cost between firm and its investors by increasing expected cost of 
expropriation. In line with these conjectures, Engelberg et al (2012) show that social 
connections between banks and borrowers through managerial interpersonal linkages 
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reduce borrowing costs. Also firm performance improves following connected deals, 
suggesting that social networks lead to better information flow and monitoring. This body 
of evidence leads to the prediction that social capital should have a negative effect on the 
cost of equity capital.    
Marginal benefits of social capital in reducing the cost of equity should stronger when 
distortionary forces of Modigliani and Miller (1958) frictionless capital market are 
aggravated. Consequently, we argue that social capital in managerial social networks 
with financiers should be more valuable in countries with the weak legal protection of 
shareholders and in underdeveloped financial markets since investors in these countries 
cannot rely on the legal system and market mechanisms alone to prevent expropriation 
and enforce contracts. In addition, we posit that social capital should have a stronger 
effect on the cost of equity financing for small, young, and constrained firms. Prior 
research (e.g., Bertrand, 2011) documents gender related differences in risk-aversion. 
Based on these findings we posit that the association between social capital and cost of 
equity should be weaker for female-tied networks. 
In the presence of costly external financing, a firm’s investment will be constrained to 
its internal cash flows. Because social capital reduces cost of external financing, these 
firms do not need to hold large cash reserves to respond unexpected profitable investment 
opportunities. Therefore we argue that the social capital in managerial social networks 
with financiers is negatively associated with the need for internal financing.   
To test these predictions, we employ BoardEx databases provided by Management 
Diagnostics Limited. Recent studies (Engelberg et al 2012, Fracassi 2012) use this 
database for the social connections measurement. BoardEx contains relational links 
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between executives based on prior overlap in employment, education and memberships in 
non-profit organizations. Based on this information, we build a panel dataset of 
managerial social connections.       
To preview results, this paper finds that social capital is significantly negatively 
related to the implied cost of equity after controlling for risk factors, governance, 
analysts’ forecast biases, and other firm and country-level effects. In addition, we find the 
negative association between social capital and cost of equity is stronger in 
underdeveloped financial markets and in markets characterized by weak legal protection 
of investors. The evidence also suggests that the marginal effect of social capital in 
reducing the cost of equity is stronger for financially constrained firms and especially for 
constrained firms with good investment opportunities. In addition, gender-specific social 
ties have important implications for the cost of equity. We also show that firms with 
greater social capital are more likely to decrease their cash holdings in response to an 
increase in cash flows. These results are robust to alternative model specifications and 
variable measurement.  
A potential issue with this research is that results could be driven by endogeneity. 
Even though it is nearly impossible to fully eliminate endogeneity concerns, we took a 
number of steps to address it. First, research design of this study eliminates the issue of 
reverse causality because formation of social connections predates measurement of the 
major dependent variables for years and sometimes for dozens of years. Second, to 
control for omitted variables that may affect results, in all regressions we include other 
observable firm characteristics that might drive the impact of social capital on the cost of 
equity.  We also deploy propensity score matching procedure to control for observable 
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firm characteristics since inclusion of these attributes in multivariate regressions might 
not be sufficient. In addition, we incorporate firm fixed effects to control for 
unobservable firm-specific characteristics that impact cost of equity and cash flow 
sensitivities. Fourth, we use death of network ties as an exogenous shock to the social 
network and apply instrumental variable approach to account for the endogeneity of 
social connections in our baseline regressions. Fifth, we use modified Heckman’s (1979) 
two-stage procedure - treatment effects model and switching regression analysis to 
control for endogenous self-selection. 
This paper adds to the general costs of financing literature. Cremers et al (2007) 
examine the effect of shareholder rights on the cost of debt. Chen et al (2009, 2011) 
investigates the effects of corporate governance and legal protection on the cost of equity 
financing. Other studies examine the effects of cross-listing (Hail and Leuz, 2009), 
default risk (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010), voluntary disclosure (Botosan, 1997), and 
accounting attributes (Francis et al, 2004). We contribute to this literature by providing 
an innovative analysis of a previously unexamined factor - social capital - that can 
directly affect the cost of obtaining equity financing. In addition we add to the corporate 
cash management policies literature (Almeida et al 2004, Khurana et al 2006, Kusandi 
and Wei, 2011) by providing strong evidence that social capital has implications for 
firms’ demand for liquid assets.   
This paper is also related to emerging literature on the implications of social capital in 
finance. Engelberg et al (2012) show that social connections between banks and 
borrowers through managerial interpersonal linkages reduce borrowing costs. Cai et al 
(2012) document a positive relation between firm’s social connections and trading costs. 
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Cohen et al (2008) finds that social networks are an important mechanism for information 
flows that shape asset prices in the mutual fund industry. Cai and Sevilir (2012) show that 
social connections improve information flow between a target and an acquirer. This paper 
examines an unexplored issue concerning the influence of social capital on a firm’s cost 
of equity and demand for liquidity and contributes to the line of research examining the 
importance of social capital in corporate finance policies.   
 The reminder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides literature 
review and develops hypotheses. Section 3 presents sample and discusses research 
design. Section 4 discusses main results. Section 5 presents robustness tests. Section 6 
discusses endogeneity concerns and section 7 concludes. 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development  
2.1. Social Capital - Channels of Influence  
The concept of social capital has been used to describe a number of phenomena 
pertaining to social-economic relations at the organizational and societal levels. Social 
capital broadly can be defined as the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inherent 
in social network (Woolcock, 1998). The concept of social capital is distinct from, but 
convergent with the idea of social network since social networks are the media through 
which social capital is created, maintained and used. Dimensions of social capital 
definition are accentuated by a variety of theoretical constructs. We aggregate these 
theories into two broad groups: cognitive and structural. Cognitive theories put forward 
by the rational-choice theory of Coleman (1988) and the collective asset view of Putnam 
(1993), derive from mental processes and resulting ideas, reinforced by norms, values 
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attitudes and beliefs. Structural social capital theories (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986; Lin 1999, 
2001) concern connections and participation in various networks. 
 From these theories of social capital, four distinct theoretical mechanisms emerge by 
which social capital plays an important causal role in the practice of corporate finance. 
These mechanisms are flow of information, trust, ability to punish and reward, and the 
ability to alter preferences. Through first three of these channels social capital exerts 
influence on the cost of external financing.   
Social capital, through information-sharing channel, facilitates the willingness and 
cooperation to share information, thereby revealing the tacit information that would be 
difficult to exchange otherwise. Information is likely to be given a higher value and 
uncertainty about information reliability is low if it comes from social acquaintances. In 
addition, the cost of information acquisition within a social network is low since it can be 
acquired passively during social interactions. The literature on social capital employment 
in finance and economics contains many applications of this information-based idea of 
social capital, though researchers are reluctant to use the term “social capital”. Fafchamps 
and Minten (1999), Granovetter (1975, 1995), Montgomery (1991), Rauch and Casella 
(2001) emphasize the role of business networks in conveying information. Hong et al 
(2004, 2005) study the influence of social ties on portfolio choices and stock market 
participation. Evidence shows support of epidemic model in which investors spread 
information about stocks to one another by social interactions. Kuhnen (2009) provides 
supportive evidence of social ties as a means for efficient information exchange. Cohen et 
al (2008) documents that social networks are an important mechanism for information 
flows that shape asset prices in the mutual fund industry.    
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Social capital induces cooperative and efficient behavior within the social structure 
through trust channel. Baier (1986) defines trust “as the trustor's expectation of being the 
recipient of the trusted party’s good will”. Trust is important because financial 
transactions can be accomplished at a lower cost in a high-trust environment.  The 
fundamental problem facing financial market participants willing to engage in economic 
transaction concerns trust. As is argued by Arrow (1972) virtually every transaction 
encompasses an element of trust. From the perspective of incomplete contract theory 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986), trust minimizes the negative consequences of incomplete 
contracts and by this link affects contracting costs of external financing. In addition, trust 
reduces a need for costly monitoring. So, trusting others enables economic agents to 
operate more efficiently since they can economize on transaction costs. In addition, trust 
makes it easier for financial market participants to renegotiate their contractual 
obligations when problem arise, thereby providing flexibility for dealing with external 
shocks (Bigsten et al, 2000). High trust can also facilitate investment where there is no 
well-developed formal system of contract enforcement. Trusting economic agents adopt 
more appropriate investment horizon in making project decisions and choose production 
technologies that are optimal over the long rather than the short run. Trust can explain 
differences in stock market participation across individuals and countries (Guiso et al, 
2008). 
Social capital fosters building a reputation for honest dealing in transactions by 
imposing punishment on the diversion behaviors through aggravating costs of reputation 
loss (Kandori, 1992; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000)
26
. Through this channel social 
capital reduces need for costly monitoring and consequently diminishes contracting costs. 
                                                          
26
 Kreps (1990) presents formal analysis of reputation in economic games. 
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Socially connected parties can choose to engage in exchanges that are not clearly 
governed by legal contracts or at least not governed by contracts with detailed 
specifications since social capital provides complementary mechanism for contract 
enforcement. In addition, social capital offers an alternative mechanism for dispute 
resolution through voluntary cooperation that can further reduce any expected need and 
cost of legal interventions. Consequently, parties engaging in financial or other 
transactions demand less price protection against possible expropriation and breach.  
2.2. Hypotheses Development  
An unexamined issue related to the social capital concerns it possible effects on the 
cost of equity financing.  In this section we develop hypotheses regarding the casual role 
of social capital in reducing a firm’s cost of equity financing and demand for liquidity.  
Social capital resident in managerial social network with financiers can reduce a firm’s 
cost of equity in several ways.  
First, social capital through information-sharing channel reduces information 
asymmetry between the firm (financee) and its investors (financiers) and consequently 
negatively affects cost of equity. Prior research (e.g., Hong et al, 2004, 2005; Kuhen, 
2009; Cohen et al, 2008, 2010) shows that social capital facilitates the sharing of 
information and reduces information asymmetry within a network. But firms which 
reduce information asymmetry through disclosure have a lower cost of capital (Botosan, 
1997; Hail, 2002; Verrecchia, 2001; Francis et al, 2004). In addition, lower information 
asymmetry reduces out-of-pocket monitoring costs borne by investors, and hence the 
compensation they demand for holding equity (Lombardo and Pagano, 2002a). The level 
of disclosure and securities regulation is significantly related to international differences 
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in equity capital costs beyond the traditional proxies for firm and country risk. Consistent 
with this conjecture, Hail and Leuz (2009) show that firms in countries with stronger 
securities regulations and more extensive disclosure requirements reduce information 
asymmetry and consequently the cost of equity. In different setting, Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002), demonstrate that the insider trading regulations that reduces the 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders lowers firms’ cost of capital. 
Easley and O’Hara (2004) investigate the role of information in affecting firm’s cost of 
external financing and show that information asymmetry positively influences a firms’ 
cost of capital. Particularly, they document that differences in the composition of 
information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, with 
investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information and 
hence greater information asymmetry.  
Second, social capital, through trust and contract enforcement channels lowers the 
cost of equity by reducing the costs and need for external monitoring. Financial contracts 
are trust-intensive. If financiers trust financee, they divert few resources to protect 
themselves from unlawful violations of their rights that consequently leads to less price 
protection and lowers the cost of capital. Since social capital is a means for creating trust 
(Dasgupta, 1988), it should have negative implications for the cost of equity financing. In 
addition, social capital offers alternative mechanism of dispute resolution over contract 
performance. Social rules within social networks stimulate voluntary cooperation without 
any need for costly legal intervention. Also, social capital plays a critical role in 
circulating information about breach of contract, thereby enabling socially connected 
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groups to penalize and exclude cheaters (Kandori, 1992; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000). 
These costs of reputation loss forces transaction parties to fair dealing. 
Costs of external monitoring that financiers usually incur include costs of collecting 
information about managerial expropriation and cost of punishing when expropriation is 
detected. Since social capital provides mechanisms of information sharing and 
punishment through reputation loss, expected cost of expropriation for managers 
increases. Therefore social capital reduces managerial incentives to expropriate and 
consequently lessens agency problems.   This analysis shows that social capital mitigates 
agency problems between investors and insiders by providing punitive mechanisms for 
expropriation, thereby reducing contracting costs and the price financiers demand for 
their capital.  
Combining the predictions of the theoretical models and empirical findings discussed 
above leads to the first hypothesis:  
H1: The social capital in managerial social networks with financiers is negatively 
associated with the cost of equity capital. 
 
Well-functioning legal systems protect outside investors, which in turn improves 
firms’ ability to raise external finance. Daouk et al (2006) finds that improvements in the 
capital market governance are associated with a reduction in the national average cost of 
equity capital. Hail and Leuz (2006) demonstrate that differences in securities regulations 
explain differences in the average cost of equity capital at the country level. So, firms in 
countries with more effective legal systems to protect investors have a lower cost of 
capital. In addition, LLSV(1997, 1998) and Djankov et al (2008) show that countries with 
strong legal protection of investors have more developed stock markets than do countries 
with weak legal protection of investors. Developed financial markets help to overcome 
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problems of moral hazard and adverse selection between financiers and financees. In 
contrast, these problems are aggravated in less financially developed markets.  Much of 
the interest in social capital stems from the view that in the absence of strong legal 
investor protection mechanisms and well-developed capital market structure, social 
capital fosters fair treatment of the contracting parties.  Social capital in managerial social 
networks with financiers should be more valuable in countries with the weak legal 
protection of shareholders and in underdeveloped financial markets since investors in 
these countries cannot rely on the legal system and market mechanisms alone (because it 
could be prohibitively expensive or corrupt) to prevent expropriation and enforce 
contracts. This discussion leads to the possible interaction between country-level 
shareholder protection, financial market development and social capital: 
H2: The negative association between social capital in managerial social networks 
with financiers and cost of equity is stronger in underdeveloped financial markets and in 
markets characterized by weak legal protection of investors. 
Since social capital reduces information asymmetry and agency problems, we expect 
the marginal benefits of social capital in reducing the cost of equity to be stronger when 
these concerns are intensified. Specifically, we argue that for financially constrained 
firms that are small, young and less visible, managerial social capital will be significant 
in reducing the cost of financing. Conversely, for financially unconstrained firms that 
enjoy cheap access to external financing, social capital will not be that important. 
Lemmon and Zender (2010) indicate that all else being equal, small and/or young firms 
are also much more likely to be constrained. As firms become more mature, larger and 
more visible, information asymmetries decrease and it becomes easier to raise capital. 
Beck et al (2005) find that the smallest firms are most affected in the absence of easy 
access to low-cost external finance. Also, different visibility attributes reduce the cost of 
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capital (e.g., French and Poterba, 1991; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Grullon, et al, 2004; 
Falkenstein, 1996). Social capital in managerial social networks with financiers should 
have a stronger effect on the cost of equity financing for small, young, and less visible 
companies since these companies have greater needs to reduce information asymmetry.  
In addition, if social capital generates positive externalities by sharing information 
and facilitating coordinated actions of socially connected individuals, than it will have a 
more pronounced effect on the cost of equity when financee firms have good growth 
opportunities since these firms have real need for external capital for value-enhancing 
investing. Consistent with these argumentations, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H3A: The negative association between the social capital in managerial social 
networks with financiers and the cost of equity capital is stronger for financially 
constrained firms. 
H3B: The negative association between the social capital in managerial social 
networks with financiers and the cost of equity capital is stronger for financially 
constrained firms with good investment opportunities. 
A considerable literature in experimental economics and psychology examines 
gender-related differences in risk-aversion (e.g., Bertrand, 2011). Bruce and Johnson 
(1994) and Johnson and Powell (1994) provide evidence that women display a lower 
propensity for risk-taking than men. Bernasek and Shwiff (2001) document that women 
are significantly more risk-averse in their allocation of wealth to pensions. Hudgens and 
Fatkin (1985) document that gender related differences in risk-taking are also present in a 
military framework. Consistent with previous hypotheses, the negative association 
between the social capital and the cost of equity should me more pronounced for 
financially constrained firms that female financier executives will try to avoid due to high 
risk-averse preferences.  This analysis leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H4: The association between the social capital in managerial social networks with 
financiers and the cost of equity capital is weaker for female-tied networks and stronger 
for male-tied networks. 
The theory of frictionless capital markets (e.g., Modegliani and Miller, 1958) 
contends that there is no divergence between internal and external costs of funds in 
perfect capital markets. However, frictions such as information asymmetry and agency 
costs create a deviation between the costs of external and internal financing. This 
difference in financing costs is amplified for countries with weak investor protection, as 
shown by La Porta et al (1997). So, corporate investments in these countries are more 
likely to be limited to available internal cash resources. Kim et al (1998) notes that 
holding cash can be costly and firms face a trade-off between the low returns earned on 
cash and the benefits of minimizing the need for costly external financing. In the 
presence of these opportunity costs of cash, several studies look at the determinants of the 
optimal level of cash holding (e.g., Frenckel and Jovanoniv, 1980). Dittmar et al (2003) 
show that cash holdings are higher in countries with weak investor protection. In these 
countries liquid assets are more important since external financing is costly. Almeida et al 
(2004) shifts the focus and analyzes the extent to which cash is saved from current cash 
flows to fund future investment opportunities (cash flow sensitivity of cash). This might 
be costly because saving cash today may cause a firm to trade current profitable 
investment opportunities for future potentially more profitable projects. 
In imperfect markets, corporate policy choice towards liquid (cash) investments 
varies with marginal cost of external equity financing. Social capital inherent in 
managerial social networks with financers helps to overcome market frictions and 
reduces the cost of equity capital as argued in the Hypothesis 1. Therefore, firms with 
more social connections with financiers do not need to hold large cash reserves to 
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respond to unexpected profitable investment opportunities. So, since social capital 
reduces the cost of equity, it should reduce a firm’s marginal propensity to save cash 
from current operating cash flows. On the other hand, changes in cash holding should be 
more sensitive to the variations in operating cash flows for firms with low social capital. 
Consistent with this argumentation, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H5: The social capital in managerial social networks with financiers is negatively 
associated with the need for internal financing. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Measurement of Variables 
3.1. Data and Sample Construction 
Our sample selection process begins with BoardEx database of Management 
Diagnostic Limited which provides social network data of senior executives and boards 
for more than fifteen thousand listed companies around the world since 1999. We first 
match these firms with I/B/E/S to obtain the analysts' earnings forecasts and with 
Datastream/Worldscope for financial and accounting variables: stock prices and trading 
volumes, market and book values of equity, total debt and payout ratios. For cash flow 
sensitivity analysis variables include cash holdings, short-term debt, total debt, cash flow, 
capital expenditures, total assets, book value of equity, and market capitalization. We 
require our cost of capital and cash flow sensitivity subsamples to have non-missing firm-
year observations. This process leaves us with a final sample of 37712 firm-year 
observations for cost of capital analysis and 74139 firm-year observations for cash for 
cash flow sensitivity analysis for the period 1999-2012. These observations are 
distributed across 52 economies
27
.  For robustness checks, we use Institutional 
                                                          
27
 Countries include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany ,Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
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Shareholder Service’s Corporate Governance Quotient database to estimate the 
governance index
28
. We retrieve country-level legal protection measures from La Porta et 
al (1998, 2006) and Djankov et al (2008). Financial development variables are obtained 
from World Bank’s WDI database.  
Table 1, Panel A presents a description of the sample. The majority of our sample 
firms are incorporated in North America (53%) and Europe (26%). We note that most of 
our sample firms (92%) are located in developed economies. Firms incorporated in 
common law countries account for 74% of the sample, while 12% of sample firms are 
located in German civil law jurisdictions and 11% - in French Civil Law jurisdictions. 
Less than 4 percent of the sample firms are incorporated Scandinavian civil law 
countries.   
3.2. Measuring Managerial Social Capital 
Empirical measure of managerial social capital deployed in this paper is based on the 
structural theories of social capital (Burt, 1992; Lin, 1999). This view considers social 
capital as an asset resident in a social network that can be accessed and mobilized 
through network membership. Economic agents derive benefits from knowing others 
with whom they form networks. This meaning of social capital, sometimes also referred 
as a social network capital, makes it measurable and explicitly grounded on network 
theory.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands ,New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,  Poland, 
Portugal, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom,  and United States. 
28
 For governance analysis starting point is 2003 since international corporate governance data prior to 
2003 is not available. 
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We follow prior research (e.g., Burt, 1983; Freeman, 1979) and use size/degree 
centrality measure of social network to empirically estimate social capital. We define as 
“financiers” investment firms, classified by BoardEx as “investment companies”, 
“private equity” or “specialty and other finance”. These firms are supplies of capital. We 
label as “financee” publicly traded corporations that demand capital and exclude from 
this sample all financial and insurance firms since managers of these firms are more 
likely to have career overlap with financiers.   We argue that social capital resident in 
managerial social networks with financiers could have implications for the cost of 
financing for financee. We measure social capital by counting the number of social 
connections of executives and directors of financee firms with their counterparts in 
financier firms. As is arranged by BoadEx, two individuals are connected via 
employment if their careers overlap at the same employer in the past or at present. 
Individuals are connected via education if they attend the same university at the same 
time and obtain the same degree. Two individuals are connected via other social activities 
if they both serve in the same professional association, non-profit associations, or leisure 
clubs. In addition, we use aggregate measure of managerial social networks that includes 
all known sources of connections.        
Since an increasing literature in experimental economics and psychology highlights 
that gender-related differences in risk-aversion (e.g., Bertrand, 2011; Bernasek and 
Shwiff, 2001) affects individual’s decisions, we separately estimate gender-based 
heterogeneity of managerial social networks with financiers. Bilateral social networks 
between managers of publicly traded firms and executives of financier firms are 
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considered as female-tied if both connected executives are females and as male-tied - if 
both connected executives are males. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows deceptive statistics of our social capital measure. On 
average, executives and directors of financee firms have 10 ties with their counterparts in 
financier firm via education, 58 - via employment and 0.49 via other social connections. 
3.3. Estimation of the Cost of Equity Capital 
Motivated by recent literature, we estimate ex ante cost of equity capital implied in 
current stock price and analysts’ earning forecast. Since ex ante estimation of the cost of 
equity capital explicitly controls for cash flows and growth potential, it provides better 
measure of the cost of equity than realized returns (Chen et al, 2011; Pastor et al, 2008; 
Hail and Leuz, 2006).  We estimate implied cost of equity based on four different models 
introduced by Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas 
(2001) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). These models are based on the residual 
income valuation and dividend discount models and depend on different assumptions of 
future growth and forecasting horizon. Detailed descriptions of the cost of equity 
estimation methods are presented in Appendix A. Because there is little consensus on 
which model is superior and performs best, we follow prior literature (e.g., Chen et al, 
2009, Hail and Leuz, 2006) and use arithmetic average estimate from the four models to 
mitigate the effect of measurement error associated with any particular methodology. In 
our main tables we also deploy all four measures individually. We calculate implied 
excess cost of equity as the implied cost of equity minus the risk free rate measured as the 
annualized yield on 3-month government securities.     
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Panel B of Table 1 shows deceptive statistics of the implied equity risk premium. 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) method produces the highest average value of the 
implied excess cost of equity, with a mean of 0.0902 and a median 0.081, whereas  
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) method gives the lowest average  estimate, with 
a mean of 0.0334 and median 0.0276. The mean and median implied equity risk 
premiums are 0.0678 and 0.0613, respectively, if the arithmetic average of the cost of 
equity estimates from all four methods is used as a measure of cost of equity capital.   
3.4. Firm-level Control Variables for the Cost of Equity Regressions   
Prior literature has established that several risk-factors and firm characteristics affect 
cost of equity financing. We augment our regressions with these control variables. Prior 
studies (e.g., Fama and French, 1992; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Chen et al, 2011) 
show stock returns and implied cost of equity capital is correlated with beta, firm size and 
the book-to-market ratio. Therefore we include beta (Beta) estimated by regressing the 
previous 24 and up to 60 monthly individual stock returns on the MSCI world market 
index returns. We also control for market value of equity (LnMV), and book-to-market 
ratio (LnBM) calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity to 
the market value of equity. We expect the coefficient estimate of Beta to be positive, 
coefficient estimate of LnMV – negative and coefficient estimate of LnBM – positive.  
Guay et al (2003) argue that to account for biases in the ex ante cost of equity 
estimates caused by analysts’ “sluggishness” with respect to information in past stock 
returns, it is necessary to include recent stock returns as a control variable. Consequently, 
we include price momentum estimated as the compounding stock returns over the 
previous six months (Retmom6). We also add leverage ratio (Leverage) estimated as the 
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ratio of long-term debt to total assets as a control, because as Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) argue, the cost of equity should increase with leverage. Expected sign for the 
coefficient estimate of Leverage is positive. 
Following Hail and Leuz (2006) we control for analysts’ forecast errors (Forerr), 
defined as the actual earnings minus the consensus earnings forecasts for the forthcoming 
fiscal year, divided by stock price. Since we calculate the cost of equity that is implied in 
stock prices and analysts’ earnings forecasts, it is necessary to include Forerr in main 
regressions to control for a spurious correlation. Expected sign for Forerr is negative. 
Chen et al (2011) argues that to account for estimation biases in the four approaches of 
the cost of capital calculation, it is essential to control for long-term earing growth (LTG). 
They show that LTG positively affects implied cost of equity capital. Subsequently, we 
also control for log-term earnings growth.   
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argue that in order to compensate investors for 
higher transaction costs, expected returns should be high for illiquid stocks. 
Consequently, we include liquidity measure (Liquid). We estimate Liquid according to 
Lesmond (2005) - equals the proportion of non-zero return days in previous quarter. 
Predicted sign for Liquid is negative. 
We also control for annualized inflation (Inflation), country, industry and year fixed 
effects. Predicted sign for Inflation is positive. In robustness tests we include firm-level 
corporate governance index (GovIndex), estimated according to Aggarwal et al (2008). 
GovIndex covers four subcategories: Board (board independence, composition of 
committees, size, and transparency), Audit (independence of the audit committee and the 
role of auditors), Anti-takeover (dual-class structure, role of shareholders, poison pill, and 
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blank check preferred) and Compensation and ownership (executive ownership, options 
and loans). Predicted sign of GovIndex coefficient estimate is negative.   
Panel B of Table 1 shows descriptive statistic of major control variables. On 
average, our sample firms are large (total assets of 1.2 billion), and moderately leveraged 
(leverage ratio 0.18). They also possess important growth opportunities as implied by 
average LnBM of -0.82. Mean forecast error is negative, implying analysts’ slight 
optimism. Mean inflation, 0.025, is reasonable. Mean proportion of non-zero trading days 
is 92%, which is comparable to Chen et al (2009) estimate.   
3.5. Measuring a Firm’s demand for Liquidity – Marginal Propensity to Save Cash 
We follow prior literature (e.g, Almeida et al 2004; Khurana et al, 2006) to measure 
the sensitivity of a firm's changes in cash holdings to its cash flow innovations. We 
measure cash holding as cash and other equivalents, divided by total assets. Change in 
cash holdings (ΔCash) is the ratio of annual change in holdings of cash and marketable 
securities to total assets. Cash flow from operations (CF) is calculated as income before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization expenses minus dividends paid.  
We use natural logarithm of total assets as a measure of firm size (LogAT). Tobin's Q (Q) 
is estimated as the market value of equity plus total assets minus total book value of 
equity divided by total assets. Changed in short term debt (ΔSTDebt) is measured as the 
annual change in short-term debt divided by lagged total assets. Following Almeida et al 
(2004) and Khurana et al (2006), we predict that if firm sets aside cash today to meet 
future investment opportunities, a firm’s change in cash holdings should be positively 
influenced by future investment opportunities. Consequently, we expect that sign of the 
coefficient estimate of Q is positive. Also, Almeida et al (2004) argues that because of 
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economies of scale associated with a firm’s cash management policy, LogAT should 
negatively impact change in cash-holdings. Similar to Khurana et al (2006) we do not 
predict a sign for the effect of change in short term debt on the change in cash holdings 
because “short-term debt could be used as a substitute for cash or because firms may use 
short-term debt to build cash reserves” (Ameida et al, 2004). Panel C of Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics of these variables. The average Tobin’s Q is 1.92. The mean change 
is short-term debt is 0.01, while median is zero. The mean cash flow from operations 
scaled by total assets is 0.04.  
Regarding country-level variables, we deploy three main measures of legal 
protection: The first measure is the legal origin (LR) variable from La Porta et al. (1998). 
Second, we use Anti-self-dealing index (ANTISELF) from Djankov et al (2008). This 
index focuses on effectiveness of regulations in restricting corporate self-dealing, is better 
grounded in theory and works better empirically (as discussed in prior literature) than 
other indices. The third measure is the investor protection index (PROT) calculated as the 
principal component of the disclosure requirements, liability standards and anti-directors 
rights indices. In robustness tests section we also use legal rights index from the World 
Bank database. To measure financial development we use market capitalizations a 
percentage of GDP, credit going to the private sector to GDP, and stock market 
development measure from Khurana et al (2006), which is average of standardize indices 
of total value traded over the GDP, total value traded over market capitalization and 
market capitalization over the GDP. In robustness section we also use another index from 
Khurana et al (2006) which is average of above three indices as well as standardize 
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indices of the ratio of liquid liabilities to the GDP, and the credit going to the private 
sector over the GDP. 
4. Empirical Analysis and Discussion of Main Results  
 
4.1. The Effect of Managerial Social Capital on the Cost of Equity Financing 
We first analyze the relationship between social capital resident in managerial social 
networks with financiers and the excess cost of equity capital in univariate setting. We 
sort firms into quartiles by the degree centrality measure of social connections (ConFin) 
between executives of financee firms and their counterparts in financier firms and 
estimate mean values of the implied equity risk premium for each quartile. The results, 
shown in Table 2, reveal that the excess cost of equity monotonically decreases with 
ConFin quartiles. If the average estimate of the cost of capital from four different models 
introduced by Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas 
(2001) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) is used, the average implied equity risk 
premium for high social capital quartile is 0.062 compared to 0.075 for the low social 
capital quartile. The difference, 0.013, is statistically significant at 1% level. Qualitatively 
similar results are obtained if each of the implied costs of capital from four different 
models is used separately. These results provide strong preliminary evidence of a 
negative association between managerial social capital and the excess implied cost of 
equity capital.  
We further examine the relationship between social capital inherent in managerial 
social networks with financers and the cost of equity financing in multivariate panel 
regression setting. We regress our implied equity risk premium measures on social capital 
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proxies and other determinants of the cost of equity capital to control for spurious 
correlation. We estimate the following regression:      
                                                                                     
                                                                           
                                                                                            
where the subscripts i, j, and t denote country, firm, and time, respectively. 
Table 3 reports results. In Panel A, social capital (Sc) is measured by the total 
number of social connections between executives of financee firms and managers of 
financier firms (ConFin). In Columns (2)-(5) r is an estimate of the cost of equity based 
on Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), 
and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), respectively. In Column (1) r is an average of 
these four measures of cost of equity capital. rf is a risk-free rate measured as a yield on 
three month government bill. In panel B, social capital is measured by the total number of 
connections with financiers via education (Columns 1-5), via employment (Columns 6-
10) and via other social activities (Columns 11-15). We also deploy our four measures of 
the cost of equity capital as well as their average. In both panels, we control for risk, 
growth prospects, firm size, momentum, leverage, analysts’ earnings forecast error, long-
term growth rate forecast, liquidity and inflation. In addition we include country, industry 
and year fixed effects. Our Hypothesis 1 predicts negative coefficient estimate for social 
capital measure      . Control variables, as well as expected signs of their coefficient 
estimates are discussed earlier.  
The results show that social capital resident in social networks with financiers is 
negatively and significantly related to the cost of equity capital. Social ties via social 
activities and education have stronger effect on the cost of equity than social networks via 
employment. These results confirm findings of prior studies that casual, non-professional 
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ties are the most efficient form of social capital.  Coefficient estimates of the control 
variables are broadly consistent with theory and prior empirical evidence (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986, Fama and French, 1992, Hail and Leuz, 2006, Chen et al. 2009, 2011). 
The equity risk-premium is positively associated with beta, book-to-market-equity and 
leverage and negatively associated with firm size (market value of equity), analysts’ 
forecast error and liquidity.  In summary, social capital seems to reduce cost of equity 
financing. Investors demand lower “price” for the capital for firms with whom they are 
socially connected. On the other hand, companies with low managerial social capital with 
financiers have to bear a higher cost of equity capital when they wish to obtain external 
financing.  Overall, results in this section present previously undocumented relationship 
between cost of equity capital and managerial social capital and provide strong support 
for the Hypothesis 1. 
4.2. The Effect of Legal Protection and Financial Development on the relationship 
between Managerial Social Capital and the Cost of Equity Capital 
In this section we focus on interactive effect of country-level legal protection of 
investors, financial market development and managerial social capital in reducing the 
cost of equity financing. Our second hypothesis predicts that social capital will have a 
more pronounced effect on the cost of equity in markets characterized by the weak legal 
protection of investors. If laws and courts are insufficient to ensure the respect of 
contracts then investors will rely more on social capital. In addition, LLSV(1997, 1998) 
and Djankov et al (2008) show that that countries with strong legal protection of investors 
have more developed stock markets than do countries with weak legal protection of 
investors.  Well-developed financial markets help to overcome problems of moral hazard 
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and adverse selection. In contrast, these problems are exacerbated in less financially 
developed countries. Therefore the effect of social capital to reduce cost of financing 
should be stronger in underdeveloped financial markets.  
To test these predictions, we estimate equation (1) for high and the low investor 
protection subsamples and for high and low financial market development subsamples. 
Table 4 reports results. Our partition of the sample is based on three measures of investor 
protection (Legal origin from La Porta et al (1998), Anti-self-dealing index from Djankov 
et al (2008), and Investor protection index from La Porta et al (2006)) and three measures 
of financial development (Financial development index form Khurana et al 2006, 
financial market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, and domestic credit to private 
sector as a percentage of GDP). A firm is classified in the “low” or “high” sub-sample if 
the value of its country’s legal protection and financial development measure is below or 
above a median
29
. Main variable of interest is proxy for social capital – ConFin, 
estimated as a total number of social connections between executives of financee firms 
and managers of financier firms. Dependent variable in all regressions is r – the average 
cost of equity capital estimate based on four models (Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005)).  
In each of the six “low” sub-samples30, our social capital (FinCon) measure has a 
negative and significant coefficient estimate. In “high” sub-samples, the coefficient on 
social capital is negative but insignificant in two models (Columns (2) and (6)) and 
negative and significant in four models (Columns (4), (8), (10) and (12)). However, the 
                                                          
29
 Note that all these indices are not available for all the countries in our sample. Therefore sample size 
varies based on data availability.  
30
 Counting Civil Law countries in “Low” subsample and Common Law countries - in “High”.  
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negative and significant coefficient estimates of FinCon in “high” subsamples are 
significantly lower than the coefficient estimates of the same predictor in the paired 
“low” subsamples. So, the benefit of managerial social capital resident in social networks 
with financiers is more profound in weakly-developed financial markets and in markets 
characterized by inferior investor protection. Results also appear to have economically 
significant implications for the valuation. For example, for the low investor protection 
countries, as measured by Anti-self-dealing index, reduction in cost of equity is 
equivalent to an increase in firm value of about 3%, or $70 million, with some reasonable 
assumptions. But for the high investor protection countries, as measured by Anti-self-
dealing index, reduction in cost of equity is equivalent to an increase in firm value of 
about 1.3%, or $19 million
31
.         
In summary, our results in this section are consistent with Hypothesis 2. Particularly, 
the negative association between social capital in managerial social networks with 
financiers and cost of equity is stronger in financially underdeveloped markets and in 
markets characterize by the weak legal protection of investors. However, social capital is 
less valuable in reducing costs of equity in financially developed markets with strong 
investor protection standards.   
4.3. The Effect of Financial Constraints and Investment Opportunities on the 
Relationship between Managerial Social Capital and the Cost of Equity Capital 
In this section we investigate whether the relationship between managerial social 
capital and cost of equity financing is affected by financial constraints and investment 
                                                          
31
 We follow Chen et al (2011) and estimate valuation implications as follows: denote V1 (R1) and V2 (R2) 
as the value (the cost of equity) for the firms with high and low social capital. From the relation of 
V1/V2=(R2–g)/(R1–g)=1+(R2–R1)/(R1–g), V1/V2=1.03, when R2–R1=0.1526 and R1–g=5.0%. We estimate 
R2–R1=β1* interquartile range of ConFin=0.0014*109=0.1526% 
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opportunities of the firm. Specifically, we first explore interactive effect of social capital 
and financial constraints and then analyze how financial constraints and investment 
opportunities together alter negative implications of social capital on the cost of equity.  
We argue that for financially unconstrained firms with almost unlimited access to cheap 
external financing, social capital resident in managerial social networks with financier 
will not be that important. On the other hand, for financially constrained firms, that 
encounter higher costs of raising capital externally, managerial social capital will be 
significant in reducing the cost of financing. In addition, firms that do not have good 
investment opportunities are more likely to use external capital for value-destroying 
projects and overinvest. If social capital improves efficiency and generates positive 
externalities by sharing information and facilitating coordinated actions of socially 
connected individuals, than it will have a more pronounced effect on the cost of equity 
when financee firms have greater growth potential since these firms have real need for 
external capital for value-enhancing investing.  
We test these predictions in Tables 5 and 6. We first split our sample into firms with 
high and low financial constraints. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Li, 2011; 
Hadlock 2010), we use three measures of financial constraints:  firm size (natural log of 
total assets), firm age (number of years since incorporation) and WW index from Whited 
and Wu (2006). Young and smaller firms are more financially constrained. Detailed 
description of the WW index is presented in Appendix B. We use respective median 
values of the financial constraints measures to partition our sample into low and high 
financially constrained firms. We then estimate equation (1) for these subsamples 
separately. The prediction of Hypotheses 3 is that the coefficient estimate of social capital 
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should be higher in the subsample of small, young, and high WW index firms than in the 
subsample of large, old and low WW index firms. Table 5 provides strong support of this 
conjecture. Particularly, coefficient estimate of ConFin is insignificant for large and low 
WW index score firms. In addition, coefficient estimate of ConFin in young firms’ 
subsample is significantly lower than the same coefficient estimate for the old firms’ 
subsample. In other words, consistent with Hypotheses 3, the negative effect of social 
capital on the cost of equity is stronger for financially constrained firms.  
In Table 6, consistent with prior literature we use Tobin’s Q (Panel A) and Sales 
Growth (Panel B) as measures of investment opportunities
32
. Sales growth is calculated 
from year t to year t +1. We then independently partition the whole sample into two 
subsamples based on investment opportunities measures. Specifically, a firm is placed in 
the high investment opportunities group if its Q or Sales Growth exceeds the sample 
median. The intersections of the two investment opportunities groups and the two 
financial constraints groups generate four subgroups of interest. We predict that 
coefficient estimate of social capital proxy should be highest for high investment 
opportunities high financial constrains subgroups. We estimate equation (1) for each 
subgroup and compare coefficient estimates of ConFin. Consistent with our prediction, 
we find that coefficient estimate of social capital proxy is negative and significant for 
small firms with high investment opportunities (Columns 1-4). In addition, Coefficient 
estimates of ConFin in young-high investment opportunities subgroup and in high WW 
index score - high investment opportunities subgroup are significantly greater than the 
coefficient estimate of the same predictor in other pair groups (Columns 5-8 and 9-12). 
                                                          
32
 To mitigate the concern about endogenous investment opportunities, we use the industry median 
estimates. 
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Qualitatively similar results are presented in Panel B, where Sales growth is used as 
measure of investment opportunities. 
Overall, results in Table 6 are consistent with our argument that social capital has 
more pronounced effect on the cost of equity financing for financially constrained firms. 
Results also appear to have economically significant implications for the valuation. For 
example, for constrained firms, as measured by age, reduction in the cost of equity is 
equivalent to an increase in firm value of about 6.4%, with some reasonable assumptions. 
But for the unconstrained firms, as measured by age, reduction in the cost of equity is 
equivalent to an increase in firm value of about 3%.
33
 The overall effect of social capital 
on the cost of equity financing is stronger for financially constrained firms with good 
investment opportunities. These results provide strong support of our Hypotheses 3.                    
4.4. The Effect of Gender-Specific Network Ties on the Relationship between Managerial 
Social Capital and the Cost of Equity Capital 
We now explore the role of gender-specific social ties on the negative association 
between the social capital in managerial social networks with financiers and the cost of 
equity capital. Prior research (e.g, Bruce and Johnson, 1994; Johnson and Powell, 1994; 
Bertrand, 2011) provides evidence that women display a lower propensity for risk-taking 
than man. In the previous section we establish that the relationship between social capital 
and cost of equity is stronger for smaller, younger and more constrained firms that female 
financier executives will try to avoid. Therefore we predict that the relationship between 
the social capital and the cost of equity financing will be weaker for female-tied networks 
and stronger for male-tied networks.  
                                                          
33
 As before, we follow Chen et al (2011) to estimate valuation implications.  
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To test this this conjecture, we augment equation (1) with additional dummy 
variables. First we estimate the proportion of female-tied and male-tied networks within 
managerial social network with financiers and create two dummy variables:   FTND – 
equals 0 for firms with low (below median) proportion of female-tied networks within 
managerial social networks with financiers and 1 otherwise and MTND - equals 0 for 
firms with low (below median) proportion of male-tied networks within managerial 
social networks with financiers and 1 otherwise. Second, we also define two additional 
dummy variables: FTN - equals 0 for firms with no female-tied networks with financiers 
and 1 other wise and MTN - equals 0 for firms with no male-tied networks with 
financiers and 1 otherwise. Next we interact these dummy variables with our social 
capital measure (FinCon). Table 7 reports results of the augmented equation (1). The 
coefficient estimates of the interaction term of social capital proxy and female-tied 
network dummies are positive and significant, suggesting that as the proportion of 
female-tied networks with financiers increases, the negative relationship between social 
capital and cost of equity capital becomes less profound. The coefficient estimates of the 
interaction term of FinCon with male-tied network dummies are negative and significant, 
suggesting that the negative effect of social capital on the cost of equity becomes stronger 
as the proportion of male-tied networks with financiers increases. These results provide 
convincing evidence of the gender-specific implications of managerial social ties with 
financiers on the cost of equity capital.  
4.5. The Effect of Managerial Social Capital on the Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash  
In previous sections we establish that social capital resident in managerial social a 
networks with financiers negatively affects cost of equity financing. This phenomenon 
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has to have implications for corporate cash management policies. Keynes (1936) first 
suggested that corporate cash policies depend on the access and cost of external 
financing. Several classical papers also propose that the wedge between cost of external 
and internal financing caused by information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and 
agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) forces firms to rely on internally generated funds in 
making future investment decisions. Almeida et al (2004) implies that firms that face 
high cost of external financing should exhibit a higher marginal propensity to save cash 
in response to cash flows. Consequently, we argue that social capital should positively 
affect a firm’s demand for liquidity. To estimate the effect of social capital on cash flow 
sensitivity of cash we use the following empirical model adapted from Almeida et al 
(2004):  
                
       
        
           
       
        
                                    
                                                                               
 
Table 8 shows results. Social Capital (Sc) is measured by the total number of 
connections with financiers (Columns 1, 5-10), by the connections via education 
(Column 2), via employment (Column 3) and via other social activities (Column 4). 
Constant with prior literature (Khurana et al 2006; Kusnadi and Wei, 2011) in Columns 
(4)-(10) we add interaction terms of investor protection measures and cash flows from 
operations and financial development measures and cash flows from operations. In 
addition, in all specifications, we control for Tobin’s Q, firm size (the natural log of total 
assets) and change in short term debt. We also include country, industry and year fixed 
effects. Our Hypothesis 5 predicts negative coefficient estimate for the interaction term of 
social capital measure and cash flows from operation (     . Expected signs of the 
coefficient estimates of control variables are discussed earlier. 
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We find that consistent with our prediction, coefficient estimates of the interaction 
term of social capital proxies and cash flows from operations are negative and significant 
in all specifications. Results also appear to be economically significant. For firms with no 
social capital, $1 increase in cash flows leads to savings of 14 cents. For firms with 
median social capital, $1 increase in cash flows leads to savings of only 3 cents.  
Coefficient estimates of the control variables and other interaction terms are broadly 
consistent with theory and prior empirical evidence (e.g, Almedia et al, 2004, 2011; 
Kusnadi and Wei, 2011; Khurana et al, 2006).   
To summarize, results in Table 8 show that social capital resident in managerial 
social networks with financiers mitigates the tendency of firms to save cash out of cash 
flows to fund future investment needs.   
5. Robustness Tests 
 
In the previous section we have established that social capital plays an important role 
in reducing the firm’s cost of equity capital and demand for liquidity. In this section we 
test robustness of our results by using a number of alternative model specifications and 
variables. We briefly discuss these tests as follows. 
First, to test robustness of the relation between social capital and the cost of equity 
financing, we augment our major regressions with additional explanatory variable. Chen 
et al (2009) finds that firm-level corporate governance has a significantly negative effect 
on the cost of equity capital. Consequently, we include governance into equation (1). 
Table 9 shows the results of this analysis. Even after controlling for governance, we 
obtain qualitatively unchanged results on the effect of social capital on the cost of equity 
financing.  
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Second, we examine whether our finding, that the negative association between 
social capital and the cost of equity is stronger in weak financial markets and in markets 
characterized by inferior legal protection, is robust to alternative measures of investor 
protection and financial market development. Table 10 show results of this analysis and 
provides supportive evidence of our main findings. 
Third, we use Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index
34
 as an alternative measure of 
financial constraints and re-estimate our finding that financial constraints and investment 
opportunities play interactive role on the relationship between social capital and the cost 
of equity financing. Results, presented in Table 11, are qualitatively similar and 
comparable to those reported in Table 6.       
Fourth, we also check robustness of our result that the relation between social capital 
and cost of equity is affected by gender aspect of managerial ties. In Table 12 we 
introduce additional explanatory variables – legal protection, financial development and 
corporate governance – and still find that gender-specific network ties impose differential 
effect on the social capital - cost of equity capital relationship.  
Fifth, we examine robustness of the effect of social capital on the need for internal 
financing. Following Almeida et al (2004), Khurana et al (2006) and Kusnadi and Wei 
(2011), we include two additional predictors into equation (2): lagged cash to assets ratio 
and interaction term between lagged cash to assets and cash flows from operation. This 
new interaction term allows “the level of saving out of cash flows to change with the 
level of cash reserves”. Following Kusnadi and Wei (2011) we also control for capital 
expenditures (CAPX) divided by total assets. In addition, since Kusandi and Wei 
highlight the role of financial constraints on the cash flow sensitive of cash, we introduce 
                                                          
34
 Appendix B provides detailed description of the index. 
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new interaction term of cash flows from operation with financial constraints. Table 13 
reports results of this analysis and shows that introduction of new variables does not 
affect our major findings.   
6. Endogeneity Concerns 
The relationship between social capital and the cost of equity financing (and between 
social capital and the cash flow sensitivity of cash) could be spurious due to endogeneity. 
We argue that endogeneity concerns arising from reverse causality do not apply for this 
study because it would require some feedback effects moving from the cost of equity 
capital to social capital. But this is not sensible in the context of the research design used. 
Formation of social connections predates the measurement of the cost of equity capital 
and the cash flow sensitivities for years and sometimes for dozens of years (especially for 
educational connections). 
Endogeneity issues arising from omitted variables could be a problem. However we 
conduct a series of tests to alleviate any concern that our results might be driven by 
omitted variables. First, we include a number of control variables. Specifically we control 
for risk, growth prospects, firm size, momentum, leverage, analysts’ earnings forecast 
error, long-term growth rate forecast, liquidity, governance, Tobin’s Q, and change in 
debt. Results are robust to the addition of these and other controls. 
 Second, we use propensity score matching procedure to compare the cost of equity 
capital for the firms with socially connected executives with financiers and a control 
sample of firms with no connections. Since matched firms are indistinguishable in term 
of firm characteristics, the cost of capital should be similar if social connections are 
indeed irrelevant. Yet results, reported in Panel A of Table 16 show that that the cost of 
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equity capital of firms run by managers without social connections with financiers is 
significantly lower than the cost of equity of firms run by socially connected executives. 
Third, in our major regressions we include firm fixed effects to control for 
unobservable firm- specific characteristics that could impact the cost of equity and cash 
flow sensitivities. Results, presented in Table 14 show that our conclusions are not 
affected by addition of firm fixed effects. 
Next we use instrumental variable approach to account for the endogeneity of social 
connections in our baseline regressions. The most efficient way to deal with endogeneity 
in the context of this study is to find an exogenous shock to the financees’ social network 
with financiers, which is unrelated to the cost of capital and cash flow sensitivities. Based 
on Fracassi and Tate (2012), death of network ties (in this case death of connecting 
financier firm executives) provides an ideal exogenous shock to the social networks of 
financee firms. Consistent with Fracassi and Tate, we count number of socially connected 
financier executives with financees who have died up to the current fiscal year and use it 
as an instrument in the following model specification of 2-SLS IV estimation:   
                                        ∑               
 
   
            
                         
                                                                                                                                    
In the second stage we use predicted value of the social capital proxy and re-estimate 
our baseline regressions. Table 15 Panel A (Columns 1-8) reports results for the cost of 
capital analysis and Panel B (Columns 1-4) – for the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
analysis. Overall, we confirm our major results regarding the causal role social capital 
plays in reducing the cost of equity capital and a firm’s need for internal financing.   
 124 
 
Firms with low costs of equity financing and low cash flow sensitivities could select 
executives with greater social capital. To address this self-selection we employ modified 
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure – treatment effects model. This approach allows 
controlling for unobserved private information that influences a firm’s decision to select 
socially connected executives. In the first stage we estimate binary model by using probit 
regression:               
                              ∑               
 
   
                           
                                                                                                                                        
where FinConD is a dummy variable that equals 0 if none of financee firm 
executives are connected with financers and 1 otherwise. LSEXEC is the local suppy of 
socially connected executives in each geographic region in each year. BoardEx reports 
company locations around the world by geographic region and cities (e.g, within 
Germany,  Bavaria, Saarland, Berlin etc.). This gives a chance to estimate local supply of 
socially connected executives. We argue that firms’ decision to appoint socially 
connected managers and directors can be affected by local supply of socially connected 
executives. Therefore we use local supply of connected executives as exogenous 
explanatory factor. We estimate inverse Mills ratio from this regression and augment 
second-stage baseline regressions with inverse Mills ratio. Results, presented in Table 15, 
Column (9) of Panel A, and Column (5) of Panel B, show that even after controlling for 
any kind of self-selection due to unobservables that leads firms to select socially 
connected executives, social capital has significant effects on the cost of equity financing 
and demand for liquidity.    
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Next we use switching regression analysis to control for endogenous self-selection 
regarding appointing socially connected executives. This approach allows performing a 
counterfactual analysis; that is, what would be the cost of capital of a company if it is run 
by socially connected executives with financiers, instead of executives with no social 
connections, and vice versa. Binary choice model is similar to the probit model outlined 
above; however, following Maddala (1991) two inverse Mills ratio parameters are 
calculated
35
. Then two regressions for the variable of interest are estimated: one for 
socially connected executives and another for executives without social connections. 
These two regressions then are augmented with these inverse Mills ratios. 
Counterfactuals are calculated by multiplying coefficient estimates from the equation for 
socially connected executives by observed values of the independent variables for the 
companies run by executives with no social connections (and visa versa). Table 16, Panel 
B, reports results of this analysis. For firm run by executives with social connections, cost 
of capital would have been 0.09 instead of 0.06, had firm been run by executives without 
social connections with financers. The mean difference is statistically significant at 1% 
level. 
Finally, to shed even more light on the endogeneity problem, we conduct event-
study analyses of the exogenous shock. We calculate the change in the cost of equity 
capital from one year before the death event of the network tie (t-1) to one year after 
(t+1). Results are presented in the Table 16, Panel C. We find that loss of social ties with 
financiers is associated with statistically significant increase in the cost of equity capital. 
                                                          
35
 These two inverse Mills ratio parameter are         
       
      
 and         
       
      
  where   represents 
a vector of repressors in the first stage probit model,   is a vector of coefficient estimates,     is standard 
normal density and   is the standard normal cumulative density. 
 126 
 
However, for the matching firms (we did matching by firm characteristics) without 
exogenous shock to the network, the difference in the change of the cost of capital for the 
same period is not significant.    
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the effects of social capital resident in managerial social 
networks with financiers on a firm’s implied cost of equity capital and demand for 
liquidity.  Financial market frictions, such as asymmetric information and agency 
problems, limit firms’ reliance on external finance (Stein, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 
1998; Myers and Majluf, 1984). We argue that social capital alleviates these forces and 
has important implications for reducing a firm’s cost of equity capital and dependency on 
internally generated funds for financing investment opportunities. 
 Social capital in managerial social networks with financiers can reduce a firm’s cost 
of equity capital by lowering information asymmetry between the firm and its investors 
and by reducing the costs and need for external monitoring. Social capital, by 
information-sharing channel, eases potential inefficiencies in financial markets caused by 
imperfect information (e.g., Cohen et al, 2008, Hochberg et al, 2007, Rauch and Casella, 
2001, Fafchamps and Minten, 1999, Granovetter 1975, 1995). In addition, social capital, 
through trust channel, enables economic agents to operate more efficiently since they can 
economize on transaction costs. Social capital, by aggravating costs of reputation loss, 
imposes punishment on divergence behavior and fosters dispute-resolution without 
expensive legal interventions.  Subsequently, parties engaging in transactions demand 
less price protection against possible expropriation and breach. Furthermore, by the 
mechanisms of information sharing and punishment through reputation loss, social 
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capital reduces managerial incentives to expropriate and consequently lessens agency 
problems.    
Using a large panel of companies from 52 countries for the period 1999-2012, we 
document that social capital negatively affects the implied cost of equity, after controlling 
for risk factors, governance, analysts’ forecast biases, and other firm and country-level 
effects. We also find the negative association between social capital and cost of equity is 
stronger in underdeveloped financial markets and in markets characterized by weak legal 
protection of investors.  These results provide support to the conjecture that social capital 
generates positive externalities and facilitates investment in countries where formal 
contract enforcement system is weak and financial market mechanisms underdeveloped. 
We also find that social capital has a stronger effect on the cost of equity financing for 
constrained firms. In addition, results show that the association between social capital and 
cost of equity is weaker for female-tied networks. Our empirical findings also 
demonstrate that social capital lowers cash flow sensitivity of cash. These results are 
robust to alternative model specifications, variable measurement as well as variety of 
endogeneity tests.   
These results have a number of important implications. First, our results suggest that 
social capital of senior management can be a mechanism for reducing agency problems 
within the firm. Second, social capital allows financiers to successfully identify 
financially constrained firms with potential, that otherwise would be difficult due to high 
information asymmetry and monitoring costs. In addition, social capital creates positive 
externality by assisting legal and market institutions in facilitating financial contracting, 
especially in underdeveloped countries.  This new and direct evidence regarding the 
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benefits of social capital at corporate as well as country level contributes to the social 
capital debates at the World Bank and other development agencies.   
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Appendix A: Implied Cost of Equity Estimation 
Following Dhaliwal et al, (2006), and Chen et al (2009), the implied cost of equity is 
estimated by implementing four variations of residual income valuation model  
Variable definitions for all models:  
Pt = price per share of common stock in June of year t as reported by I/B/E/S 
Bt = book value at the beginning of the year divided by the number of common share 
outstanding in June of year t 
DPS0= dividends per share paid during year t-1 
EPS0= actual earnings per share reported by I/B/E/S for year t-1 
LTG= consensus long-term growth forecast reported in June of year t 
FEPSt+i= consensus forecasted EPS from I/B/E/S for the next i-th year at time t. FEPS1 and 
FEPS2 are equal to the one and two-year-ahead consensus EPS forecasts reported in 
I/B/E/S in June of year t. 
k= expected dividend payout ratio, calculated as DPS0/EPS0. If the firm-specific payout 
ratio is missing, then we substitute it with a country/industry median dividend payout 
ratio. 
rf= country risk-free rate, estimated as a return on three annualized yield on 3-month 
government securities.  For currencies where no liquid treasury bill market exists, 
LIBOR rates are used.  
glt= Expected long-term or perpetual future earnings growth rate, calculated as the long-
term median realized annual inflation rate for each country
36
.  
 
 
Model 1: Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) 
      ∑
            
(      )
       
  
   
 
             
               
      
FROEt+i= forecasted return on equity. For the first three periods, FROE is equal to FEPSt + i /Bt+ 
i-1. Subsequent FROE forecasts are a linear interpolation to industry median ROE, 
with industries defined using the 48 classifications in 
Fama and French (1997). 
Bt+i = Bt+ i-1 +FEPSt+i (1+k). Forecasts of B are based on the clean surplus relation, I/B/E/S 
earnings forecasts, and the year t dividend payout rate. 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 Results are qualitatively similar if rf-0.03 is used as an estimate for glt. 
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Model 2: Claus and Thomas (2001) 
      ∑
                  
        
 
   
 
                          
                 
 
FEPSt+i  
= 
I/B/E/S consensus for the first two years, for years three, four, five, consensus 
forecasts if available, otherwise, FEPSt+i= FEPSt+ i -1(1+LTG). 
Bt+i = Bt+ i-1 +FEPSt+i (1+k). Forecasts of B are based on the clean surplus relation, I/B/E/S 
earnings forecasts, and the year t dividend payout rate. 
glt= growth in abnormal earnings.  
  
 
Model 3: Ohlson and Jüettner-Narouth (2005) model, implemented by Gode and 
Mohanram (2003) 
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Model 4: Easton’s (2004) implementation of Ohlson and Jüettner-Narouth (2005) 
   
                        
     
  
where 
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Appendix B: Financial Constraints Indices 
1) WW Index is estimated following Whited and Wu (2006)  according to the 
following formula: 
 
         WW Index= -0.091*CF-0.062*DIVPOS+0.021*TLDT-0.044*LNTA+0.102*ISG-
0.035*SG 
 
where  
 
CF= cash flow/total assets 
DIVPOS= 
indicator that takes the value of one if the firm pays cash 
dividends  
TLTD= long-term debt/total assets  
LNTA= Ln(total assets)  
ISG= the firm’s three-digit industry sales growth 
SG= firm sales growth.  
 
 
 
2) KZ Index is estimated following Lamont et al (2001) and Kapaln and Zingales 
(1997).  
 
KZ = −1.001909*CashFlow/K+0.2826389*Tobin’s Q + 3.139193* Debt/TotalCapital       
−39.3678*Dividends/K − 1.314759*Cash/K 
 
where  
 
CashFlow/K = (income before extraordinary items + depreciation and 
amortization)/ property, plant, and equipment lagged  
Tobin’s = (total liabilities and stockholders’ equity + Market Equity – 
Book Value of total common equity  - deferred taxes)/ total 
liabilities and stockholders’ equity  
Debt/TotalCapital= (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities)/( (long-term 
debt + debt in current liabilities + stockholders’ equity) 
Dividends/K= (common dividends + preferred dividends)/ property, plant, 
and equipment lagged 
Cash/K= cash and short-term investments/ property, plant, and 
equipment lagged 
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A reports sample distribution across geographic location, legal regime origin and development status. Legal 
regimes are defined according to La Porta et al (2008) classification. Country development status is according to 
International Monetary Fund classification. Panels B and C report summary statistics for the main dependent and 
independent variables. The excess cost of equity is the cost of equity minus the risk-free rate. Rpeg, Rgls, Rct, and Roj are 
estimates of the cost of equity based on Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas 
(2001), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Rave is an average of four measures of cost of capital. Rf is a risk-free 
rate measured as a yield on three month government bill. ConFin, ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther 
consequently denote size/degree centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and 
managers of financier firms by total number of connections, by their current and past overlap in education, employment 
and other activities. Beta is calculated from the regression of the previous 24 and up to 60monthly stock returns on 
contemporaneous MSCI world market index returns.         is the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio as 
measured at the end of the previous fiscal year.         is the natural logarithm of the equity market value at the end 
of the previous fiscal year.         is measured as the compounded returns over the previous six months.          
is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.        is the analysts’ earnings forecast error for the forthcoming fiscal 
year, measured as actual earnings minus the earnings forecast and scaled by the stock price.     is the analysts’ 
forecast of the long-term earnings growth rate.        is estimated by Lesmond (2005) method (equals the proportion 
of non-zero return days in the previous quarter).           is country inflation rate.         is investor protection 
index and            is a measure of stock market development estimated according to Khyrana et al (2006) 
methodology (it is calculated as the average of three standardized indices: the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, the 
ratio of total value traded to GDP, the ratio of total value traded to market capitalization). ΔCash is the ratio of annual 
change in holdings of cash and marketable securities to total assets. CFAT is cash flow from operations and is 
calculated as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization expenses minus dividends paid, 
scaled by lagged total assets. Q is Tobin's Q and is calculated as the market value of equity plus total assets minus total 
book value of equity divided by total assets. Log(AT)is the natural log of total assets. CAPXAT is capital expenditures 
scaled by lagged total assets. ΔSTDebt is the change of the ratio of short-term debt to lagged total assets.   
Panel A: Sample Distribution 
Region No. Firms Percent 
Africa 480 1.27% 
Asia 4716 12.51% 
Australia/New 2112 5.60% 
Central America 168 0.45% 
Europe 9784 25.94% 
Middle East 147 0.39% 
North America 20078 53.24% 
South America 227 0.60% 
Total 37712 100% 
   
Development No. Firms Percent 
Developed 34558 91.64% 
Developing 129 0.34% 
Newly Industrialized Economies 3025 8.02% 
Total 37712 100.00% 
   
Legal Regime No. Firms Percent 
Common Law 27933 74.07% 
French Civil Law 4370 11.59% 
German Civil Law 4168 11.05% 
Scandinavian Civil Law 1241 3.29% 
Total 37712 100% 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics - Social Capital and Cost of Equity Capital 
 
N Mean Median Std Min Max 
Rave-Rf 37712 0.0678 0.0613 0.0399 0.0054 0.1941 
Rpeg-Rf 37712 0.0847 0.0744 0.0508 0.0065 0.283 
 133 
 
Rgls-Rf 37712 0.0334 0.0276 0.0636 -0.0528 0.9524 
Rct-Rf 37712 0.0599 0.0511 0.0545 -0.0049 0.9524 
Roj-Rf 37712 0.0902 0.081 0.0489 0.0139 0.2664 
ConFin 37712 82.6443 62 72.7847 0 286 
ConFinEduc 37712 10.6843 7 11.0611 0 41 
ConFinEmpl 37712 58.3939 39 58.3085 0 232 
ConFinOther 37712 0.4897 0 1.2422 0 7 
Beta 37712 0.5605 0.416 0.611 -1.0138 2.2517 
Log(BM) 37712 -0.8187 -0.7608 0.7 -2.6483 0.9676 
Log(MV) 37712 14.2718 14.2373 1.5855 8.4394 17.0798 
Retmom6 37712 0.0187 0.014 0.0687 -0.1625 0.2635 
Leverage 37712 0.1788 0.158 0.1587 0 0.6537 
Forerr 37712 -0.0069 0 0.0351 -0.2423 0.0897 
LTG 37712 0.149 0.1332 0.1027 -0.0429 0.5 
Liquid 37712 0.9165 0.9394 0.0807 0 1 
Inflation 37712 0.0253 0.0246 0.01723 -0.0448 0.1832 
              
Panel C: Summary - Statistics Social Capital and Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash 
  N Mean Median Std Min Max 
ConFin 74139 73.0571 42 81.6875 0 286 
ConFinEduc 74139 8.8787 4 11.6974 0 41 
ConFinEmpl 74139 55.0683 27 67.2373 0 232 
ConFinOther 74139 0.6802 0 1.7772 0 7 
ΔCash 74139 0.0416 0.003 0.488 -10.9172 41.7833 
CFAT 74139 0.0349 0.0747 0.4033 -19.1144 39.0721 
Q 74139 1.9091 1.3853 1.4779 0.6236 7.7736 
Log(AT) 74139 6.1504 6.1861 2.2373 1.3167 10.4311 
ΔSTDebtAT 74139 0.0112 0 0.2072 -13.441 21.3429 
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Table 2: Social Capital and Cost of Equity Capital 
This table presents univariate analysis of managerial social capital and cost of equity financing. ConFin is a size/degree 
centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms. For each 
ConFin quartile average value of the excess cost of equity is reported. The excess cost of equity is the cost of equity 
minus the risk-free rate. Rpeg, Rgls, Rct, and Roj are estimates of the cost of equity based on Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee 
and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Rave is an average of 
four measures of cost of capital. Rf is a risk-free rate measured as a yield on three month government bill. P-values are 
reported in parentheses.     
ConFin Quartiles  N Rave-Rf Rpeg-Rf Rgls-Rf Rct-Rf Roj-Rf 
       
Low 9428 0.0752 0.0928 0.0386 0.0664 0.0969 
2 9428 0.0725 0.0898 0.0372 0.0611 0.0943 
3 9428 0.0664 0.0829 0.0321 0.0559 0.0878 
High 9428 0.0615 0.0769 0.0241 0.0547 0.0824 
       
Difference (High-Low) 
 
-0.0137 -0.0159 -0.0145 -0.0117 -0.0145 
P-value  (High-Low) 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
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Table 3: Social Capital and Cost of Equity Capital – Does a social capital in managerial 
social networks with financiers negatively affect cost of equity capital?   
This table reports results of the following regressions:                                                       
                                                                                          
                                                        . In Panel A, Social Capital    )  is 
ConFin - size/degree centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and managers of 
financier firms by total number of connections.  In Columns (2)-(5) r is an estimate of the cost of equity based on 
Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005), respectively. In Column (1)   is an average of these four measures of cost of equity capital.    is a risk-free rate 
measured as a yield on three month government bill. In Panel B, Social Capital (Sc) is ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and 
ConFinOther, denoting size/degree centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and 
managers of financier firms by their current and past overlap in education, employment and other activities, 
respectively. The cost of equity capital  is estimated in Columns (2),  (7) and (12) of Panel B based on Easton (2004) , 
in Columns (3), (8) and (13) – based on Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), in Columns (4), (9) and (14) – based 
on Claus and Thomas (2001), in Columns (5), (10) and (15) – based on Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). In 
Columns (1), (6) and (11)   is an average of these four measures of cost of capital. Control variables include: Beta, 
calculated from the regression of the previous 24 and up to 60 monthly stock returns on contemporaneous MSCI world 
market index returns,        - the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio as measured at the end of the 
previous fiscal year,        - the natural logarithm of the equity market value at the end of the previous fiscal year,  
        - measured as the compounded returns over the previous six months,          - the ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets,        - the analysts’ earnings forecast error for the forthcoming fiscal year, measured as actual 
earnings minus the earnings forecast and scaled by the stock price,     - the analysts’ forecast of the long-term 
earnings growth rate,        - estimated by Lesmond (2005) method (equals the proportion of non-zero return days in 
the previous quarter), and           - country annualized inflation rate. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
Panel A: Networks with Financiers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.1059 0.1249 0.0735 0.1028 0.1269 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0015 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0263] [0.0005] [<.0001] 
Beta 0.0013 0.0016 0.0024 0.0013 0.0015 
 
[0.0006] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0078] [0.0009] 
LnBM 0.0207 0.0152 0.0418 0.0141 0.0148 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LnMV -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.8248] [<.0001] 
Retmom6 0.0112 0.0175 0.0084 0.0040 0.0126 
 
[0.0001] [<.0001] [0.0282] [0.2904] [0.0003] 
Leverage 0.0242 0.0302 0.0176 0.0303 0.0206 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Forerr -0.3118 -0.3722 -0.3022 -0.2286 -0.3523 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LTG 0.0007 0.0006 0.0002 0.0011 0.0009 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Liquid -0.0290 -0.0384 -0.0028 -0.0417 -0.0420 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.4542] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Inflation 0.0013 0.0011 0.0014 0.0014 0.0011 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
      
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Obs 37712 37712 37712 37712 37712 
AdjR2 0.4115 0.3006 0.4445 0.2420 0.3103 
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Table 5: Social Capital and Financial Constraints - Is the negative association between a 
social capital and a cost of equity capital stronger for financially constrained firms? 
This table reports results of the following regressions:                                                       
                                                                                          
                                                          where   is an average of the cost of 
equity estimates by  Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005).    is a risk-free rate measured as a yield on three month government bill. Social 
Capital    )  is ConFin - size/degree centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and 
managers of financier firms by total number of connections. Control variables include: Beta, calculated from the 
regression of the previous 24 and up to 60monthly stock returns on contemporaneous MSCI world market index 
returns,        - the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio as measured at the end of the previous fiscal year, 
       - the natural logarithm of the equity market value at the end of the previous fiscal year,          - measured 
as the compounded returns over the previous six months,          - the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,        
- the analysts’ earnings forecast error for the forthcoming fiscal year, measured as actual earnings minus the earnings 
forecast and scaled by the stock price,     - the analysts’ forecast of the long-term earnings growth rate,        - 
estimated by Lesmond (2005) method (equals the proportion of non-zero return days in the previous quarter), and 
          - country annualized inflation rate. The sample is partitioned in Columns (1)-(2) based on firm size (total 
assets), in Columns (3)-(4) – age (number of years since incorporation), and in Columns (5)-(6) – WW index of 
financial constraints from Whited and Wu (2006). P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Size  Age  WW Index 
 Small Large  Young Old  Low High 
         
Intercept 0.1011 0.0746  0.1214 0.0963  0.1057 0.1081 
 [<.0001] [ <.0001]  [ <.0001] [<.0001]  [ <.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin -0.0019 0.0005  -0.0023 -0.0014  -0.0003 -0.0020 
 [0.0001] [0.1572]  [<.0001] [<.0001]  [0.4503] [<.0001] 
Beta 0.0005 0.0036  0.0023 -0.0007  0.0011 0.0015 
 [0.3399] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [0.1712]  [0.0421] [0.0061] 
LnBM 0.0173 0.0212  0.0175 0.0205  0.0212 0.0194 
 [<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LnMV -0.0027 0.0000  -0.0001 0.0000  -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [<.0001] [0.118]  [<.0001] [0.0158]  [<.0001] [0.0069] 
Retmom6 0.0142 0.0046  0.0036 0.0123  0.0146 0.0112 
 [0.0002] [0.325]  [0.2842] [0.0005]  [0.0004] [0.0077] 
Leverage 0.0206 0.0330  0.0156 0.0287  0.0298 0.0226 
 [<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Forerr -0.3381 -0.2708  -0.0587 -0.1123  -0.2565 -0.3246 
 [<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LTG 0.0002 0.0003  0.0002 0.0002  0.0006 0.0009 
 [<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Liquid -0.0214 0.0120  -0.0390 -0.0130  -0.0304 -0.0287 
 [<.0001] [0.0436]  [<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Inflation 0.0020 0.0009  0.0011 0.0036  0.0005 0.0018 
 [<.0001] [0.0004]  [<.0001] [<.0001]  [0.054] [<.0001] 
    
0.0209 
   
P-value For Diff       
in ConFin Coeff.         
         
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
         
Obs 18867 18845  18818 18894  18723 18989 
AdjR2 0.3778 0.4550  0.3779 0.4699  0.4384 0.3831 
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Table 7: Social Capital, Cost of Equity Capital and Gender-Specific Network Ties - Is the 
negative association between social capital and cost of equity weaker for female-tied 
networks?   
This table reports results of the following regressions:                                                   
                                                                                                           
                                                               where   is an average of the cost of 
equity estimates by  Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005).    is a risk-free rate measured as a yield on three month government bill. Social 
Capital    )  is ConFin - size/degree centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and 
managers of financier firms by total number of connections. δ is a dummy variable and in Column (1) is denoted by 
FTND – equals 0 for firms with low (below median) proportion of female-tied networks within managerial social 
networks with financiers and 1 otherwise. In Column (2) δ is denoted by MTND - equals 0 for firms with low (below 
median) proportion of male-tied networks within managerial social networks with financiers and 1 otherwise. In 
Column (3) δ is denoted by FTN - equals 0 for firms with no female-tied networks with financiers and 1 other wise. In 
Column (4) δ is denoted by MTN - equals 0 for firms with no male-tied networks with financiers and 1 otherwise. 
Control variables include: Beta, calculated from the regression of the previous 24 and up to 60 monthly stock returns on 
contemporaneous MSCI world market index returns,        - the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio as 
measured at the end of the previous fiscal year,        - the natural logarithm of the equity market value at the end of 
the previous fiscal year,          - measured as the compounded returns over the previous six months,          - 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,        - the analysts’ earnings forecast error for the forthcoming fiscal year, 
measured as actual earnings minus the earnings forecast and scaled by the stock price,     - the analysts’ forecast of 
the long-term earnings growth rate,        - estimated by Lesmond (2005) method (equals the proportion of non-zero 
return days in the previous quarter), and           - country annualized inflation rate. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.0919 0.0947 0.0941 0.0904 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin -0.0024 -0.0005 -0.0024 0.0001 
 
[<.0001] [0.0056] [<.0001] [0.0037] 
ConFin*FTND 0.0017 
   
 
[<.0001] 
   
ConFin*MTND 
 
-0.0008 
  
  
[0.0654] 
  
ConFin*FTN 
  
0.0016 
 
   
[<.0001] 
 
ConFin*MTN 
   
-0.00172 
    
[<.0001] 
Beta 0.0015 0.0021 0.0014 0.0017 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LnBM 0.0193 0.0203 0.0194 0.0189 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LnMV -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Retmom6 0.0083 0.0111 0.0084 0.0084 
 
[0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0008] 
Leverage 0.0220 0.0249 0.0216 0.0216 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Forerr -0.2651 -0.3245 -0.2634 -0.2693 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
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LTG 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Liquid -0.0185 -0.0255 -0.0184 -0.0210 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Inflation 0.0025 0.0028 0.0020 0.0033 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
FTND -0.0016 
   
 
[0.0147] 
   
MTND 
 
0.0008 
  
  
[0.2478] 
  
FTN 
  
-0.0014 
 
   
[0.029] 
 
MTN 
   
-0.0004 
    
[0.2619] 
     
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Obs 37712 37712 37712 37712 
AdjR2 0.4548 0.4185 0.4522 0.4623 
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Table 9: Robustness Tests - Social Capital and Cost of Equity Capital – Alternative Model 
Specifications 
This table reports results of the following main regression:                                                       
                                                                                                          
                                        , where   is an average of the cost of equity estimates by  Easton 
(2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). 
   is a risk-free rate measured as yield on three month government bill. Corporate governance measure (GovIndex) is 
added as a control. GovIndex is corporate governance index from Aggarwal et al (2008). Social Capital    )  is ConFin, 
ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther, denoting size/degree centrality measure of social connections between 
executives of public firms and managers of financier firms by total number of connections (Columns (1)),  by their 
current and past overlap in education (Columns (2)), employment (Columns (3)) and other activities (Columns (4)), 
respectively. Control variables include: Beta, calculated from the regression of the previous 24 and up to 60 monthly 
stock returns on contemporaneous MSCI world market index returns,        - the natural logarithm of the book-to-
market ratio as measured at the end of the previous fiscal year,        - the natural logarithm of the equity market 
value at the end of the previous fiscal year,          - measured as the compounded returns over the previous six 
months,          - the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,        - the analysts’ earnings forecast error for the 
forthcoming fiscal year, measured as actual earnings minus the earnings forecast and scaled by the stock price,     - 
the analysts’ forecast of the long-term earnings growth rate,        - estimated by Lesmond (2005) method (equals the 
proportion of non-zero return days in the previous quarter), and           - country annualized inflation rate. P-values 
are reported in parentheses.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.0621 0.0624 0.0635 0.1239 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin -0.0021 
   
 
[<.0001] 
   
ConFinEduc 
 
-0.0092 
  
  
[<.0001] 
  
ConFinEmpl 
  
-0.0023 
 
   
[<.0001] 
 
ConFinOther 
   
-0.1300 
    
[<.0001] 
     Beta 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0036 
 
[0.0869] [0.1084] [0.1235] [<.0001] 
LnBM 0.0154 0.0155 0.0154 0.0133 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LnMV -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0047] 
Retmom6 0.0112 0.0113 0.0113 -0.0085 
 
[0.0036] [0.0034] [0.0033] [0.1117] 
Leverage 0.0258 0.0253 0.0258 0.0235 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Forerr -0.2766 -0.2775 -0.2766 -0.1927 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LTG 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Liquid -0.0268 -0.0285 -0.0282 -0.0577 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Inflation 0.0053 0.0055 0.0052 0.0000 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.8856] 
     GovIndex 0.0012 0.0007 0.0009 -0.0084 
 
[0.4496] [0.6778] [0.5612] [0.051] 
     
          Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Obs 12576 12576 12576 12576 
AdjR
2
 0.4784 0.4773 0.4780 0.4813 
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Table 10: Robustness Tests - Social Capital, Investor Protection and Financial Development 
– Alternative Measures of Investor Protection and Financial Development 
This table reports results of the following regressions:                                                       
                                                                                          
                                                          where   is an average of the cost of 
equity estimates by  Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005).    is a risk-free rate measured as a yield on three month government bill. Social 
Capital    )  is ConFin - size/degree centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and 
managers of financier firms by total number of connections. Control variables include: Beta, calculated from the 
regression of the previous 24 and up to 60monthly stock returns on contemporaneous MSCI world market index 
returns,        - the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio as measured at the end of the previous fiscal year, 
       - the natural logarithm of the equity market value at the end of the previous fiscal year,          - measured 
as the compounded returns over the previous six months,          - the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,        
- the analysts’ earnings forecast error for the forthcoming fiscal year, measured as actual earnings minus the earnings 
forecast and scaled by the stock price,     - the analysts’ forecast of the long-term earnings growth rate,        - 
estimated by Lesmond (2005) method (equals the proportion of non-zero return days in the previous quarter), and 
          - country annualized inflation rate. The sample is partitioned in Columns (1)-(2) based on Legal Rights 
Index and in Columns (3)-(4) based on overall financial development index from Khurana et al. (2006). P-values are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 LEGALINDEX  FINDEV 
 Low High  Low High 
      
Intercept 0.1962 0.1022  0.1177 0.1098 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin -0.0019 -0.0007  -0.0027 -0.0018 
 
[0.0002] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Beta 0.0074 0.0008  0.0054 0.0015 
 
[<.0001] [0.0703]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LnBM 0.0242 0.0190  0.0192 0.0167 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LnMV -0.0001 0.0000  -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
[0.0014] [0.0015]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Retmom6 -0.0182 0.0157  -0.0021 0.0074 
 
[0.0015] [<.0001]  [0.6017] [0.0063] 
Leverage 0.0177 0.0267  0.0119 0.0223 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Forerr -0.2594 -0.3507  -0.1695 -0.2658 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LTG 0.0006 0.0007  0.0001 0.0007 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Liquid -0.0239 -0.0458  -0.0205 -0.0593 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Inflation -0.0038 0.0054  -0.0011 0.0073 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001] [<.0001] 
   
 
  
P-value for Diff 
  
 
  
in ConFin Coeff.  [0.0297]  [0.0747] 
      
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Obs 11585 26127  13325 18784 
AdjR2 0.5323 0.3731  0.4895 0.4424 
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Table 12: Robustness Tests - Social Capital, Cost of Equity Capital and Gender-Specific 
Network Ties – Alternative Model Specifications   
This table reports results of the following main regression:                                        
                                                                                           
                                                                                           
where   is an average of the cost of equity estimates by  Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus 
and Thomas (2001), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005).    is a risk-free rate measured as a yield on three month 
government bill. Social Capital    )  is ConFin - size/degree centrality measure of social connections between 
executives of public firms and managers of financier firms by total number of connections. δ is a dummy variable and 
in Column (1), (3) and (5)  is denoted by FTND – equals 0 for firms with low (below median) proportion of female-tied 
networks within managerial social networks with financiers and 1 otherwise. In Column (2), (4) and (6) δ is denoted by 
MTND - equals 0 for firms with low (below median) proportion of male-tied networks within managerial social 
networks with financiers and 1 otherwise. In Columns (1) and (2), investor protections measure (LR) is added to the 
main model, in Columns (3) and (4) – financial development measure (FinDev) is added, and in Columns (5) and (6) 
governance measure (GovIndex) is added.  LR is the legal origin dummy variable from La Porta et al. (1998) and equals 
1 for countries with common-law origin and 0 otherwise. FinDev is the financial development index from Khurana et al 
(2006) and GovIndex is corporate governance index from Aggarwal et al (2008). Control variables include: Beta, 
calculated from the regression of the previous 24 and up to 60 monthly stock returns on contemporaneous MSCI world 
market index returns,        - the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio as measured at the end of the 
previous fiscal year,        - the natural logarithm of the equity market value at the end of the previous fiscal year,  
        - measured as the compounded returns over the previous six months,          - the ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets,        - the analysts’ earnings forecast error for the forthcoming fiscal year, measured as actual 
earnings minus the earnings forecast and scaled by the stock price,     - the analysts’ forecast of the long-term 
earnings growth rate,        - estimated by Lesmond (2005) method (equals the proportion of non-zero return days in 
the previous quarter), and           - country annualized inflation rate. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Intercept 0.1481 0.1373 0.0827 0.0841 0.1181 0.1051 
 
[<.0001] [ <.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin -0.0026 -0.0005 -0.0026 -0.0012 -0.0038 -0.0021 
 
[<.0001] [0.0047] [<.0001] [0.0005] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin*FTND 0.0014 
 
0.0014 
 
0.0013 
 
 
[0.0003] 
 
[0.0007] 
 
[0.0391] 
 
ConFin*MTND 
 
-0.0008 
 
-0.0008 
 
-0.0010 
  
[0.0755] 
 
[0.0996] 
 
[0.0791] 
Beta 0.0015 0.0021 0.0010 0.0014 -0.0060 -0.0054 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0017] [0.0007] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LnBM 0.0194 0.0203 0.0185 0.0191 0.0167 0.0162 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LnMV 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0002] [<.0001] [0.7667] [0.1481] 
Retmom6 0.0083 0.0110 0.0090 0.0106 0.0054 0.0046 
 
[0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0008] [0.1639] [0.2581] 
Leverage 0.0222 0.0249 0.0234 0.0268 0.0289 0.0274 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Forerr -0.2664 -0.3252 -0.2658 -0.3191 -0.2440 -0.2456 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LTG 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 
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[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Liquid -0.0192 -0.0262 -0.0188 -0.0241 -0.0209 -0.0165 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0011] [0.0153] 
Inflation 0.0025 0.0028 0.0025 0.0027 -0.0005 -0.0006 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.1762] [0.1346] 
FTND -0.0014 
 
-0.0019 
 
-0.0001 
 
 
[0.0385] 
 
[0.0062] 
 
[0.9599] 
 
MTND 
 
0.0007 
 
0.0008 
 
0.0007 
  
[0.2772] 
 
[0.2699] 
 
[0.4157] 
LCOMM -0.0554 -0.0418 
    
 
[<.0001] [0.0212] 
    
FinDev 
  
0.0002 -0.0003 
  
   
[0.6995] [0.6643] 
  
GovIndex 
    
-0.0470 -0.0488 
     
[<.0001] [<.0001] 
       
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 37712 37712 37712 37712 12576 12576 
AdjR2 0.4536 0.4180 0.4351 0.4007 0.3839 0.3800 
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Table 13: Robustness Tests - Social Capital and Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash – Alternative 
Model                                                       
This table report results of the following regression:                 
       
        
           
       
        
          
              
         
        
                  
           
        
   
       
        
 
           
        
                           
                               , where ΔCash is the ratio of annual change in holdings of cash and 
marketable securities to total assets. CF is cash flow from operations and is calculated as income before extraordinary 
items plus depreciation and amortization expenses minus dividends paid. AT is total assets (in millions). Social Capital 
(Sc) is ConFin, ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther - denoting size/degree centrality measure of social 
connections between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms by total number of connections, by 
their current and past overlap in education, employment and other activities, respectively. Q is Tobin's Q and is 
calculated as the market value of equity plus total assets minus total book value of equity divided by total assets. Size is 
the natural log of total assets. CAPX is capital expenditures and ΔSTDebt is the change in short-term debt to lagged 
total assets. Cash is the one-year lagged level of cash holding. In Column (5) interaction term of investor protection 
measure and cash flow from operations is added: LEGALINDEX is a dummy variable and equals 1 for countries with 
above-median index score and 0 otherwise. In Column (6) interaction term of financial development measure and cash 
flow from operations is added: FinDev is the financial development index from Khurana et al. (2006) and equals 1 for 
countries with above-median index score and 0 otherwise. In Column (7) interaction terms of investor protection and 
cash flow from operations, financial development and cash flow from operations and financial constraints and cash 
flow from operations are added. KZ index is Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index and equals 1 for countries with above-
median index score and 0. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0.0136 0.0286 0.0190 0.0398 -0.0632 0.0099 0.0341 
 
[0.6314] [0.3144] [0.5022] [0.1602] [0.7278] [0.7175] [0.1979] 
CFAT 0.09989 0.07090 0.07734 0.05812 0.86342 0.12576 0.63856 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT*ConFin -0.0025 
   
-0.0027 -0.0008 -0.3453 
 
[<.0001] 
   
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT*ConFinEduc 
 
-0.0090 
     
  
[<.0001] 
     
CFAT*ConFinEmpl 
  
-0.0026 
    
   
[<.0001] 
    
CFAT*ConFinOther 
   
-0.0635 
   
    
[<.0001] 
   
CFAT*LEGALINDEX 
    
-0.0819 
 
-0.06781 
     
[<.0001] 
 
[<.0001] 
CFAT*FinDev 
     
-0.0865 -0.11168 
      
[<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT*KZ  
      
0.2661 
       
[<.0001] 
Q 0.0308 0.0298 0.0303 0.0298 0.0307 0.0228 0.0272 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Log(AT) -0.0074 -0.0084 -0.0087 -0.0116 -0.0049 -0.0014 -0.0057 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0001] [0.2534] [<.0001] 
CAPXAT 0.0773 0.0797 0.0790 0.0000 0.0614 0.3212 0.4668 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ΔSTDebtAT 0.2331 0.2309 0.2326 0.2914 0.2399 0.0613 0.0328 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0005] 
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CASHATt-1 -0.2925 -0.2963 -0.2918 -0.2879 -0.2947 -0.3355 0.1513 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT*CASHATt-1 0.0642 0.0580 0.0579 0.0625 0.0583 0.0784 -0.0012 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Sc 0.0642 0.0580 0.0579 0.0625 0.0001 -0.00003 0.00001 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0038] [0.3001] [0.8452] 
        
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Obs 70146 70146 70146 70146 70146 70146 70146 
AdjR2 0.0590 0.0544 0.0564 0.0445 0.0642 0.0850 0.1272 
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Table 14: Endogeneity Concerns – Firm Fixed Effects 
Columns (1) and (4) of this table  report results of the following main regression:                           
                                                                                           
                                                                       .   is an average of the cost of 
equity estimates by  Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005).    is a risk-free rate measured as a yield on three month government bill. Social 
Capital    )  is ConFin - size/degree centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and 
managers of financier firms by total number of connections. Control variables include: Beta, calculated from the 
regression of the previous 24 and up to 60monthly stock returns on contemporaneous MSCI world market index 
returns,        - the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio as measured at the end of the previous fiscal year, 
       - the natural logarithm of the equity market value at the end of the previous fiscal year,          - measured 
as the compounded returns over the previous six months,          - the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,        
- the analysts’ earnings forecast error for the forthcoming fiscal year, measured as actual earnings minus the earnings 
forecast and scaled by the stock price,     - the analysts’ forecast of the long-term earnings growth rate,        - 
estimated by Lesmond (2005) method (equals the proportion of non-zero return days in the previous quarter), 
          - country annualized inflation rate. In Columns (2)-(4) investor protections measure (LR) and stock market 
development measure (STKMKT) are added to the main model. LR is the legal origin dummy variable from La Porta et 
al. (1998) and equals 1 for countries with common-law origin and 0 otherwise. STNKTDEV is the stock market  
development index from Khurana et al (2006).  In Columns (3)-(4) interaction term of social capital measure and 
female (ConFinFTND) and male-tied (ConFinFTND) network dummies are added, respectively. Columns (5)-(6) 
report results of the main regression:                  
       
        
           
       
        
                      
  
         
        
                                                      , where ΔCash is the ratio of annual 
change in holdings of cash and marketable securities to total assets. CF is cash flow from operations and is calculated 
as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization expenses minus dividends paid. AT is total 
assets (in millions). Social Capital (Sc) is ConFin - size/degree centrality measure of social connections between 
executives of public firms and managers of financier firms by total number of connections. Q is Tobin's Q and is 
calculated as the market value of equity plus total assets minus total book value of equity divided by total assets. Size is 
the natural log of total assets. CAPX is capital expenditures and ΔSTDebt is the change in short-term debt to lagged 
total assets. In Columns (6) interaction term of investor protection measure (LR) and cash flow from operations, and 
stock market development measure (STNKTDEV) and cash flow from operations are added. P-values are reported in 
parentheses.    
 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.2714 0.2809 0.2259 0.2248 -0.4506 -0.4044 
 [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin -0.0034 -0.0019 -0.0041 -0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [ <.0001] [0.0023] [<.0001] [0.0002] [0.1636] [0.2333] 
ConFin*FTND  0.0017    
   [<.0001]    
ConFin*MTND   -0.0018   
    [0.0006]   
CFAT     0.1429 0.3495 
     [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT*ConFin     -0.0026 -0.0029 
     [<.0001] [<.0001] 
       
Q     0.0306 0.0300 
     [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Log(AT)     0.0505 0.0504 
     [<.0001] [<.0001] 
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CAPXAT     0.0785 0.0721 
     [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ΔSTDebtAT    0.2309 0.2307 
     [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Beta 0.0016 0.0031 0.0032 0.0032   
 [0.0072] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001]   
LnBM 0.0217 0.0190 0.0190 0.0190   
 [ <.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001]   
LnMV -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002   
 [ <.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001]   
Retmom6 -0.0475 -0.0108 -0.0114 -0.0114   
 [ <.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001]   
Leverage 0.0205 0.0303 0.0307 0.0306   
 [ <.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001]   
Forerr -0.0923 -0.1210 -0.1215 -0.1217   
 [ <.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001]   
LTG 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004   
 [ <.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001]   
Liquid -0.0773 -0.0425 -0.0423 -0.0423   
 [ <.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001]   
Inflation -0.0014 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001   
 [ <.0001] [0.6808] [0.4253] [0.4369]   
LR  -0.0924 -0.0925 -0.0925   
  [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001]   
STKMKT -0.0106 -0.0055 -0.0056   
  [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001]   
CFAT*LR      -0.2433 
      [<.0001] 
CFAT*STKMKT      0.0704 
      [<.0001] 
FTND  -0.0033     
  [0.0002]     
MTND   0.0005    
   [0.4729]    
       
       
       
       
Firm Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Obs 37712 37711 32377 32377 74139 70146 
AdjR2 0.9156 0.9126 0.8263 0.8263 0.1175 0.1188 
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t 
ef
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ct
s 
m
o
d
el
. 
In
 t
h
e 
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t 
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ag
e 
p
ro
b
it
 
m
o
d
el
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s 
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ti
m
at
ed
 w
h
er
e 
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
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s 
a 
d
u
m
m
y
 v
ar
ia
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le
 t
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at
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q
u
al
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f 
fi
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h
 f
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n
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p
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ti
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n
 e
ac
h
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ra
p
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io
n
 i
n
 e
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h
 y
ea
r 
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d
 a
s 
an
 e
x
o
g
en
o
u
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ru
m
en
t.
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se
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il
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 c
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te
d
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m
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 f
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 c
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at
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p
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Panel B: Social Capital and Cash Flow Sensitivity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -0.0653 -0.0348 -0.0709 0.0006 0.1623 
 
[0.6075] [0.6389] [0.5778] [0.9612] [0.0001] 
 CFAT 0.0599 0.1053 0.1186 0.1191 0.0256 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT        ̂  -0.0042 -0.0048 -0.0051 -0.0051 
 
 
[0.0202] [0.009] [0.0052] [0.0102] 
 
CFAT*LR 
 
-0.0486 
   
  
[0.0162] 
   
CFAT* STNKTDEV  
  
-0.0726 
  
   
[<.0001] 
  
CFAT*LEGALINDEX 
   
-0.0392 
 
    
[0.0632] 
 
CFAT*FinDev 
   
-0.0010 
 
    
[0.9243] 
 
CFAT*KZ 
   
-0.0351 
 
    
[0.0032] 
 
CFAT* ConFinD 
    
-0.0016 
     
[<.0001] 
 IMR 
    
-0.5612 
     
[<.0001] 
 Q 0.0103 0.0103 0.0104 0.0100 0.0237 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
 Log(AT) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0022 
 
[0.9201] [0.7253] [0.4966] [0.561] [0.1065] 
 CAPXAT 0.0485 0.0475 0.0464 0.0559 0.0845 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ΔSTDebtAT 0.0506 0.0502 0.0500 0.0540 0.1516 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
      ̂  0.00018 0.00022 0.00024 0.00024 0.000003 
 
[0.25] [0.1551] [0.1308] [0.1506] [0.9304] 
      
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Obs 70146 70146 70146 70146 70146 
AdjR2 0.0248 0.0249 0.0257 0.0260 0.0390 
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Table 16: Endogeneity Concerns – Additional Tests 
Panel A of this table compares mean values of the excess cost of equity measure for firms with socially connected 
executives with financiers and a control sample of firms run by executives without social connections with financiers. 
Firms are matched by propensity score estimated based on all firm characteristics included in our main regressions. The 
excess cost of equity capital is the cost of equity minus the risk-free rate. The cost of equity capital, Rave is an average 
of four measures of cost of capital estimated based on Easton (2004), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Claus 
and Thomas (2001), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Rf is a risk-free rate measured as a yield on three month 
government bill. Panel B reports means of the actual values of the excess cost of equity capital and counterfactuals 
calculated via Heckman’s two stage selection model. Panel C compares changes in the mean values of the excess cost 
of equity capital one year before the death event of the connecting tie and one year after for event sample that 
experience exogenous shock and control sample of firms, matched by propensity score, that did not experience the 
shock. P-values of difference are reported in parentheses.    
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching 
    
 Mean Difference P-value 
(Rave-Rf)Connected with financiers 0.0620   
  
0.0172 [ <.0001] 
(Rave-Rf)Not Connected with financiers 0.0792   
         
Panel B: Counterfactual Analysis 
    
 Mean Difference P-value 
(Rave-Rf) Actual 0.0620   
  
0.0304 [<.0001] 
(Rave-Rf) Counterfactual 0.0924   
    
Panel C: Change in Cost of Equity Capital around Exogenous Event  
    
Event Sample Mean Difference P-value 
    
(Rave-Rf )t-1 0.0732   
  
0.0023 [0.0967] 
(Rave-Rf )t+1 0.0755   
    
Matched Sample Mean Difference P-value 
    
    
(Rave-Rf )t-1 0.0700   
  
-0.0005 [0.6966] 
(Rave-Rf )t+1 0.0702   
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Chapter V: SOCIAL CAPITAL, INVESTMENTS AND EXTERNAL FINANCING 
1. Introduction  
This paper examines the effects of social capital on investment and external finance. 
More specifically, we ask whether social capital resident in managerial social networks 
with financiers affects investment sensitivity to cash flow and Q in traditional framework 
(e.g. Tobin, 1969; Hayashi, 1982, Fazzari et al 1988, 2000). As a follow up question we 
examine the implication of social capital for external finance-cash flow and external 
finance-Q sensitivities. In addition, we explore how these relationships are affected by 
the degree of investor protection and whether efficiencies in firm-level resource 
allocation caused by social capital are reflected in firm performance. The importance of 
these questions stems from the idea that in frictionless capital markets (e.g., Modegliani 
and Miller, 1958) firms enjoy unlimited access to external financing to fund growth 
options. However, market frictions, such as information asymmetry and agency distort a 
firm’s access to external funds. Consequently, mechanisms that mitigate these forces are 
important area of modern research in academic finance. We argue that social capital is 
one of such mechanisms. 
  Based on the interdisciplinary theoretical framework, Woolcock (1998) proposes a 
broad conceptualization of the social capital idea: social capital is defined as information, 
trust, and norms of reciprocity inherent in a social network.  There has been a recent spur 
in the social science literature examining the effects of social capital on various socio-
economic outcomes, yet it has received only limited attention in academic finance. This 
study reinforces a growing awareness among finance scholars that social capital could 
have important implications for corporate finance practices.  
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Social capital resident in managerial social networks ameliorates potential 
inefficiencies in financial markets caused by information asymmetry. A number of 
studies (e.g. Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; Granovetter, 1975,1995; Montgomery, 1991) 
find supportive evidence of social ties as a means for efficient information exchange. 
Prior evidence suggests that firms that reduce information asymmetry have better access 
to cheap external financing (e.g., Francis et al, 2004; Hail, 2002; Verrecchia, 2001; 
Botosan, 1997). Social capital through trust channel reduces need for costly monitoring. 
Consequently, trusting economic agents can transact more efficiently. High trust can 
facilitate investment where there is no well-developed formal system of investor 
protection. Trust minimizes the negative consequences of incomplete contracts 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986) and subsequently improves a firm’s access to external 
financing. Finally, social capital by aggravating costs of reputation loss (Kandori, 1992; 
McMillan and Woodruff, 2000) facilities honest dealing in transactions and reduces 
managerial incentives for expropriation thereby reducing agency problems between the 
insiders and investors.  
Consistent with Hubbard (1998) and Fazzari et al (2000) we argue that investment 
sensitivity to cash flow reflects financial constraints. Because social capital results in 
better transparency, stricter contract enforcement, and effective managerial decision-
making, investment will be less dependent on internally generated cash for socially well-
connected firms. In addition, if social capital improves availability of external finance, 
then firms with high social capital but low cash flows should be able to issue more shares 
(more debt) if needed. Tobin’s (1969) seminal work shows that marginal Q predicts real 
investments. If social capital lessens financial constraints to fund growth opportunities, 
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than we should observe relationship between investment and external finance sensitivities 
to Q (as a proxy for growth options) and social capital. 
 In addition, these effects of social capital should be stronger when distortionary 
forces of frictionless capital market are aggravated. Therefore we argue that social capital 
should have distinct implications for these sensitivities in market characterized by weak 
protection of investors. Also since social capital mitigates agency problems and forces 
managers to make more efficient investment decisions, it should have implications for 
firm performance.  
To test these predictions, we use BoardEx databases provided by Management 
Diagnostics Limited. We build a panel dataset of managerial social connections via 
education, employment and other social activities.  Recent studies such as Engelberg et al 
(2012) and Fracassi (2012) use this database to estimate corporate social connections.  
To preview results, this paper finds that social capital is positively associated with 
investment sensitivity to Q and negatively – with investment sensitivity to cash flow. In 
similar vein, we find that social capital positively affects external finance-Q and 
negatively – external finance-cash flow sensitivities. These effects of social capital are 
stronger in market characterized by weak legal protection of investors. In addition, our 
results are consistent with the prediction that social capital has important implications for 
firm performance. These results are robust to alternative model specifications and 
variable measurement. To address the endogeneity concerns of social connections in our 
baseline regressions, we use death of network ties as an exogenous shock to the social 
network and apply instrumental variable estimation method. We still find convincing 
support of our main conjectures.  
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      This paper is related to emerging literature on the implications of social capital in 
corporate finance (e.g., Engelberg et al 2012,  Cai et al, 2012, Cai and Sevilir, 2012). In 
addition, this paper is also related to real investments and financial constraints literature 
(e.g., Fazzari et al 1988, Love, 2003; Bates et al 2009, Mclean et al, 2012).    
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides literature 
review and develops hypothesis. Section 3 describes our empirical model and variable 
construction. Section 4 presents main results. Section 5 reports robustness tests. Section 6 
discusses endogeneity concerns, and section 7 concludes.  
2. Background and Hypotheses Development   
2.1. Social Capital Theories and Channels of Influence   
The idea of social capital has received sizable attention in various social sciences 
since the publication of Putnam’s original work almost two decades ago, however 
examining its implication for corporate finance is relatively new development. The term 
social capital in its contemporary meaning is identified by Jacobs (1961) and Loury 
(1977), but the first broad definition reflecting the positions of the major contributors to 
the social capital theory is by Woolcock (1998): Social capital is defined as the 
information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inherent in social network. The concept of 
social capital is distinct from, but convergent with the idea of social network since social 
networks are the media through which social capital is created, maintained and used. 
Social network constitutes social capital to the extent that certain configurations of 
relationships confer significant information and control benefits. 
 We classify social capital theories into two broad groups: cognitive and structural.  
The common idea in these theories is that social capital constitutes an important asset 
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which can be used for leveraging social, economic, and political resources. However, 
these theories are distinct: cognitive theories put forward by rational-choice theory of 
Coleman (1988) and collective asset view of Putnam (1993), derive from mental 
processes and resulting ideas, reinforced by norms, values attitudes and beliefs. Structural 
theories developed by Lin (1999) based on the Bourdieu’s (1984; 1986; 1989) theoretical 
framework, concern connections and participation in various networks. From these 
theories of social capital four distinct theoretical channels emerge by which social capital 
affects practices of corporate finance. These mechanisms are flow of information, trust, 
ability to punish and reward, and the ability to alter preferences. Through the first three of 
these channels social capital exerts influence on investment and external finance 
sensitivities to Q and cash flow.  
Information channel implies that social capital can be understood as the 
economically meaningful shared information that resides in a social network. Imperfect 
information in financial markets leads to large search costs and failures of financial 
contracts. From this informational perspective several studies apply the idea of social 
capital in finance and economics research (e.g. Cohen et al, 2008; Hochberg et al, 2007; 
Rauch and Casella, 2001; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; Granovetter 1975,1995; 
Montgomery, 1991). These authors provide overwhelming evidence that social capital 
through social networks opens new avenues for the circulation of information and plays 
an important role for portfolio choice decisions and stock market participation. In 
addition, social networks are important channels for information flow into asset prices. A 
smoother and more accurate dissemination of information through social networks guards 
against failures in financial markets caused by asymmetric information and consequently 
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has implications for corporate finance (particularly for the availability of external 
finance).  
Another principal mechanism of social capital is trust, which allows economic 
agents to operate efficiently as they can economize on transaction costs. Trust is often 
conceptualized as reliability in transactions. Increased trust and cooperation reduces 
uncertainty about economic agents’ willingness to reciprocate and hence enables socially 
connected individuals with valuable information to share it within the network expecting 
the reward in terms of future reciprocity. Arrow (1972) argues that every commercial 
transaction encompasses an element of trust, which enables agents to operate even in the 
markets contaminated by the “lemons” problem. Trust has important implications for the 
availability of external financing and consequently for investments from the perspective 
of incomplete contract theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Imperfect information and 
uncertainty about the future means that all contracts are incomplete to some degree (Hart 
and Moore, 1999). Trust interacts with the degree of contract completeness and facilitates 
access to external financing where there is no well-developed formal system of contract 
enforcement. 
Social capital can also improve economic efficiency and encourages building a 
reputation for honest dealing in transactions through a disciplinary mechanism of 
reputation loss (Kandori, 1992; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000). Social capital by 
aggravating costs of expropriation and breach provides a mechanism for contract 
enforcement. Through this channel social capital diminishes costs of financial contracting 
and facilitates access to external financing. In addition, social capital makes available an 
alternative mechanism for dispute resolution through voluntary cooperation within social 
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network that can diminish expected need and costs of legal interventions thereby 
affecting firms’ ability to obtain external financing. 
2.2. Hypotheses Development 
In this section we derive testable hypotheses regarding the effects of social capital on 
external financing and investments.   We follow prior research (e.g., Hubbard, 1998) and 
posit that investment sensitivity to cash flow reflects financial constraints. Fazzari et al 
(1988, 2000) argue that investment sensitivity to cash flow should be lower for firms 
facing lower external financing costs. Our previous essay shows that social capital 
resident in managerial social networks with financiers reduces the costs of external 
financing. Consequently, we theorize that social capital should reduce investment 
sensitivity to cash flow.  
Our reasoning that social capital eases a firm’s access to external finance stems from 
the mechanisms of social capital discussed above. First, social capital reduces 
information asymmetry between the firm and its investors through information-sharing 
channel. Prior research (e.g., Hong et al, 2004, 2005; Kuhnen, 2009; Cohen et al, 2008, 
2010) shows that social capital facilitates the sharing of information and reduces 
information asymmetry within a network. Firms which reduce information asymmetry in 
financial markets should be able to obtain external financing more easily. Second, 
financial contracts are trust-intensive. If financiers trust financee they divert few 
resources to protect themselves from unlawful violations of their rights and more easily 
render the capital. Since social capital is a means for creating trust (Dasgupta, 1988), it 
should have implications for a firm’s access to external financing. Third, social capital 
through the mechanism of reputation loss forces transaction parties to fair dealing. 
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Consequently, social capital mitigates financiers’ concerns of expropriation by insiders 
and improves availably of external financing for socially well-connected firms. These 
analysis leads to the prediction that investments will be less sensitive to internally 
generate cash flows for socially well-connected firms because these firms can more easily 
obtain capital.   Based on this argumentation we pose the following hypotheses: 
H1: The social capital in managerial social networks with financiers negatively affects 
the sensitivity of investment to cash. 
 
Consistent with Mclean et al (2012), we argue that conditional on growth 
opportunities, low cash flow firms have a greater need for external finance (so 
relationship is inverse). If social capital reduces costs and improves availability of 
external finance, then socially well-connected firms with low cash-flows should be able 
to issue more shares (more debt) if needed. Consequently, we suggest the following sub-
hypothesis:  
H1A: The social capital in managerial social networks with financiers negatively affects 
the sensitivity of external finance to cash. 
 
If firms with greater social capital resident in managerial social networks with 
financiers are better able to raise capital to fund growth opportunities, than we should 
observe relationship between investment sensitivity to growth options and social capital. 
This reasoning is based on   linear relationship between investment and marginal Q (e.g., 
Tobin, 1969; Hayashi, 1982; Baker et al, 2003; Rauh, 2006). Idea is that stock prices 
reflect the marginal product of capital
37
. Tobin (1969) explicitly shows that marginal Q 
predicts real investments. In this framework, high marginal Q firms also should raise 
                                                          
37
 A linear relationship between investment and marginal q can be derived using a model of investment in 
which firms pay adjustment costs with the property that is linear in investment/capital ratio. Alternatively, 
adjustment costs may be expressed as an installation function which is linearly homogeneous in 
investments and capital (Hayashi, 1982).   
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more capital as these firms invest more. If social capital affects managerial incentives for 
expropriation and results in less financial constraints, than it should have positive 
implications for investment-Q and external finance-Q relationships. Consistent with these 
argumentations, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H2: The social capital in managerial social networks with financiers positively affects the 
sensitivity of investment to Q. 
H2A: The social capital in managerial social networks with financiers positively affects 
the sensitivity of external financing to Q. 
Legal systems that strongly protect outside investors improve firms’ ability to raise 
external finance. Social capital should be more valuable in countries with weak legal 
protection of shareholders since investors in these countries cannot rely on the legal 
system alone to prevent expropriation and enforce contracts. Increased interest in social 
capital stems from the view that in the absence of strong legal investor protection 
mechanisms social capital fosters fair treatment of the contracting parties through the 
mechanism of reputation loss. This argumentation leads to the possible interaction 
between country-level shareholder protection and investment (external finance) 
sensitivity to Q and cash flows. Consequently, we propose the following hypotheses:  
H3A: The effect of social capital in managerial social networks with financiers on the 
investment sensitivities to Q and cash flow is stronger in markets characterized by weak 
legal protection of investors. 
 
H3B: The effect of social capital in managerial social networks with financiers on the 
external finance sensitivities to Q and cash flow is stronger in markets characterized by 
weak legal protection of investors. 
Finally, if social capital provides mechanisms of information sharing and punishment 
through reputation loss (Kandori, 1992; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000), expected cost of 
expropriation for managers increases. This analysis shows that social capital mitigates 
agency problems between investors and insiders. Consequently, managers are more likely 
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to invest in projects that benefit financiers. Better managerial incentives could results in 
efficient capital allocation. If social capital resident in managerial social networks with 
financiers forces managers to make better investment decisions due to reduction in 
agency problem, we should expect positive implication of social capital on firm 
performance. Therefore we posit the following hypothesis: 
H4: The Social capital in managerial social networks with financiers positively affects 
firm performance. 
 
3. Sample Selection, Model Specification and Variable Construction   
3.1. Data and Sample selection 
We collect data from several datasets. BoardEx database of Management Diagnostic 
Limited provides social network data of senior executives and boards for more than 
fifteen thousand listed companies around the world since 1999. We match these firms 
with Datastream/Worldscope for financial and accounting variables: property, plant, and 
equipment, R&D spending, capital expenditures, deferred taxes, retained earnings, total 
debt, book equity and market value of equity, sales, net income before extraordinary 
item, depreciation and amortization expenses, total assets, monthly and annual returns. 
We obtain country-level legal protection measures from La Porta et al (1998) and La 
Porta et al (2006). Our final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firms from 57 
countries
38
 for the period 1999-2012.  
                                                          
38
 Countries include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Cayman 
Islands, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, 
South Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua 
New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay. 
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Panel A of Table 1 shows a description of the sample. The majority of our sample 
firms are incorporated in North America (60%) and Europe (24%). Firms incorporated in 
common law countries account for 81% of the sample, while 10% of sample firms are 
located in German civil law jurisdictions and 5% - in French Civil Law jurisdictions. 
Most of our sample firms (93%) are located in developed economies    
3.2. Empirical Model and Measurement of Main Variables 
Our baseline equations for testing the main hypotheses are as follows: 
                                                                                
                                                                                      (1) 
                                                                                  
                                                                                        (2) 
where Inv is a measure of investment, ExFin – a proxy for external financing, Q – a 
proxy for growth opportunities, Sc – measure of social capital, CF – cash flow variable, 
and RET – market adjusted return for the next three years. This empirical framework is 
adapted from Fazzari et al (1988), Baker et al (2003), Mclean et al (2012) and others.  
The major variable of interest is a measure of social capital. Our main hypotheses 
predicts that social capital should positively affect the sensitivities of investment and 
external finance to Q, and negatively – the sensitivities of investment and external 
finance to cash flow. Consequently, we expect       and      in both equations (1) 
and (2).   
To measure investment (Inv), we estimate the yearly growth in property, plant, and 
equipment, plus growth in inventory, plus R&D spending, all scaled by lagged book 
value of total assets. In robustness tests we deploy three alternative measures of 
 173 
 
investments – the annual growth in property, plant and equipment, annual growth in total 
assets, and capital expenditure scaled by lagged book value of total assets.  
We deploy two measures of external finance: external equity finance (EqFin), 
estimated as the change in book equity, plus the change in deferred taxes, minus the 
change in retained earnings, all scaled by lagged assets, and external debt finance 
(DebtFin) estimated as the annual percentage change in total debt. In robustness tests we 
use another measure of external debt financing – the annual change in long-term debt. 
Not that these measures of investment, equity and debt financing closely follow prior 
research (e.g., Fazzari et al 1988; Chen et al, 2006; Mclean et al, 2012).  
Empirical proxies of managerial social capital used in this paper are grounded on 
structural theories of social capital (Burt, 1992; Lin, 1999). These theories consider  
social capital as an asset resident in a social network that can be accessed and mobilized 
through network membership. This view of social capital makes it empirically 
measureable by network centrality estimates (e.g., Burt, 1983; Freeman, 1979).  
We use size/degree centrality measure of managerial social network to empirically 
estimate social capital. We define as “financiers” investment firms, classified by BoardEx 
as “investment companies”, “private equity” or “specialty and other finance”. These 
firms are supplies of capital. We label as “financee” publicly traded corporations that 
demand capital and exclude from this sample all financial and insurance firms since 
managers of these firms are more likely to have career overlap with financiers.  Next we 
count the number of social connections between executives/directors of financee firms 
and executives/directors of financier firms within an economy by their current and past 
overlap in education, employment and other activities. As arranged by BoadEx, two 
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individuals are connected via employment if their careers overlap at the same employer 
in the past or at present. Individuals are connected via education if they attend the same 
university at the same time and obtain the same degree. Two individuals are connected 
via other social activities if they both serve in the same professional association, non-
profit associations, or leisure clubs. In addition, we use aggregate measure of managerial 
social networks that includes all known sources of connections. From our theory the 
direct effect of social capital on investments and external finance is uncertain. Therefore 
we make no predictions regarding the sign for the regression coefficients of the social 
capital measures.   
We measure Tobin’s Q as the market value of equity, minus the book value of 
equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets. We estimate 
cash flow (CF) as net income before extraordinary item plus depreciation and 
amortization expenses plus R&D expenses, all scaled lagged book value of total assets. 
As has been observed in the literature many times (e.g., seminal papers in the traditional 
Q-Investment framework, Tobin, 1969, Hauashi, 1982), we predict positive coefficient 
estimate of Q (    ) in equations (1) and (2). In addition, investment sensitivity of cash 
flow reflects financial constraints. Since negative effect of cash flow on investment is 
well-documented in the literature (e.g., Fazzari et al, 1988, Hubbard 1998), we predict 
     in equation (1).  Consistent with Mclean et al (2012), we also posit that low cash 
flow firms are more likely to have need for external equity financing. Consequently, we 
predict negative coefficient estimate of cash flow (      in equation (2)
39
.  
                                                          
39
 However, for the debt financing, its relation with cash flow is not completely certain because low cash 
flow firms could find it difficult to borrow.   
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Since Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Baker et al (2003) show that firms invest more 
if their stocks are overvalued, we include future returns (RET) estimated as market-
adjusted 1-3 year return as an additional conditioning variable.  We also control for 
country, industry and year fixed effects. In section 6 we include firm fixed effects as well.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of main variables. On average, 
executives and directors of financee firms have 12 ties with their counterparts in financier 
firm via education, 55 - via employment and 1.26 via other social connections. Mean 
value of our investment measure is 0.15, and mean value for external equity and debt 
financing variables are 0.13 and 0.32, respectively. These numbers are similar to those 
reported by prior research (e.g., Chen et al, 2006, Mclean et al 2012).  On average, our 
sample firms are large (total assets of around half billion), and moderately profitable 
(medium ROA is 6.4%). They also possess important growth opportunities as implied by 
average Q of 2.36.  
4. Empirical Results  
4.1. The Effect of Social Capital on Investment and External Finance 
We first analyze the effect of social capital on investment-Q and investment-cash 
flow sensitivities. Table 2 reports regression results estimated by equation (1). In Column 
(1) social capital is measured by the total number of social connections between 
executives of financee firms and managers of financier firms (ConFin). In Columns (2)-
(4) social capital is estimated  by ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther – degree 
centrality measures of social connections between executives of public firms and 
managers of financier firms by their current and past overlap in education, employment 
and other activities, respectively. In all regressions we control for the direct effects of 
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social capital, Q, and cash flows on investments to make sure that these direct effects 
does not drive the results on     and   . In addition, we also control for future returns, 
country, industry and year fixed effects.  
Results show that coefficient estimate of    is positive and significant in all 
regressions. For all four measures of social capital, the results are consistent with our 
hypothesis that the relation between Q and investment is stronger for socially connected 
firms.  The effects of social capital are also economically significant. Consider 
specification in Column (1) in which social capital is measured by the total number of 
social connection (ConFin).   Total Q coefficient is the sum of the Q coefficient estimate 
and the coefficient estimate of the interaction term. For the firms in the bottom quartile of 
the social capital measure overall Q coefficient is less than or equal 0.0565 (that is, 
13*0.0035+0.0110=0.0565). For the firms in the top quartile overall Q coefficient is 
greater than 0.382 (that is, 106*0.0035+0.0110=0.382), which is almost 7 times that of 
bottom quartile estimate.    
Coefficient estimate of    is negative and significant in all specifications 
implying that investment is less sensitive to internally generated funds in firms with 
greater social capital. We interpret these findings as supportive to our proposition that 
investment is less constrained for socially well-connected firms because these 
connections facilitate access to external finance. As before, coefficient estimates of the 
interaction terms appear to be economically significant. For example, in Column (1) 
overall effect of cash flow on investment is greater than 0.5255 (estimated as 13*(-
0.0023)+0.5554=0.5255) for the firms in the bottom quartile, while the same indicator for 
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the top quartile is less than 0.3116 (estimated as 106*(-0.0023)+0.5554=0.3116), or 
almost 1.7 times smaller.   
Next we examine the effects of social capital on external finance-Q and external 
finance-cash flow sensitivities.   In Table 3 we estimate regressions by equation (2) and 
use external equity financing as the dependent variable. In Table 4 we estimate the same 
models for external debt financing. Control variables, as well as expected signs of their 
coefficient estimates are discussed earlier. All Q interaction terms in Table 3 are 
significant with predicted signs (      suggested that sensitivity of external equity 
financing to Q is stronger for firms with greater social capital. The negative signs 
(      of coefficient estimates of the social capital-cash flow interaction terms are also 
consistent with our theoretical predictions, suggesting that low cash flow firms are more 
likely to raise external equity capital and this relation becomes stronger as social capital 
increases.  Previously we document that investment becomes less sensitive to cash flow 
as social capital increases. Results in Table 3 suggest why; this is because social capital 
eases firms’ access to external equity financing. Qualitatively similar results are 
presented in Table 4 for external debt financing.   
In summary, results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with our prediction that Q is a 
stronger predictor of external financing for the firms with greater social capital resident in 
managerial social networks with financiers. In addition, cash flow is more negatively 
associated with external equity financing for socially well-connected firms. We also not 
that coefficient estimates of the control variables are broadly consistent with theory and 
prior empirical evidence in both, investment and external finance, regressions.     
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Next we focus on interactive effect of country-level legal protection of investors and 
managerial social capital on the sensitivity of investment and external finance to Q and 
cash flow. Our hypothesis predicts that social capital will have a more pronounced effect 
on these sensitivities in markets characterized by the weak legal protection of investors. If 
laws and courts are insufficient to ensure the respect of contracts then investors will be 
more reluctant to provide the capital. Consequently, firms demanding external financing 
will rely more on social capital. 
To test this prediction, we estimate equation (1) and (2) for high and the low investor 
protection subsamples. Table 5 reports results. Our partition of the sample is based on the 
legal origin from La Porta et al (1998). In Columns (1) and (2) dependent variable is 
investment, and in Columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) – external equity and debt financing, 
respectively. Social capital is measured by ConFin - a total number of social connections 
between executives of financee firms and managers of financier firms. Table 5 shows that 
in civil law countries, coefficient estimates of the social capital-Q interaction terms are 
significantly greater than the same estimates for the common law countries. In addition, 
coefficient estimates of the social capital-cash flow interaction terms are significantly 
lower for the civil law countries than the same estimates for the common law countries. 
In summary, our results in Table 5 are consistent with hypothesis that the positive 
effect of social capital on investment sensitivity to Q is stronger in markets characterize 
by the weak legal protection of investors. In addition, social capital plays less important 
role in reducing external finance-cash flow sensitivity in markets with strong investor 
protection standards.   
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4.2. Social Capital and Firm Performance 
If social capital encourages investment for firms with strong growth opportunities, 
reduces dependence on internally generated capital, and lessens managerial incentives to 
expropriate thereby diminishing agency problems between the firm and its investors, we 
would expect its positive effect on firm performance. In this section we test this 
prediction of our theory. We follow prior literature (e.g., Chen et al, 2006) and estimate 
the following two models for accounting and stock-based performance measures:  
                                                                          
                                                                                                          (3)               
                 
                                                             
                                                                                                          (4) 
where AccPerf  and           are accounting and stock-based based performance 
measure, respectively. KZ4 is four variable version of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index 
of capital constraints, Sales – the sales revenue in year t –1, and Tobin’s Q estimated as 
the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, 
all scaled by the book value of assets, LnMV – the natural logarithm of the equity market 
value, BM – book-to-market ratio, and Debt - the ratio of total debt divided by the sum of 
total debt plus equity.  
The results are summarized in Table 6. Columns (1) and (2) report estimations results 
of equation (3), where dependent variable in Columns (1) is Return on Assets (ROA) - 
the ratio of earnings before interest and taxed to total assets, and in Column (2) – Return 
on Equity (ROE) - the ratio of earnings before interest and taxed to total stockholders’ 
equity. Both ROA and ROE are averages over the three-year periods after year t. Social 
Capital (Sc) is measured by ConFin - size/degree centrality measure of social connections 
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between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms. We find that social 
capital is positively associated with future operating performance measures. For example, 
when social capital increases from bottom quartile to top, ROA increases by 1.86% 
(estimated as 0.0002*100*(106-13)), which is almost doubling the cross-sectional mean.   
Columns (3) and (4) report results of regression estimated by equation (4). Dependent 
variable is Sharpe ratio, estimated as the ratio of average stock excess return over the 
three-year periods after year t, scaled by standard deviation of stock return for the same 
period. In Column (4) we include return momentum (RETMOM) compounded returns 
over the previous 12 months, as an additional control.  We find that social capital also 
positively affects future stock-based performance measures. An increase in social capital 
from the bottom to top quartile causes increase in risk-adjusted return by 6.51% 
(estimated as 0.0007*100*(106-13)). 
5. Robustness Checks 
In the previous section we have established that social capital exerts a significant 
influence on investment and external finance sensitivities to Q and cash flow. In addition, 
conditional on country investor protection standards, we show that the implications of 
social capital for these sensitivities are distinct. We also document that social capital 
affects firm performance.  In this section we check robustness of these results.  We 
briefly discuss these tests as follows. 
First, we us three alternative measures of investments to test robustness of the effects 
of social capital on investment sensitivity to Q and cash flow. Table 7 shows the results. 
In Columns (1) – (3) investment is measured as the annual growth in property, plant and 
equipment, annual growth in total assets, and capital expenditure scaled by lagged book 
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value of total assets, respectively. We find that coefficient estimate of the interaction term 
of social capital with Q is positive and significant in all specifications. Also, consistent 
with our hypotheses, coefficient emirate of social capital-cash flow interaction term 
remains negative and significant. In addition, in Column (4) we re-estimate equation (2), 
but use annual change long-term debt as measure of external debt finance. We obtain 
qualitatively unchanged results on the effect of social capital on external debt finance 
sensitivity to Q and cash flow.   
Second, we examine whether our finding that the association between social capital 
and sensitivities of investment and external finance to Q and cash flow is stronger in 
markets characterized by inferior legal protection, is robust to alternative measure of 
investor protection. We use investor protection index estimated as the principal 
component of the disclosure requirements, liability standards, and anti-director rights 
indices from La Porta et al., (2006). Table 10 show results. Coefficient estimates of the 
social capital interaction with investment and external finance sensitivities to Q are 
positive and significantly greater for civil law countries than the same estimates for the 
common law countries. In addition, coefficient estimates of the social capital interaction 
with cash flow sensitivities are significantly lower for the civil law countries than the 
same indicators for the common law countries. Overall, results of this analysis provide 
supportive evidence of our previous findings. 
Third, we also check robustness of our result that social capital has positive 
implications for firm performance. We use Sales Growth estimated as average sales 
growth over the three-year period as a measure of operating performance and Jensen’s 
Alpha - the intercept in the time-series regression of excess stock returns over the three-
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year period on market risk premium (estimated as excess return of MCSI world market 
index returns), and Treynor Ratio – estimated as the ratio of average stock excess return 
over the three-year period, scaled by Beta of the stock for the same period. Results, 
presented in Table 11, are qualitatively similar to our previously documented findings. 
6. Endogeneity Concerns  
We argue that endogeneity concerns arising from reverse causality do not apply for 
this study. In the context of the research design used in the paper, it is not sensible to 
assume some feedback effects moving from investment or external finance to social 
capital because formation of social connections predates the measurement of these 
variables for years and sometimes for dozens of years (especially for educational 
connections).  
However, endogeneity issues arising from omitted variables could be a problem. To 
address this issue, we have included a number of control variables in main regressions. In 
addition, we include firm fixed effects to control for unobservable firm- specific 
characteristics that could drive the effect of social capital on investment-Q, external 
finance-Q, investment-cash flow and external finance-cash flow sensitivities. Results, 
presented in Table 10 show that our conclusions are not affected by addition of firm fixed 
effects. 
Next we use instrumental variable approach to address endogeneity concerns. We 
follow Fracassi and Tate (2012) and argue that death of network ties (in this case death of 
connected financier firm executives) provides an ideal exogenous shock to the social 
networks of financee firms. We count number of socially connected financier executives 
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with financees who have died up to the current fiscal year and use it as an instrument in 
the following model specification of IV estimation:   
                                        ∑               
 
   
            
                                                                                                             
In the second stage we use predicted value of the social capital proxy and re-estimate 
our baseline regressions. Table 11 reports results. In Column (1) we use Inv – the yearly 
growth in property, plant, and equipment, plus growth in inventory, plus R&D spending, 
as a dependent variable, in Columns (2) – EqFin – the change in book equity, plus the 
change in deferred taxes, minus the change in retained earnings, and in Columns (3) 
DebtFin – the annual percentage change in total debt. Overall, we confirm our major 
results regarding the effects of social capital on investment and external finance 
sensitivities to Q and cash flow.   
7. Conclusion  
This article examines the empirical relation between social capital resident in 
managerial social networks with financiers and investment sensitivity to cash flow and Q. 
As an additional corollary, we investigate the role of social capital for external finance-
cash flow and external finance-Q sensitivities. We also analyze how these sensitivities 
are affected by the degree of investor protection and how social capital influences firm 
performance.  
We argue that social capital, through information sharing, trust and enforcement 
channels reduces negative consequence of financial market frictions, such as information 
asymmetry and agency problem, and eases a firm’s access to external financing. In 
addition, social capital, through trust channel reduces transaction costs and enables 
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economic agents to operate more efficiently. Furthermore, through the mechanism of 
reputation loss, social capital reduces managerial incentives to expropriate and 
consequently lessens agency problems between the firm and its investors.    
Using a large panel of companies from 57 countries for the period 1999-2012 we 
find that investment is less sensitive to cash flows for socially well-connected firms, 
implying that social capital effectively reduce financial constraints. Consistent with our 
hypotheses, we also find that external financing is negatively associated with cash flow 
and this relationship becomes stronger (in absolute sense) as our measures of social 
capital increase.  
Our findings also suggest that because social capital results in better transparency, 
stricter contract enforcement, effective managerial decision-making, and consequently 
reduction in financial constraints, it positively affects investment sensitivity to Q and 
external finance sensitive to Q. We also find that documented effect of social capital on 
these sensitivities is stronger in countries where formal contract enforcement system is 
weak. In addition, our results provide convincing evidence that firm-level capital 
allocation efficiency is reflected into firm performance. These results are robust to 
alternative model specifications, variable measurement as well as variety of endogeneity 
tests.   
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of this table reports sample distribution across geographic location, development status, and legal regime 
origin. Country development status is according to International Monetary Fund classification. Legal regimes are 
defined according to La Porta et al (2008) classification. Panel B reports summary statistics for the main dependent and 
independent variables. ConFin, ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther denote size/degree centrality measure of 
social connections between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms by total number of connection, 
by their current and past overlap in education, employment and other activities, respectively. Inv is the yearly growth in 
property, plant, and equipment, plus growth in inventory, plus R&D spending, all scaled by lagged book value of total 
assets. ΔPPENAT is estimated as the annual growth in property, plant and equipment. ΔAT is annual growth in total 
assets. CAPXAT is capital expenditure scaled by lagged book value of total assets. EqFin is the change in book equity, 
plus the change in deferred taxes, minus the change in retained earnings, all scaled by lagged assets. DebtFin is 
estimated as the annual percentage change in total debt. Q is estimated as the market value of equity, minus the book 
value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets.CF is net income before 
extraordinary item plus depreciation and amortization expenses plus R&D expenses, all scaled by lagged book value of 
total assets. RET is market-adjusted return for the next 1-3 years. Return on Assets (ROA) is the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxed to total assets, and Return on Equity (ROE) is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxed to 
total stockholders’ equity. Both ROA and ROE are averages over the three-year periods after year t. Sales is the sales 
revenue, Sales Growth is average sales growth over the three-year periods after year t, and LnMV – the natural 
logarithm of the equity market value.  
Panel A: Sample Distribution  
  
Region 
No. Firm-Year 
Observations 
Percent 
Africa 398 0.93% 
Asia 3948 9.18% 
Australia/New Zealand 1623 3.77% 
Central America 234 0.54% 
Europe 10203 23.72% 
Middle East 636 1.48% 
North America 25860 60.13% 
South America 108 0.25% 
Total 43010 100% 
   
Development 
No. Firm-Year 
Observations 
Percent 
Developed 39905 92.78% 
Developing 316 0.73% 
Newly Industrialized Economies 2789 6.48% 
Total 43010 100% 
   
Legal Origin 
No. Firm-Year 
Observations 
Percent 
Common Law 34802 80.92% 
French Civil Law 2318 5.39% 
German Civil Law 4276 9.94% 
Scandinavian Civil Law 1614 3.75% 
Total 43010 100% 
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Table 2: Social Capital and Investment - Q and Investment - Cash Flow Sensitivities: - Does 
the social capital resident in managerial social networks affect the sensitivity of investment 
to q and the sensitivity of investment to cash flow?   
This table reports results of the following regressions: 
       
         
                        
        
        
         
                       
        
        
                                                         , 
where AT is book value of total assets. Inv is the yearly growth in property, plant, and equipment, plus growth in 
inventory, plus R&D spending, all scaled by lagged book value of total assets. CF is net income before extraordinary 
item plus depreciation and amortization expenses plus R&D expenses, all scaled lagged book value of total assets. Q is 
estimated as the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the 
book value of assets. Social Capital (Sc) is ConFin, ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther, denoting size/degree 
centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms by total 
number of connection, by their current and past overlap in education, employment and other activities, respectively. 
RET is market-adjusted return for the next three years. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.8281 -0.4900 -0.9391 -0.7259 
 
[0.5723] [0.6824] [0.5308] [0.3019] 
ConFin *Q 0.0035    
 
[<.0001]    
ConFin *CFAT -0.0023    
 
[<.0001]    
ConFinEduc *Q  0.0316   
  [<.0001]   
ConFinEduc *CFAT  -0.0055   
  [<.0001]   
ConFinEmpl *Q   0.0028  
   [<.0001]  
ConFinEmpl *CFAT   -0.0007  
   [0.0103]  
ConFinOther*Q    0.0012 
    [0.0433] 
ConFin Other*CFAT    -0.3342 
    [<.0001] 
ConFin -0.0076 
   
 
[<.0001] 
   
ConFinEduc 
 
-0.0739 
  
  
[<.0001] 
  
ConFinEmpl 
  
-0.0062 
 
   
[<.0001] 
 
ConFinOther 
   
0.0255 
    
[0.0007] 
Q 0.0110 0.0057 0.0120 0.0129 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT 0.5554 0.7878 0.3615 1.9839 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
RET 0.0114 0.0218 0.0050 0.0001 
 
[0.7138] [0.3922] [0.8758] [0.7599] 
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Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Obs 43010 43010 43010 43010 
AdjR2 0.1114 0.4076 0.0727 0.1004 
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Table 3: Social Capital and External Equity Financing - Q and External Equity Financing - 
Cash Flow Sensitivities: - Does the social capital resident in managerial social networks 
affect the sensitivity of external equity financing to Q and the sensitivity of external equity 
financing to cash flow?   
This table reports results of the following regressions: 
         
         
                        
        
        
         
                       
        
        
                                                         , 
where AT is total assets. EqFin is the change in book equity, plus the change in deferred taxes, minus the change in 
retained earnings, all scaled by lagged assets. CF is net income before extraordinary item plus depreciation and 
amortization expenses plus R&D expenses, all scaled lagged book value of total assets. Q is estimated as the market 
value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets. 
Social Capital (Sc) is ConFin, ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther, denoting size/degree centrality measure of 
social connections between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms by total number of connection, 
by their current and past overlap in education, employment and other activities, respectively. RET is market-adjusted 
return for the next 1-3 years. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.2117 -0.1947 -0.1903 -0.2081 
 [0.1862] [0.2221] [0.2328] [0.1941] 
ConFin *Q 0.000036    
 [<.0001]    
ConFin *CFAT -0.00045    
 [<.0001]    
ConFinEduc *Q  0.00075   
  [<.0001]   
ConFinEduc *CFAT  -0.00022   
  [<.0001]   
ConFinEmpl *Q   0.00028  
   [<.0001]  
ConFinEmpl *CFAT   -0.00047  
   [<.0001]  
ConFinOther*Q    0.00058 
    [0.0432] 
ConFin Other*CFAT    -0.01496 
    [<.0001] 
ConFin -0.00004    
 
[<.0001]    
ConFinEduc  -0.00325   
 
 [<.0001]   
ConFinEmpl   -0.00086  
 
  [<.0001]  
ConFinOther    -0.00181 
    [0.009] 
Q 0.0191 0.0157 0.0176 0.0199 
 [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT -0.1815 -0.1940 -0.1957 -0.2058 
 [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
RET 0.0057 0.0031 0.0041 0.0051 
 [0.2031] [0.4948] [0.3548] [0.2538] 
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Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Obs 38374 38374 38374 38374 
AdjR2 0.1935 0.2000 0.1997 0.1920 
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Table 4: Social Capital and External Debt Financing - Q and External Debt Financing - 
Cash Flow Sensitivities: - Does the social capital resident in managerial social networks 
affect the sensitivity of debt financing to Q and the sensitivity of debt financing to cash 
flow?   
This table reports results of the following regressions: 
           
         
                        
        
        
         
                       
        
        
                                                         , 
where AT is total assets. DebtFin is estimated as the annual percentage change in total debt. CF is net income before 
extraordinary item plus depreciation and amortization expenses plus R&D expenses, all scaled lagged book value of 
total assets. Q is estimated as the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, 
all scaled by the book value of assets. Social Capital (Sc) is ConFin, ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther, 
denoting size/degree centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and managers of 
financier firms by total number of connection, by their current and past overlap in education, employment and other 
activities, respectively. RET is market-adjusted return for the next three years. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.8306 -0.8554 -0.8462 -0.8843 
 
[0.5498] [0.5377] [0.542] [0.5244] 
ConFin *Q 0.00011    
 
[0.0893]    
ConFin *CFAT -0.00152    
 
[0.0153]    
ConFinEduc *Q  0.00302   
  [<.0001]   
ConFinEduc *CFAT  -0.00217   
  [0.0015]   
ConFinEmpl *Q   0.00062  
   [<.0001]  
ConFinEmpl *CFAT   -0.00226  
   [0.003]  
ConFinOther*Q    0.00681 
    [0.0037] 
ConFin Other*CFAT    -0.05379 
    [0.0743] 
ConFin -0.00015 
   
 
[0.0038] 
   
ConFinEduc 
 
-0.00951 
  
  
[<.0001] 
  
ConFinEmpl 
  
-0.00165 
 
   
[<.0001] 
 
ConFinOther 
   
-0.00143 
    
[0.1549] 
Q 0.0829 0.0648 0.0716 0.0867 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT -0.2436 -0.2108 -0.2155 -0.3032 
 
[0.0009] [0.0036] [0.004] [<.0001] 
RET -0.0997 -0.1139 -0.1101 -0.0902 
 
[0.3012] [0.2378] [0.2534] [0.349] 
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Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Obs 36688 36688 36688 36688 
AdjR2 0.0135 0.0143 0.0146 0.0127 
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Table 6: Social Capital and Firm Performance: - Does the social capital in managerial social 
networks with financiers positively affect firm’s performance?   
Columns (1) and (2) of this table report results of the following regression:                               
                                                                            , where 
             equals in Columns (1) Return on Assets (ROA) - the ratio of earnings before interest and taxed to total 
assets, and in Column (2) Return on Equity (ROE) - the ratio of earnings before interest and taxed to total stockholders’ 
equity. Both ROA and ROE are averages over the three-year periods after year t. Social Capital (Sc) is measured by 
ConFin - size/degree centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and managers of 
financier firms. Control variables include: KZ4 – four variable version of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index of capital 
constraints from Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), Sales - the sales revenue in year t –1, and Tobin’s Q estimated as the 
market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of 
assets. Columns (3) and (4) report results of the following regression:                                
                                                                              , where 
Sharpe ratio is estimated as the ratio of average stock excess return over the three-year periods after year t, scaled by 
standard deviation of stock return for the same period. Control variables include LnMV – the natural logarithm of the 
equity market value, BM – book-to-market ratio, and Debt - the ratio of total debt divided by the sum of total debt plus 
equity. In Column (4) RETMOM – return momentum - compounded returns over the previous 12 months, is added as 
an additional control. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.2122 0.1360 -0.3236 -0.3466 
 
[0.0741] [0.3951] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin 0.0002 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] 
  
KZ4 0.0095 0.0119 
  
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] 
  
Sales -0.0005 0.0009 
  
 
[0.0233] [0.0039] 
  
Q -0.0030 -0.0047 
  
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] 
  
LnMV 
  
-0.0348 -0.0336 
   
[ <.0001] [<.0001] 
BM 
  
0.0501 0.0523 
   
[ <.0001] [<.0001] 
DEBT 
  
0.0069 0.0047 
   
[0.6162] [0.7325] 
RETMOM 
   
0.1995 
    
[<.0001] 
     
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No 
     
Obs 24466 24466 94393 94197 
AdjR2 0.1539 0.1876 0.0093 0.0111 
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Table 7: Robustness Tests: Social Capital and Investment- Q, External Financing- Q, 
Investment-Cash Flow and External Financing-Cash Flow Sensitivities – Alternative 
Measures of Investment and Debt financing  
This table reports results of the following regressions: 
     
         
                        
        
        
         
                       
        
        
                                                         , 
where AT is book value of total assets.       in Columns (1)-(3) is estimated as the annual growth in property, plant and 
equipment, annual growth in total assets, and capital expenditure scaled by lagged book value of total assets, 
respectively. In Column (4)       equals the annual change in long-term debt. CF is net income before extraordinary 
item plus depreciation and amortization expenses plus R&D expenses. Q is estimated as the market value of equity, 
minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets. Social Capital (Sc) 
is measured by ConFin - size/degree centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and 
managers of financier firms. RET is market-adjusted return for the next three years. P-values are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.2239 -0.3410 -0.0938 -0.8867 
 
[0.4214] [0.5122] [0.6565] [0.5313] 
ConFin *Q 0.0032 0.0064 0.0004 0.0001 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0338] 
ConFin *CFAT -0.0022 -0.0040 -0.0001 -0.0016 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0305] [0.0101] 
ConFin -0.0045 -0.0094 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0024] 
Q 0.0112 0.0206 0.0011 0.0833 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT 0.5136 0.9870 0.0443 -0.2290 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0023] 
RET 0.0146 0.0338 0.00001 -0.12840 
 
[0.64] [0.563] [0.9182] [0.1915] 
     
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Obs 43010 43010 38877 36903 
AdjR2 0.1027 0.1115 0.0903 0.0131 
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Table 9: Robustness Tests - Social Capital and Firm Performance: - Alterative Measures of 
Performance 
Columns (1) of this table report results of the following regression:                                         
                                                                   , where              is 
average sales growth over the three-year periods after year t. Social Capital (Sc) is measured by ConFin - size/degree 
centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms. Control 
variables include: KZ4 – four variable version of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index of capital constraints from Baker, 
Stein and Wurgler (2003), LnAT - the natural logarithm of total assets, and Tobin’s Q estimated as the market value of 
equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the book value of assets. Columns 
(2)-(5) report results of the following regression:                                                       
                                                        , where                     is 
estimated in Columns (2)-(3) as Jensen’s Alpha - the intercept in the time-series regression of excess stock returns over 
the three-year periods after year t on market risk premium (estimated as excess return of MCSI world market index 
returns), and Treynor Ratio - as the ratio of average stock excess return over the three-year periods after year t, scaled 
by Beta of the stock for the same period. Risk-free rate as measured as the yield on three-month government bill. Social 
capital (Sc) is defined as before. Control variables include LnMV – the natural logarithm of the equity market value, 
BM – book-to-market ratio, and Debt - the ratio of total debt divided by the sum of total debt plus equity. In Column (3) 
and (5) RETMOM – return momentum - compounded returns over the previous 12 months, is added as an additional 
control. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. P-values are reported in parentheses.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.3891 0.19 0.13 -0.215 -0.218 
 [0.1112] [0.0864] [0.2783] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin 0.00018 0.0008 0.0009 0.00035 0.00035 
 [<.0001] [0.0011] [0.0008] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
KZ4 -0.0068     
 [<.0001]     
Q 0.0135     
 [<.0001]     
LnAT -0.0466     
 [<.0001]     
LnMV  -0.027 -0.025 -0.0003 -0.0017 
  [0.0234] [0.0436] [0.6328] [0.015] 
BM  0.023 0.02 0.0023 0.0007 
  [0.1066] [0.0977] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
DEBT  0.29 0.288 0.0025 0.0030 
  [0.1153] [0.1353] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
RETMOM   0.37  0.043 
   [0.0217]  [0.0011] 
      
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes No No No 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes No No No 
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Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No No 
      
Obs 24212 94914 90945 94462 94666 
AdjR2 0.0973 0.0006 0.0020 0.0133 0.0116 
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Table 10: Endogeneity Concerns – Firm Fixed  
This table reports results of the following regressions: 
     
         
                        
        
        
         
                       
        
        
                                      , where      equals in Column 
(1) Inv – the yearly growth in property, plant, and equipment, plus growth in inventory, plus R&D spending, in 
Columns (2) EqFin – the change in book equity, plus the change in deferred taxes, minus the change in retained 
earnings, and in Columns (3) DebtFin  – the annual percentage change in total debt.AT is book value of total assets.CF 
is net income before extraordinary item plus depreciation and amortization expenses plus R&D expenses. Q is 
estimated as the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets, all scaled by the 
book value of assets. Social Capital (Sc) is measured by ConFin size/degree centrality measure of social connections 
between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms. RET is market-adjusted return for the next three 
years. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.8070 -0.0456 -0.5692 
 
[0.7733] [0.8667] [0.6267] 
ConFin *Q 0.0047 0.00014 0.0008 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin *CFAT -0.0029 -0.0002 -0.0015 
 
[<.0001] [0.0188] [0.0846] 
ConFin -0.0086 -0.00002 -0.00162 
 
[<.0001] [0.0821] [0.0374] 
Q 0.0123 0.0146 0.0738 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT 0.7404 -0.0783 -0.2545 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0132] 
RET -0.0015 -0.0001 0.0270 
 
[0.9698] [0.5948] [0.6412] 
    
Firm Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Obs 43010 38374 36688 
AdjR2 0.1536 0.4358 0.1837 
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Table 11: Endogeneity Concerns – Instrumental Variable Approach 
This table reports results of the second stage IV regression: 
     
         
                     ̂    
        
        
        ̂  
          ̂              
        
        
                                        Instrumental variable in the 
first stage is number of executives with ties to financiers who have died during the sample period up to the current 
fiscal year.      equals in Column (1) Inv – the yearly growth in property, plant, and equipment, plus growth in 
inventory, plus R&D spending, in Columns (2) EqFin – the change in book equity, plus the change in deferred taxes, 
minus the change in retained earnings, and in Columns (3) DebtFin  – the annual percentage change in total debt.AT is 
book value of total assets.CF is net income before extraordinary item plus depreciation and amortization expenses plus 
R&D expenses. Q is estimated as the market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the book value of 
assets, all scaled by the book value of assets. Social Capital (Sc) is measured by ConFin size/degree centrality measure 
of social connections between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms. RET is market-adjusted 
return for the next three years. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.0862 -0.5785 0.8494 
 
[0.0679] [0.3051] [0.1166] 
ConFin *Q 0.0002 0.00279 0.0041 
 
[0.0057] [<.0001] [0.0651] 
ConFin *CFAT -0.0030 -0.0117 -0.0421 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0927] 
ConFin -0.0047 -0.01309 -0.01500 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
Q 0.0203 0.0829 0.1487 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
CFAT 0.0238 -0.1971 0.9571 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [0.0132] 
RET -0.0031 0.0154 0.0664 
 
[0.5394] [0.1536] [0.8247] 
    
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Obs 43010 38374 36688 
AdjR2 0.0655 0.1988 0.0075 
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Chapter VI: SOCIAL CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
1. Introduction  
A considerable body of modern finance and economics literature documents a strong 
positive relation between financial development, defined as the ease with which any 
entrepreneur or company with a sound project can obtain finance (Rajan and Zingales, 
2003), and economic growth around the world (Levin and Zevros, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998; Levine 2003; Demetriades and Andrianova, 2004; Bekaert et al, 
2005). However what determines financial development remains imperfectly understood. 
Examining the factors that might account for differences in financial development has 
become an increasingly important research topic in recent years
40
.  
While both theory and survey evidence suggest that social capital could be a very 
important determinant of financial development, the limited investigation of its 
implications on financial development is surprising, especially compared to our 
knowledge, both theoretical and empirical, regarding the other determinants of financial 
development. This paper fills the gap in the literature and investigates the implications of 
social capital for financial market development. Particularly, we ask does the social 
capital in managerial social networks with financiers affect financial development? 
Social capital, defined as information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inherent in a 
social network (Woolcock, 1998), has been emerged as one of the most prominent topics 
in modern social science research. Social capital may produce several positive 
socioeconomic effects which can spur national development. At the same time, 
                                                          
40
 Studies point out a large number of exogenous and endogenous factors that could explain financial 
development: legal tradition, institutions, macroeconomic policies, openness, political economy factors, 
geography, and culture (see Huang 2010 for extensive review). 
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improvements in social capital have been associated with democratic participation and 
support for democracy. Powerful agents such as the World Bank and national 
governments embraced social capital as a way in which market failures could be 
addressed without returning to a reliance on costly state interventions to promote 
development. 
Social capital alleviates potential impediments to financial development through 
trusts, preference modification, information-sharing, and contract enforcement channels.  
Baier (1986) defines trust “as the trustor's expectation of being the recipient of the trusted 
party’s good will”. Social capital induces efficiency within the social structure through 
trust channel. Social capital is a means of creating trust (Dasgupta, 1988). Trust is 
important because financial exchange depends not only on the legal enforceability of 
contracts, but also on the extent to which the financier trusts the financee (Guiso et al, 
2004). Trust appears to be a new explanatory factor for cross-country differences in 
financial development (Guiso et al, 2008). In addition, social capital trigger agents to 
adopt more altruistic preferences that are the major source of trust (Camerer, 2003; Fehr 
and Schmidt, 2003).  
Social capital facilitates the sharing of information and reduces information 
asymmetry within a network (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; 2010; Kuhnen, 2009; Hong et al, 
2004, 2005). Prior evidence suggests that reduction in information asymmetry between 
the firm and its investors through disclosure requirements increases investor confidence 
and promotes financial development (Pagano, 1993; Japelli and Pagano, 1999; Mayer and 
Sussman, 2001; La Porta et al, 2006).      
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Social capital, by aggravating costs of reputation loss (Kandori, 1992; McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2000) imposes punishment on divergence behavior and fosters dispute-
resolution without legal interventions.  Subsequently, socially connected parties more 
easily engage in financial transactions. Social capital provides means for preventing 
expropriation and enforcing contracts. Prior research (e.g., Pistor et al, 2000, Barth et al, 
2003, La Porta et al,  2006, Jackson and Roe, 2009) show that the effectiveness of 
contract enforcement is crucial for financial development.  
This body of evidence leads to the prediction that social capital should have a positive 
effect on the financial development. To test this prediction, we employ BoardEx 
databases provided by Management Diagnostics Limited. This dataset contains relational 
links between executives based on prior overlap in employment, education and 
memberships in non-profit organizations. Recent studies such as Engelberg et al (2012) 
and Fracassi (2012) use this database to estimate corporate social connections. 
Consequently, we use the BoardEx database to develop a set of social capital measures. 
To preview results, we find that social capital resident in managerial social networks 
positively affects financial development. The evidence also suggests that casual, non-
professional ties are the most efficient forms of social capital that could have implications 
for financial markets. Results are qualitatively similar when we use alternative measures 
of main variables, model specifications as well as estimation methods, including dynamic 
panel GMM (Arrelano and Bond, 1991).   
This study is related to the general literature examining the determinants of financial 
development. This paper is also related to Guiso et al (2004) research that identifies the 
effect of social capital for financial development within one country, Italy, by using 
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survey evidence. The authors contend that it is difficult to observe social networks and 
therefore use outcome-based measure of social capital. This study adds to Guiso et al 
(2004) research by examining the effect of social capital for large number of countries 
and by using network-based measure of social capital.     
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides literature 
review and develops hypothesis. Section 3 outlines our empirical model. Section 4 
presents sample and describes major variables. Section 5 presents main results. Section 6 
reports robustness tests and discusses endogeneity concerns, and section 7 concludes.  
2. Background and Hypothesis 
2.1. Social Capital Theories and Channels of Influence 
 The concept of social capital has become favorable in various social disciplines 
ranging from economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology relatively 
recently, but intellectual origins of the concept can be traced to David Hume and Adam 
Smith. The central idea of social capital is that social networks have value. The concept 
of social capital is distinct from, but convergent with the idea of social network since 
social networks are the media through which social capital is created, maintained and 
used. Social capital broadly can be defined as the information, trust, and norms of 
reciprocity inherent in social network (Woolcock, 1998). This general definition 
summarizes the positions of the major contributors to the social capital theory.  
 We aggregate social capital theories into two broad groups: cognitive and structural. 
Cognitive theories put forward by the rational-choice theory of Coleman (1988) and the 
collective asset view of Putnam (1993), consider social capital as a cognitive resource, 
emotional attachment to a group or society at large. Cognitive elements of social capital 
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include norms, values, attitudes and beliefs. Structural social capital theories (Bourdieu, 
1984, 1986; Lin 1999, 2001) concern connections and participation in various networks. 
This meaning considers social capital as a structure, an asset embedded in the networks. 
From these theories of social capital, four distinct theoretical channels emerge by which 
social capital plays exerts an influence on financial market development. These 
mechanisms are trust, flow of information, ability to punish and reward, and the ability to 
alter preferences. 
 The fundamental problem facing financial market participants willing to engage in 
economic transaction concerns trust. As argued by Arrow (1972) virtually every 
transaction encompasses an element of trust. Trust is an optimistic expectation or belief 
regarding other agents' behavior (Fafchamps, 2004). Trust is important because financial 
transactions can be accomplished at a lower cost in a high-trust environment. Financial 
contracts are trust-intensive. If financiers trust financee, they divert few resources to 
protect themselves from unlawful violations of their rights and more easily render the 
capital. High trust can facilitate investment where there is no well-developed formal 
system of contract enforcement. Since social capital is a means for creating trust 
(Dasgupta, 1988), it should have major effects on the development of financial markets. 
 One important potential role for social capital concerns its ability to ameliorate 
potential inefficiencies in financial markets caused by imperfect information. Hayek 
(1945) is among the first to point out that information asymmetries are an inescapable 
feature of human society. Financial markets are hindered because economic agents who 
could benefit from transactions bear high information search and transaction costs.  
Social networks of pairwise interactions can help economic agents reduce search costs 
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(Kranton, 1996). Social capital shapes the flow and quality of information between 
financiers and financees and through this channel affects financial market development.  
 Social capital fosters building a reputation for honest dealing in transactions by 
imposing punishment on the diversion behaviors through aggravating costs of reputation 
loss (Kandori, 1992; McMillan and Woodruff, 2000). In addition, socially connected 
parties can choose to engage in exchanges that are not clearly governed by legal contracts 
since social structure itself generates social collateral that forces transaction parties to fair 
dealing. Much of the interest in social capital stems from the view that the absence of 
strong legal investor protection mechanisms represents one of the major impediments to 
financial development. Social capital provides alternative means for preventing 
expropriation and enforcing contracts. Consequently, it should have implications for 
financial market development. If laws and courts are insufficient to ensure the respect of 
financial contracts then capital markets must rely on social capital. 
 Social capital favors altruism and raises concerns for the common good within social 
network. Identification with a group or network alters preferences and the choices of 
connected individuals. Economic experiments suggest that agents exhibit more altruism 
and play more cooperatively if they have been induced to identify with a group 
(Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001). Social networks influence connected agents to adopt 
more altruistic preferences thereby increasing trust and yielding more efficient 
contracting outcomes. Through this channel, social capital can affect financial market 
development. Since socially connected individuals have interdependent utility functions, 
they care more about each other. These altered preferences can, in turn, raises efficiency, 
improve coordination and have implications for financial markets. 
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2.2. Hypothesis Development  
 In this section we develop a testable hypothesis regarding the causal role social 
capital plays in financial market development. There are three arguments that justify a 
positive relation between social capital and financial development. 
 First, because social capital stimulates trust (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Dasgupta , 1988; 
Bowles and Gintis, 2002), it should have a positive effect on financial market 
development. The role of trust in capital market development is widely examined in the 
literature. La Porta et al (1997a) argue that public and private institutions, including 
financial markets, are less effective in countries exhibiting low levels of trust. Knack and 
Keefer (1997) show that trust has a significant impact on aggregate economic activity. 
The level of trust can impact the economic development of a country by lowering 
transaction costs, which in turn can promote financial market development. La Porta et al 
(1997b) document a strong correlation between the trust prevailing in a country and the 
presence of large organizations. Guiso et al (2008) argue that participation in stock 
markets requires not only assessment of the risk-return tradeoff, but also an act of faith – 
trust. They posit that the lack of trust reduces the demand for equity. Companies find it 
more difficult to float their stocks in low-trust environment. The authors find that trust 
has a positive effect on stock market participation and this effect is present even after 
controlling for legal protection. So differences in trust appear to be a new additional 
explanatory factor for cross-country differences in financial development. In addition, 
socially connected individuals exhibit more altruistic preferences. Several studies (e.g., 
Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Schmidt, 2003, Sobel, 2002) show that social preferences such 
as altruism, fairness, or reciprocity are a major source of trust. Therefore social capital 
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can impact trust and consequently financial market development through the preference 
modification channel as well.  
 Second, social capital through information-sharing channel reduces information 
asymmetry between the firm (financee) and its investors (financiers). It facilitates transfer 
of information and reduces costly search for information (e.g., Barr, 2000; Granovetter, 
1975, 1995; Montgomery, 1991; Rauch and Casella, 2001; Shiller and Pound, 1989). 
High transparency and strict disclosure requirements promote capital market 
development by reducing information asymmetry between financiers and financees. In 
this environment, it is easier for investors to value companies and therefore they are more 
willing to invest. Pagano (1993) argues that the existence of transparency increases 
investor confidence and has a large impact on the development of financial markets. 
Japelli and Pagano (1999) survey credit bureaus around the world and find that the 
breadth of credit markets is directly related to the characteristics of the information-
sharing mechanisms that reduce information asymmetry between financiers and 
financees. Mayer and Sussman (2001) highlight that stricter regulations on information 
disclosure and accounting standards affect financial development. In addition, several 
authors (Benston, 1973; Fischel and Grossman, 1984; Miller, 1991) show that private 
stock exchanges reduce information asymmetry by mandating optimal disclosure and 
monitoring compliance of listed firms. This encourages securities market development. 
La Porta et al (2006) further document strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure 
benefit stock market development. 
 Third, effective enforcement of contracts is essential for financial market 
development. Because social capital provides mechanisms of contract enforcement 
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(Fafchamps, 1996; Platteau, 1994) it should positively affect financial development. 
Government institutions, such as regulators and courts, help to ensure contract 
enforcement and to secure property rights. Extralegal relationship grounded in social 
capital, can be viewed as a private enforcement mechanism of contracts (Fafchamps, 
1996; Platteau, 1994). As La Porta et al (2006) shows, legal regulations facilitating 
private enforcement improve financial development. A number of studies (e.g., Coffee, 
2007; Roe and Siegel, 2009; Jackson and Roe, 2009; Daines and Jones, 2012) argue that 
active law enforcement in the corporate and securities area promote stock market 
development. La Porta et al (1997, 1998) show that legal traditions influence the degree 
of protection of creditors and shareholders, and the efficiency of contract enforcement, 
thus affecting financial systems. Pistor et al (2000) highlight that not only the quality of 
the legal system, but also the effectiveness of contract enforcement are crucial for 
financial development. Barth et al (2003) find that the private monitoring of contract 
compliance is positively correlated with the size of the banking sector. Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) show that the strength of legal contracting institutions promotes stock 
market development. These findings lead to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The social capital is positively associated with national financial development. 
3. Empirical Model   
 Our empirical method is aimed at the maximum use of both time series and cross-
country dimensions of the available data. We follow Balgati et al (2009) and specify the 
following main empirical model: 
                                                                       
                                                                                                                          (1) 
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where is FD is an indicator of financial development, Sc is social capital, INS is a 
measure of quality of institutions, FO is financial openness indicator, TO is trade 
openness and LnGDPPC is real per capita gross domestic product. Subscripts i and t 
denote country and year, respectively. This empirical method uses annual panel data and 
is distinct from the standard approach used in empirical growth literature that averages 
data over several years horizon to capture the steady state relationship. As argued by 
Balgati et al (2009), averaging out data removes useful time-series variations that could 
increase estimation efficiency. Major variable of interest is a measure of social capital. 
Our hypothesis predicts that      .  
 Motived by prior research, we augment our empirical model with several control 
variables. Institutional theories of financial development (e.g., La Porta et al, 1997; 1998; 
Acemoglu, 2001) posit that the strength of institutions, such as financial regulation and 
the rule of law are important determinants of financial development. La Porta et al (1997, 
1998) propose law and finance hypothesis arguing that English common law systems 
offer better investor protection than French civil-law systems, and are, therefore, more 
conducive to the development of capital markets. In a similar vein, Acemoglu et al (2001) 
develop initial endowment hypothesis and show that institutional quality varies across 
countries because of varying initial endowments. European colonizers were much more 
willing to invest in the development of institutions that could enhance long-run growth in 
countries or regions where the mortality rate was low; in places with high mortality rates 
they were much more likely to set up extractive institutions. Motivated by these 
institutional theories, we include measures of institutional quality as control variables.  
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 The simultaneous openness theory put forward by Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
postulates that interest groups, specifically industrial and financial incumbents, frequently 
stand to lose from financial development, because it erodes their rents due to competition. 
They argue that incumbents’ opposition will be weaker when an economy is open to both 
trade and capital flows. Hence the simultaneous opening of both the trade and capital 
accounts is critical to successful financial development. Consequently, we include both 
trade and financial openness measures as additional conditioning variables. 
 We also control for per capita GDP and year and country fixed effects based on the 
theory that the stage of economic development, captured by per capita income, and time-
invariant country specific factors, such as geography, climate, natural resources, culture, 
and unvarying political economy factors, are important determinants of financial 
development (Levine, 2003, 2005; Jaffee and Levonian, 2001, Stulz and Williamson, 
2003).  
4. Data, Measurement of Variables and Sources 
4.1. Sample Selection and Sources 
 We use data obtained from a variety of databases to estimate equation (1) empirically.  
We obtain data regarding social network from the BoardEx database of Management 
Diagnostic Limited. BoardEx provides social network data for senior executives and 
directors for a set of global public and private firms since 1999
41
. This establishes the 
starting point for empirical analysis as 1999. From these profiles, we collect information 
on current employment, past employment, education background, and affiliation to 
professional associations, not-for-profit associations, and clubs. Annual data on financial 
                                                          
41
 Social ties formed before 1999 are also captured since BoardEx records the covered executives and 
directors’ career, education, and activity history for as long as data are available. 
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development measures and several macroeconomic variables (particularly, GDP, gross 
national income, exports and imports) are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. Data for measuring quality of institutions are 
obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – a publication of Political 
Risk Services, the Economic Freedom of the World database of Fraser Institute and the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators database. Financial openness indices 
are from Hiro Ito’s and Philip Lane’s websites. Our final sample consists of 729 country-
year observation.
42
  
 Panel A of Table 1 contains a description of our sample. 40% of the sample is 
developing economies or newly industrialized countries. As for the geographic 
distribution, the sample is dominated by the European economies (49%).   
4.2. Measuring Social Capital 
 Empirical proxies of the social capital deployed in this study are grounded on the 
structural theories of social capital (Burt, 1992; Lin, 1999). These theories consider social 
capital as a structure, an asset embedded in a network. This meaning, sometimes referred 
as social network capital to emphasize that agents derive benefits from knowing others 
with whom they form networks, makes social capital empirically measureable and 
explicitly grounded on network theory. 
 We follow seminal social capital research (e.g., Burt, 1983; Freeman, 1979) and use 
degree centrality measure of social networks to measure social capital empirically.   We 
                                                          
42
 Countries include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, China, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia ,Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya ,South 
Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal Qatar, Romania ,Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden ,Switzerland, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Zambia. 
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define as “financiers” investment firms, classified by BoardEx as “investment 
companies”, “private equity” or “specialty and other finance”. These firms are supplies of 
capital. We label as “financee” publicly traded corporations that demand capital and 
exclude from this sample all financial and insurance firms since managers of these firms 
are more likely to have career overlap with financiers.  Next we count the number of 
social connections between executives/directors of financee firms and 
executives/directors of financier firms within an economy. The simple average of this 
count for each country, each year, is our primary measure of social capital. 
  As is arranged by BoadEx , two individuals are connected via employment if their 
careers overlap at the same employer in the past or at present. Individuals are connected 
via education if they attend the same university at the same time and obtain the same 
degree. Two individuals are connected via other social activities if they both serve in the 
same professional association, non-profit associations, or leisure clubs. Consequently, we 
separately estimate social capital resident in educational, employment and other social 
networks. In addition, we estimate the aggregate measure of managerial social network 
that includes all known sources of connections. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents deceptive statistics of our social capital measures. On 
average, executives and directors of financee firms have 5 ties with their counterparts in 
financier firms via education, 33 - via employment and 0.38 via other social connections. 
Overall average of managerial social ties with financiers that include all types of social 
connections is 45.  
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4.3. Estimation of the Financial Development  
 Motivated by prior research we consider two groups of financial development 
measures: equity market development and financial intermediary development. We use 
three variables from the World Bank’s WDI database to measure equity market 
development - market capitalization over the GDP, total value of shares traded over the 
GDP, and total value of shares traded over market capitalization. Since there is little 
consensus on which measure is superior and each of these indicators have its own 
strength and weaknesses we follow prior research (e.g., Love, 2003; Khurana et al, 2006; 
Balgati et al, 2009) and estimate an average of these three standardized indicators as a 
measure of stock market development. In similar vein, we use an average of three 
standardized indices – domestic credit to private sector as a percent of GDP, the ratio of 
liquid liabilities to the GDP, and domestic credit provided by banking sector – as a 
measure of financial intermediary development.  Panel B of Table 1 depicts descriptive 
statistics of the financial development measures.  Average value of financial intermediary 
indicator has slightly greater dispersion with greater median than equity market 
development measure (interquartile range 1.13 vs 1.01).    
4.4. Control Variables  
 Prior literature (e.g., La Porta et al, 1997; 1998; Acemoglu, 2001; Andrianova et al, 
2008) has established that quality of regulatory and legal institutions as well as openness 
of trade and capital accounts are important determinants of financial development. 
Consequently, we augment our empirical model with these controls variables.  
 We follow Knack and Keefer (1995) and Balgati et al (2009) and include the 
measure of quality of institutions  (INS) estimated as the chain-linked index of corruption, 
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rule of law, bureaucratic quality, government repudiation of contracts, and risk of 
expropriation measures from ICRG – a publication of Political Risk Services. The 
institutions indicator (INS) is obtained by summing the above five indicators. In 
robustness tests section we include two additional measures of quality of institutions: 1)  
A summary index of legal system and property rights (INSECFR) from the Economic 
Freedom of the World that includes measures of judicial independence, protection of 
property rights, impartial courts, integrity of the legal system, legal enforcement of 
contracts, and business costs of crime, and 2) A summary index of three indicators – rule 
of law, control of corruption, and regulatory quality from Worldwide Governance 
Indicators database.   
 We deploy trade openness (TradeGDP) indicator estimated by the ratio of total trade 
(the sum of exports and imports) to GDP as a control variable. In robustness tests section 
we follow Balgati et al (2009) and use alternative measure of trade openness 
(DutiesImport) estimated by the ratio of import duties to total imports.  
 We also include two measures of capital account openness: 1) “De facto” measure of 
financial openness (FinOpenDF) by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) defined as a volume 
of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities as a percent of GDP and 2) “De jure” measure 
of financial openness (FinOpenDJ) by Chinn and Ito (2006) constructed from four 
dummy variables that codify restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported 
in the International Monetary Fund’s  Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions.  
 In addition, in all model specifications we control for per capita GDP and year and 
country fixed effects. Following La Porta et al (1997), in robustness test we also include 
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GDP growth rate and gross national income because larger and faster growing economies 
may have more developed financial markets.   Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistic of major control variables
43
. Quality of institutions and trade and capital 
openness measures show considerable variation between countries. On average, our 
sample countries are moderately large with gross national income of  218 billion and 
moderate annual growth rate of 2%.   
5. Empirical Results  
We first analyze the relationship between the social capital and the financial 
development in univariate setting. We sort countries into tertiles by our social capital 
measures and estimate the mean (median) values of the financial development indicators 
for each tertile. In Column (1) of Table 2 countries are classified according to their 
ranking in ConFin - country average of firm-level degree centrality measure of social 
connections between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms by the 
total number of connection. Panel A reports mean (median) values of equity market 
development index for the bottom 30%, middle 40% and top 30% of the social capital 
tertiles. Panel B reports the same estimates for the financial intermediary development 
indicator. Results reveal that the financial development measures monotonically increase 
with ConFin tetriles. So, higher social capital measures are associated with more 
developed financial markets.  
Qualitatively similar results are obtained if each of the three other social capital 
measures is used. Social capital resident in managerial social networks via other social 
activities produces the highest difference between the top and the bottom tertile, with 
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 Note that in the robustness tests number of countries declines based on the availability of the control 
variables.  
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mean difference of 0.84 and median 0.93. The differences are statistically significant 
at1% level. These results provide strong preliminary evidence of a positive association 
between the social capital and the financial development. Table 2 points to the 
importance of social capital and indicates the need for more systematic testing in 
multivariate regression framework. 
Next we examine the relationship between social capital and the financial 
development in multivariate panel regression setting. We estimate equation (1) 
empirically by regressing our financial development measures on the social capital 
proxies and other determinants of the financial development. Table 3 depicts the 
estimates for equity market development regressions and Table 4 – for financial 
intermediary development regressions. In Column (1) social capital is measured by the 
country-average of the total number of social connections between executives of financee 
firms and managers of financier firms (ConFin). In Columns (2)-(4) social capital is 
measured as by ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther – country averages of 
degree centrality measures of social connections between executives of public firms and 
managers of financier firms by their current and past overlap in education, employment 
and other activities, respectively
44
. In all regressions we control for the quality of 
institutions (INSCRG), estimated as the chain-linked index of corruption, rule of law, 
bureaucratic quality, government repudiation of contracts, and risk of expropriation 
measures from ICRG – a publication of Political Risk Services, financial openness 
(FinOpenDF) – a “de facto” measure of financial openness by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2006) defined as a volume of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities as a percent of 
GDP, and trade openness (TradeGDP) –  total trade (the sum of exports and imports) as a 
                                                          
44
 Note that for the financial intermediary regressions “financiers” include banks.  
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share of GDP. In addition we include country and year fixed effects. Going straight to the 
hypotheses of interest, we predict a positive coefficient estimate of the social capital 
variables (    ). 
The results show that all four measures of social capital enter with positive and 
statistically significant coefficient estimates in our regressions.  Social ties via social 
activities and education have stronger effect on the cost of equity than social networks via 
employment. These results confirm findings of prior studies that casual, non-professional 
ties are the most efficient form of social capital.  Coefficient estimates of the control 
variables are broadly consistent with theory and prior empirical evidence. Overall, results 
in this section present strong evidence of positive causal relationship between social 
capital and financial development. Social capital seems to encourage stock market 
development as well as development of financial intermediary.  
6. Robustness Tests and Endogeneity Concerns  
In the previous section we have established that social capital plays an important role 
in financial market development. In this section we test robustness of our results by using 
a number of alternative model specifications and variables, and alternative estimation 
strategies and methods.  
6.1. Alternative model specification  
The first set of robustness checks involves using a different model specification and 
variable measurement. We estimate the following regression:      
                                                                    
                                                                                                       (2)               
This specification closely follows La Porta et al (1997) seminal study. We deploy 
two alternative measures of the quality of institutions - a summary index of legal system 
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and property rights from the Economic Freedom of the World that includes measures of 
judicial independence, protection of property rights, impartial courts, integrity of the legal 
system, legal enforcement of contracts, and business costs of crime, and a summary index 
of three indicators - rule of law, control of corruption, and regulatory quality from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators. In addition, we use alternative measures of financial 
and trade openness - “de jure” measure of financial openness by Chinn and Ito (2006), 
and import duties as a ratio of total imports, respectively. In all regressions we control for 
per capita GDP growth rate and natural logarithm of gross national income because larger 
and faster growing economies may have more developed financial markets.    
Table 5 depicts the results of the equity market development regressions estimated 
by equation (2) and Table 6 – for the financial intermediary development regressions. As 
before, social capital is measured as ConFin,ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and 
ConFinOther – country averages of size/degree centrality measures of social connections 
between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms by the total number 
of social connection, by their current and past overlap in education, employment and 
other activities, respectively. In Columns (1)-(4) quality of institutions is measured by the 
summary index of the legal system and property rights from the Economic Freedom of 
the World (INSECFR). In Columns (5)-(8) we employ another measure of the 
institutional development - the summary index of rule of law, control of corruption, and 
regulatory quality from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Results in Tables 5 and 6 
are qualitatively very similar to those obtained before and provide strong supportive 
evidence of our main findings. Again we document that social ties via education and 
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other social activities have a stronger effect on financial development than social 
networks occurring from employment.    
6.2. Dynamic Panel GMM Estimation   
Financial development variables display considerable persistence over time (Balgati 
et al, 2009). Therefore we consider the possibility that annual measures of the financial 
development may not represent long-run equilibrium value in any given year. We modify 
our major equations and include a lagged dependent variable as a regressor to allow for 
the possibility of partial adjustment of the financial development to changes in other 
explanatory variables. Our modified empirical models are as follows:       
                                                                 
                                                                                                 (3) 
                                                                  
                                                                                      (4)                                          
The generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure provides an effective 
method for estimating relationships such as equations (3) and (4) characterized by 
autocorrelation resulting from the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the 
regressors (Wooldridge, 2010). For panels with a limited number of years and a 
substantial number of observations, as is the case with our sample, preferred estimator is 
GMM in first differences suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). Additional advantage 
of this estimator is that by differencing it ensures that all the regressors are stationary. 
Using Arrelano and Bond GMM procedure we estimate two diagnostics to test first and 
second order serial correlations in error terms. We expect to reject the null hypotheses of 
the absence of first order serial correlation and not reject the absence of the second order 
serial correlation. In dynamic panel GMM estimation, number of moment conditions 
increases with t. Even though too many moment conditions increase efficiency, they 
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could introduce a bias. As suggested by prior research (e.g., Balgati 2005), only subset of 
these moment conditions should be used to exploit the tradeoff between reduction in bias 
and increase in inefficiency. To test validity of instruments we perform another 
diagnostics - Sargan test for over-identified restrictions.  
Table 7 reports results of GMM estimation of equations (3) and (4). In Columns 
(1)-(3) dependent variable is equity market development index and in Columns (4)-(6) – 
financial intermediary development indicator. Social Capital is estimated as country 
averages of degree centrality measures of social connections between executives of 
public firms and managers of financier firms (ConFin). Control variables, as before, 
include measures of quality of institutions, financial openness and trade openness, per 
capita GDP (Columns (1)-(4)), a natural logarithm of GNI and GDP growth (Columns 
(2)-(3) and (5)-(6)).    
We note that all the diagnostics produce satisfactory results. Specifically, tests of 
serial correlation in error terms shows that the null hypothesis of the absence of first 
order serial correlation is rejected and the absence of the second order serial correlation – 
is not.  Additionally, Sargan test does not reject the over-identified restrictions in all 
specifications. We also find that lagged dependent variable is positive highly significant 
in all cases. Consequently, we conclude that GMM is an appropriate estimator for testing 
our hypothesis of interest. Results presented in Table 7 show that GMM estimation 
produces qualitatively unchanged results on the effects of social capital on the financial 
development and provide strong support of our main findings.  
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6.3. Endogeneity Concerns  
The relationship between social capital and the financial development could be 
spurious due to endogeneity. We argue that endogeneity concerns arising from reverse 
causality do not apply for this study because it would require some feedback effects 
moving from the financial development to social capital. But this is not sensible in the 
context of the research design used because formation of social connections predates the 
measurement of the financial development for years and sometimes for dozens of years 
(especially for educational connections). 
Endogeneity issues arising from omitted variables could be a problem. However we 
conduct a series of tests to alleviate any concern that our results might be driven by 
omitted variables. First, motivated by prior research we include a number of control 
variables. Particularly we control for the quality of institutions, trade and financial 
openness. Results are robust to the addition of these and other controls. We also include 
year and country fixed effects to control for all time-invariant country specific factors, 
such as steady political economy variables, culture, geography and others. In addition, we 
deploy two-stage Arrelano and Bond GMM estimation method to eliminate any 
endogeneity that may be caused by the correlation of country specific effects and the 
explanatory variables.     
7. Conclusion 
Financial markets greatly facilitate economic development by attracting foreign 
investment, boosting domestic saving, and improving the pricing and availability of 
capital. A growing number of studies document that financial development positively 
affects real economic activity and growth (e.g., Levin, 1997; Rajand and Zingales, 1998; 
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Goodhart, 2004; Bekaert et al, 2005). As a result, what determines financial development 
becomes an important question.  
In this paper, we argue that social capital, defined as the aggregate benefits derived 
from social obligations and informal contacts formed through social networks, easies 
potential obstacles to financial development through trusts, preference modification, 
information-sharing, and contract enforcement channels.    
In developing the economics of social capital, some researchers focus exclusively 
on trust (Dasgupta, 1988). Social capital harnesses the participation of financiers 
otherwise unavailable for development purposes. Economic agents in high-trust societies 
need to divert fewer resources to protect themselves from unlawful violations of their 
property rights. Consequently, more resources can be deployed in financial exchange. In 
addition, socially connected agents demonstrate more altruistic preferences. Social 
preferences such as altruism, fairness, or reciprocity are a major source of trust. 
Subsequently, social capital can exert an influence on financial markets through the 
preference modification channel as well. Much information in financial markets is subtle, 
nuanced and difficult to verify. Social capital can encourage financial development by 
lowering information asymmetry between the firm and its investors. As a result, it is 
easier for financiers to value companies and therefore they are more willing to invest. 
The quality of contract enforcement is important determinant of financial market 
development. Social capital fosters building a reputation for honest dealing since it 
elevates the costs of reputation loss. Therefore socially connected parties more easily 
engage in financial transactions. 
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Using a large panel of 65 countries for the period 1999-2012, we document that social 
capital positively affects financial market development, after controlling for the quality of 
intuitions, financial and trade openness, size and growth rate of an economy, and other 
time-invariant country and year fixed effects. We also find that social ties via education 
and social activities have a stronger effect on financial development then social ties via 
employment. These results are robust to the alternative measures of main variables as 
well as dynamic panel GMM estimation method.   
Regarding policy implications, our result suggested that World Bank’s and other 
developing agencies efforts to increase the social capital in developing economies could 
encourage the development of both capital markets and financial intermediaries. 
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A of this table reports sample distribution across geographic location and development status. Country 
development status is according to International Monetary Fund classification. Panel B reports summary statistics of 
the main dependent and independent variables. FDSTK is a measure of stock market development and equals an 
average of three standardized indices - market capitalization over the gross domestic product (GDP), total value of 
shares traded over the GDP, and total value of shares traded over market capitalization. FDFIN is measure of financial 
intermediary development and equals an average of three standardized indices – domestic credit to private sector as a 
percent of GDP, the ratio of liquid liabilities to the GDP, and domestic credit provided by banking sector. ConFin, 
ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther denote country averages of size/degree centrality measure of social 
connections between executives of public firms and managers of financier firms by total number of connection, by their 
current and past overlap in education, employment and other activities, respectively. INSCRG is the chain-linked index 
of corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, government repudiation of contracts, and risk of expropriation measures 
from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – a publication of Political Risk Services. INSECFR is a summary 
index of legal system and property rights from the Economic Freedom of the World and includes measures of judicial 
independence, protection of property rights, impartial courts, integrity of the legal system, legal enforcement of 
contracts, and business costs of crime. INSGOV is a summary index of three indicators – rule of law, control of 
corruption, and regulatory quality – from Worldwide Governance Indicators. FinOpenDJ is “de jure” measure of 
financial openness by Chinn and Ito (2006). FinOpenDF is a “de facto” measure of financial openness by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2006) defined as a volume of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities as a percent of GDP. TradeGDP 
is total trade, estimated as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services, as a share of GDP. DutiesImport is 
import duties as a ratio of total imports. GDPGrowth is average annual percent growth of per capita GDP. LnGNI  is 
the natural logarithm of the gross national income. LnGDPPC is the natural logarithm of per capital GDP.  
Panel A: Sample Distribution    
Region No. Obs Percent 
Africa 53 7.27% 
Asia 143 19.62% 
Australia/New Zealand 25 3.43% 
Central America 26 3.57% 
Europe 357 48.97% 
Middle East 42 5.76% 
North America 26 3.57% 
South America 57 7.82% 
Total 729 1 
   
Developement No. Obs Percent 
 Developed 435 59.67% 
 Developing 203 27.85% 
 NIC 91 12.48% 
 
729 1 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Quartile 1 Quartile3 
FDSTK 729 0.0587 -0.1456 0.8407 -0.5620 0.4472 
FDFIN 696 0.0639 -0.0058 0.7723 -0.5548 0.5706 
ConFin 729 45.3867 31.0000 43.1914 11.3333 65.0000 
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ConFinEduc 729 4.4865 3.4063 4.4221 1.3333 6.3007 
ConFinEmpl 729 33.9865 21.6049 36.0505 5.8750 50.0000 
ConFinOther 729 0.3824 0.0221 0.9942 0.0000 0.3176 
INSCRG 729 36.2141 36.4236 7.3675 30.1389 43.1250 
INSECFR 712 6.9606 7.0350 1.6917 5.6900 8.6150 
INSGOV 729 0.7718 0.8510 0.9302 -0.0754 1.6962 
FinOpenDF 729 7.1835 2.0478 26.5884 1.2600 4.0627 
FinOpenDJ 716 1.3320 2.4390 1.3813 0.0644 2.4390 
TradeGDP 729 95.9454 73.9708 71.7420 56.6323 108.9331 
DutiesImport  468 0.0200 0.0114 0.0248 0.0010 0.0325 
GDPGrowth 722 2.4017 2.4782 3.6743 0.7621 4.2270 
LnGNI 728 26.1124 26.1240 1.6364 25.2142 27.1524 
LnGDPPC 729 9.3744 9.7681 1.3075 8.5306 10.4369 
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Table 2: Univariate tests – Social Capital and Financial Development 
This table presents univariate analysis of social capital and financial development. In Columns (1)-(4) countries are 
classified according to their ranking in ConFin, ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther - country averages of 
size/degree centrality measure of social connections between executives of public firms and managers of financier 
firms by total number of connection, by their current and past overlap in education, employment and other activities, 
respectively. For each Column, table shows mean (median) values of financial development measures for the bottom 
30%, middle 40% and top 30% of social capital tertiles. In Panel A financial development is estimated as FDSTK - the 
measure of stock market development that equals an average of three standardized indices - market capitalization over 
the gross domestic product (GDP), total value of shares traded over the GDP, and total value of shares traded over 
market capitalization. In Panel B financial development is estimated as FDFIN - the measure of financial intermediary 
development that equals an average of three standardized indices – domestic credit to private sector as a percent of 
GDP, the ratio of liquid liabilities to the GDP, and domestic credit provided by banking sector. P-values are reported in 
parentheses.       
Panel A: Social Capital and Equity Market Development  
Social Capital Tertiles N (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bottom 30% 219 
-0.2202 -0.3470 -0.2470 -0.3562 
(-0.3803) (-0.4306) (-0.3841) (-0.4887) 
Mid 60% 291 
-0.0157 0.1041 0.0343 0.3505 
(-0.0403) (0.0407) (-0.0033) (0.1664) 
Top 30% 219 
0.3936 0.3595 0.3646 0.4818 
(0.3882) (0.3436) (0.3173) (0.4380) 
      
Diff in Means (Top-Bottom) 
 
0.6138 0.7065 0.6116 0.8379 
P-value (Top-Bottom) 
 
 [<.0001]  [<.0001]  [<.0001]  [<.0001] 
Diff in Medians 0.7686 0.7742 0.7014 0.9268 
P-value (Top-Bottom)  [<.0001] [<.0001]  [<.0001]  [<.0001] 
      
Panel B: Social Capital and Financial Intermediary Development  
Social Capital Tertiles N (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bottom 30% 209 
-0.2202 -0.3989 -0.2470 -0.3562 
(-0.3803) (-0.4794) (-0.3841) (-0.4887) 
Mid 60% 278 
(-0.0157 0.1078 0.0343 0.3505 
(-0.0403) (0.0621) (-0.0033) (0.1664) 
Top 30% 209 
(0.3936 0.3231 0.3646 0.4818 
(0.3882) (0.2384) (0.3173) (0.4380) 
      
Diff in Means (Top-Bottom) 
 
0.6138 0.7219 0.6116 0.8379 
P-value (Top-Bottom) 
 
 [<.0001  [<.0001]  [<.0001]  [<.0001] 
Diff in Medians 
 
0.7178 0.7014 0.9268 
P-value (Top-Bottom) 
 
 [<.0001]  [<.0001]  [<.0001] 
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Table 3: Multivariate Analysis - Social Capital and Equity Market Development  
This table report results of the following regression:                                              
                                              where FDSTK is a measure of stock market 
development and equals an average of three standardized indices - market capitalization over the gross domestic 
product (GDP), total value of shares traded over the GDP, and total value of shares traded over market capitalization. 
Social Capital (Sc) is estimated in Columns (1)-(4) as ConFin,ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther – country 
averages of size/degree centrality measures of social connections between executives of public firms and managers of 
financier firms by the total number of social connection, by their current and past overlap in education, employment 
and other activities, respectively. Control variables include: quality of intuitions (INS) estimated as INSCRG – the 
chain-linked index of corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, government repudiation of contracts, and risk of 
expropriation measures from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – a publication of Political Risk Services, 
financial openness (FO) estimated as  FinOpenDF – a “de facto” measure of financial openness by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006) defined as a volume of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities as a percent of GDP, trade openness 
(TO) estimated as TradeGDP –  total trade (the sum of exports and imports) as a share of GDP, and LnGDPPC - the 
natural logarithm of per capital GDP. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -3.1694 -2.8956 -3.2371 -3.1938 
 
[<.0001] [0.2221] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin 0.0021 
   
 
[0.0042] 
   
ConFinEduc 
 
0.0292 
  
  
[<.0001] 
  
ConFinEmpl 
  
0.0016 
 
   
[0.0687] 
 
ConFinOther 
   
0.0781 
    
[0.002] 
INS 0.0153 0.0142 0.0160 0.0148 
 
[0.0398] [<.0001] [0.0319] [0.0463] 
FO 0.0005 0.0002 0.0008 0.0009 
 
[0.8699] [<.0001] [0.7691] [0.7468] 
TO 0.0046 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
LnGDPPC 0.1982 0.1729 0.2096 0.2070 
 
[0.0003] [<.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
     
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Obs 729 729 729 729 
AdjR2 0.8238 0.8249 0.8224 0.8241 
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Table 4: Multivariate Analysis - Social Capital and Financial Intermediary Development  
This table report results of the following regression:                                              
                                              where FDFIN is measure of financial intermediary 
development and equals an average of three standardized indices – domestic credit to private sector as a percent of 
GDP, the ratio of liquid liabilities to the GDP, and domestic credit provided by banking sector. Social Capital (Sc) is 
estimated in Columns (1)-(4) as ConFin,ConFinEduc, ConFinEmpl and ConFinOther – country averages of 
size/degree centrality measures of social connections between executives of public firms and managers of financier 
firms by the total number of social connection, by their current and past overlap in education, employment and other 
activities, respectively. Control variables include: quality of intuitions (INS) estimated as INSCRG – the chain-linked 
index of corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, government repudiation of contracts, and risk of expropriation 
measures from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – a publication of Political Risk Services, financial openness 
(FO) estimated as  FinOpenDF – a “de facto” measure of financial openness by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) 
defined as a volume of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities as a percent of GDP, trade openness (TO) estimated as 
TradeGDP –  total trade (the sum of exports and imports) as a share of GDP, and LnGDPPC - the natural logarithm of 
per capital GDP. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -4.3090 -2.8066 -4.5886 -4.1707 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
ConFin 0.0018 
   
 
[<.0001] 
   
ConFinEduc 
 
0.0388 
  
  
[<.0001] 
  
ConFinEmpl 
  
0.0019 
 
   
[<.0001] 
 
ConFinOther 
   
0.0755 
    
[<.0001] 
INS 0.0156 0.0048 0.0174 0.0090 
 
[0.0102] [0.4032] [0.0047] [0.1326] 
FO 0.0100 0.0084 0.0100 0.0096 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
TO 0.0007 0.0012 0.0010 0.0010 
 
[0.397] [0.1365] [0.2625] [0.2517] 
LnGDPPC 0.3660 0.2054 0.3978 0.3642 
 
[<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] [<.0001] 
     
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Obs 696 696 696 696 
AdjR2 0.8941 0.9085 0.8918 0.9003 
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